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Abstract
The prevalence of poverty in advanced economies represents a chal-
lenge, both to economic theory and to society. We know that poverty
is perpetuated by low levels of educational investment amongst disad-
vantaged children, but we have no credible theoretical explanation for
the observed degree of that apparent underinvestment, and we have not
yet developed sufficient policy tools to break the intergenerational cycle
of deprivation. In response, this thesis undertakes theoretical and em-
pirical analyses of the pathways that perpetuate poverty. I demonstrate
that divergently low educational investment could arise as an equilib-
rium response to a grades-focussed educational system; I develop the
existing state-of-the-art technique in econometric estimation of the edu-
cational production function; and I apply that technique to find strong
empirical support for my theoretical model. In addition my results show
that the average child’s propensity to think analytically has a substan-
tial influence over their developmental pathway, which suggests that
models of educational investment should adopt a generalisation of Ex-
pected Utility Theory that allows agents to maximise one of two possible
objective functions.
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Chapter 1: An Holistic Introduction
“The ultimate goal of economic science is to improve
the living conditions of people in their everyday lives.”
Economics, Samuelson & Nordhaus (2009, p.7)
The living conditions of people in their everyday lives are not all in equal
need of improvement. Moreover, it is well known that people who are deprived
in one aspect their everyday life tend to face deprivation across a cluster of life
outcomes. As such, impoverished individuals are often characterised by the co-
incidence of poor outcomes in education, employment, earnings, mental health,
physical health, criminality, and family life (Hills, Le Grand & Piachaud 2002). In
this thesis I pursue the goal of Samuelson and Nordhaus (see epigraph) by develop-
ing our understanding of the pathways that lead individuals into multi-dimensional
poverty.
A large quantity of research has sought to address this question. Within eco-
nomics, the majority of this research is empirical, and the typical approach is to use
a large- or small-scale policy initiative to identify a causal effect on specific dimen-
sions of socio-economic disadvantage. Such studies can illuminate the pathways
that perpetuate poverty from parents to their children, because they can establish
the extent to which exogenous changes in measurable characteristics affect those
pathways. This approach provides an insight into what conditions might lead to
poverty, but it says little about how those conditions might lead to poverty, and
it cannot propose new avenues for policy intervention.
A complementary strand of empirical research seeks to estimate the techno-
logy by which socio-economic outcomes are produced. This literature builds upon
the founding contributions of Cunha & Heckman (2008) and Cunha, Heckman &
Schennach (2010), which investigate the simultaneous development of cognitive
and noncognitive skills. From this literature we learn that early intervention in
cognitive skill formation is vital, because a child’s ongoing cognitive development
pathway has largely been determined by the time they reach compulsory schooling
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age. This approach could be applied to test the effect of any measurable factor
on the development of any socio-economic outcome, but hitherto its use has typic-
ally been limited to estimating the technologies of cognitive and noncognitive skill
formation as functions of parental investment and skill levels.1
In order to investigate how various inputs could affect the production of socio-
economic outcomes we therefore turn to economic theory. If we can model the
mechanism by which an outcome is produced, then we can predict which factors
are likely to affect its production, and we can suggest new avenues through which
pubic policy might influence that production. Existing economic theory typic-
ally considers each dimension of poverty in isolation, and so there is a diverse
literature of specific theories that are built to explain specific phenomena. For
example, Akerlof & Kranton (2002) propose that a payoff to ‘fitting in’ could ex-
plain high school drop out, whilst Pissarides (1990, 2000) propose that individuals
with greater wealth should place a higher relative value on leisure and so remain
in unemployment for longer. I survey the existing theoretical explanations for
very low educational investment in Chapter 2, and I find that we do not yet have
an adequate explanation for the observed extent of this empirical phenomenon.
Moreover, because existing theories target one specific socio-economic outcome,
they rarely generalise to provide an holistic insight across multiple dimensions of
poverty, and they do not explain why those multiple dimensions of poverty are
highly correlated within individuals.
The first contribution of this thesis is therefore to propose and analyse a single
economic model that is readily applicable to multiple dimensions of poverty. To
achieve this we need to reconsider the mechanism by which outcomes such as
education, employment, wage progression, health, criminality, and interpersonal
relationships are produced. Traditional microeconomic models describe the pro-
duction of these outcomes as a high-level decision over how much costly effort
and/or financial investment to supply. I propose that new insight might be gained
by disaggregating those high-level decisions into a series of elemental particip-
ation decisions such as: whether to attempt the current classwork, whether to
respond to the current job advert, whether to search for new promotion oppor-
tunities this evening, whether to exercise this morning, whether to hang out with
the street gang tonight, and whether to wash the dishes today. Each of these
elemental decisions can be represented by a simple expected utility model, with
participation payoffs that include long-term benefits, immediate costs, and the pos-
sibility of improving one’s skill-level for similar tasks in the future. An improved
skill-level might reduce future participation costs, or increase the likelihood that
1Schooling inputs have also been studied, and so has the role of childhood physical health in
developing countries – see the literature review in Chapter 3.
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participation would produce a positive feeling of success, but in either case the
implications of dynamic skill development are likely to be increasing returns to
participation, multiple (weak) equilibria, and therefore potentially inefficient out-
comes (as explored by Arthur 1989). In the context of educational participation
decisions, I show in Chapter 2 that these inefficient outcomes could include di-
vergently low educational investment amongst disadvantaged children. In work
published elsewhere, I sketch applications to other empirical anomalies including
chronic unemployment and the crowding-out effect (Embrey 2019e).
The model presented in Chapter 2 applies this theoretical paradigm to educa-
tional investment decisions. It is particularly important to understand the mechan-
isms that lead to very low levels of educational investment amongst disadvantaged
children, because this apparent underinvestment is an important first step on the
pathway to multi-dimensional poverty in adulthood (Heckman 2006). I show in
Chapter 2 that the model outlined above generates an Education Trap, under
which children with more than a critical threshold level of initial disadvantage
should optimally invest very little into their education thereafter. In addition, the
model proposed in Chapter 2 operationalises a tangible mechanism of educational
production, and so its parameters represent concrete aspects of educational op-
portunities. I am therefore able to derive practical policy recommendations from
the model, each of which should reduce the proportion of children who select a
low-investment pathway at equilibrium.
The fact that the model presented in Chapter 2 describes tangible educational
opportunities also enables direct econometric testing of its validity. A stringent
series of tests would require that heterogeneity in each of the model’s proposed
decision payoffs should have a statistically significant effect on the production of
cognitive skills. In order to carry out those statistical tests, I devote the first part
of Chapter 3 to a survey of the existing econometric approaches toward estimating
the technologies of cognitive and noncognitive skill production. I conclude that
the seminal contribution of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) still represents
the state-of-the-art in that field, but I also identify several shortcomings in both
the approach and the implementation of that work.
The second contribution of this thesis is therefore to build upon the pion-
eering work of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) to advance the frontier in
estimating the technologies of simultaneous skill production. My contribution here
includes: replacing the misleading anchoring technique with an explicit normalisa-
tion of the production function, reformulating the dynamic measurement system
to remove over-identifying restrictions, nesting the production function to identify
dynamic complementarity in investment, and correcting several other more minor
coding errors. The first of these developments required substantial research into
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the properties of CES production functions; that research is now separately under
review as Embrey (2019c), which may be found as a departmental working paper
at https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/131589/1/LancasterWP2019_004.pdf.
With the econometric developments of Chapter 3 in hand, I am able to test
the theoretical predictions of the model presented in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the
first part of Chapter 4 formally determines the implications of individual hetero-
geneity in each of the model’s parameters, and discusses the interpretation of each
parameter as an aspect of an individual’s noncognitive skill. The second part of
Chapter 4 operationalises those noncognitive skills using data from the UK Millen-
nium Cohort Study, to find that measurable heterogeneity in each of the model’s
four parameters has statistically significant positive effects on ongoing cognitive
skill formation. What is more, I find that the effects of an individual’s drive to
succeed and their idiosyncratic cost of exerting effort are both substantially lar-
ger than the effects of the benchmark proxy for noncognitive skills suggested by
Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010). These results corroborate the model de-
veloped in Chapter 2, and they suggest specific aspects of noncognitive skill that
could fruitfully be targeted in interventions that aim to support ongoing cognitive
skill formation.
In addition to testing the model that was developed in Chapter 2, I also extend
that model in Chapter 4 by using the generalised decision theory proposed in Em-
brey (2019a). Under that generalisation of Expected Utility Theory, an agent will
either analyse each decision problem as per Homo Economicus, or they will act as
if they were maximising only their immediately salient payoffs. The generalised
decision theory therefore relaxes the assumption that a single functional form for
utility can adequately describe the behaviour of all individuals on all occasions,
by instead allowing each individual on each occasion to act so as to maximise one
of two possible objective functions. The probability with which an individual will
act according to the analytic preferences of Homo Economicus is denoted by ρ,
and we refer to this parameter as the individual’s idiosyncratic propensity to think
analytically. As such, the statistical significance of the operationalised parameter
ρ provides an econometric test of the relevance of the generalised decision theory
to the present context, and in Chapter 4 I find that this parameter is a highly sig-
nificant determinant of an individual’s cognitive development pathway. My results
show that, once a child reaches compulsory schooling age, the input share of their
propensity to think analytically is larger than any other candidate noncognitive
skill, and it accounts for 14% of their period-on-period cognitive development.
The final contribution of this thesis is therefore to provide initial evidence that
an individual’s propensity to think analytically could have a pervasive influence
over their socio-economic outcomes. We demonstrate that this is the case for
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educational development, but we have already noted that the model presented in
Chapter 2 is readily transferable to describe the incremental decisions that de-
termine many other dimensions of socio-economic (dis)advantage. This suggests
that the generalised decision theory could provide important new insights in each
of those areas. For example, many health decisions are intuitively characterised
by a conflict between impulsive preferences – such as the desire to watch a T.V.
show right now – and analytic preferences – such as the long-term health benefits
of going for a run instead. It is not clear that decision-makers necessarily act as if
they project these qualitatively distinct dimensions of utility onto an hypothetical
single-dimensional Expected Utility scale; instead they may follow the generalised
decision theory and act as if they maximise just one of these two natural dimen-
sions of utility on any given occasion. An initial investigation of this possibility
is sketched in Embrey (2019e), which applies the generalised decision theory to
provide an unified explanation for several important aspects of poverty. A thor-
ough comparison of the foundational assumptions of Expected Utility Theory and
its generalisation is provided in Embrey (2019a), and so this introduction will now
provide only a brief overview of that discussion.
The main advantage of the normative assumption that there exists a single
representative agent is that it typically affords a mathematically elegant analysis.
However that mathematical elegance should not be mistaken for parsimony. Ex-
pected Utility Theory requires three layers of assumption: firstly, the set of rel-
evant motivations is postulated; secondly, a functional form for each motivation
is prescribed; and finally, the functional form of a single-valued utility function is
also prescribed, whereby those disparate motivations are assumed to be traded-off
against each other. The generalised approach typically also requires the first two
layers of assumption, but it does not impose any homogeneous rule by which dis-
parate motivations must be traded-off. Thus, ceteris paribus, the law of parsimony
would favour the generalised theory (Ockham ca. 1323); a conclusion which would
hold a fortiori if that generalised theory were to provide an unified explanation for
multiple dimensions of poverty.
It is rare for modern decision theory to explicitly consider the validity of
the above ‘single-self’ assumption set. This is because the revealed-preference
paradigm of Samuelson (1938), and its formalisation by Savage (1954), demon-
strate that an expected-utility representation must exist whenever a number of
postulates are satisfied. The generalised theory proposed in Chapter 4 is fully
compatible with those seminal observations. Its contribution is to expand the
applicability of Expected Utility theory from situations in which the Savage pos-
tulates apply globally, to situations in which they apply conditional upon the
decision-maker’s state of mind. Thus we do not require preferences to be complete,
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transitive, and consistent-through-time, but only that these characteristics separ-
ately describe both the agent’s analytic and their impulsive thought-processes.
This substantially more tenable assumption relaxes the normative assumption in
much the same way that conditional independence relaxes an econometric inde-
pendence assumption.
This thesis now proceeds by presenting the aforementioned theoretical, econo-
metric, and empirical contributions in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Mathem-
atical derivations and ancillary estimation results are appended to each of these
chapters in sequence, whilst supplementary materials such as additional robustness
exercises are appended after the concluding chapter. That concluding chapter syn-
thesises the key findings of the thesis, and it discusses the potential implications of
these findings for our understanding of the pathways that lead to multi-dimensional
poverty.
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Existing economic theory does not adequately explain the very low edu-
cational investment of disadvantaged children in advanced economies. We
propose a new model of educational investment that endogenously separates
disadvantaged children into a divergent low-investment equilibrium, and we
observe that this education trap could transmit poverty between genera-
tions. We show that the education trap arises when a grades-focussed edu-
cational system induces children to care about their performance in each of
the incremental educational investment decisions that they face on a daily
basis, and we respond by deriving tangible policy recommendations that
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1 Introduction
Poverty is undesirable. Given the choice between an impoverished existence and
earning a comfortable living, very few people would prefer the former. It is there-
fore puzzling that a substantial minority of children in advanced economies reveal
precisely that preference by making minimal investment in their education. Dis-
advantaged children are disproportionately likely to choose very low levels of edu-
cational investment, and in making that choice they frequently become trapped
within an intergenerational cycle of poverty (Sparkes & Glennerster 2002; Conti,
Heckman & Urzua 2010; Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos 2016). However, despite
significant research interest, the question as to why disadvantaged children in ad-
vanced economies do not invest more into their education remains open.
The existing literature has investigated two related aspects of that question.
The first asks whether disadvantaged children could be investing optimally given
their constraints, and the second asks whether behavioural factors could distort
normatively optimal investment levels to the observed degree. In Section 2 we
survey the existing literature to conclude that neither normative constraints nor
behavioural adaptations have yet been shown to provide a viable explanation for
observed investment levels. For example, credit constraints rarely bind school at-
tendance in the developed world; there is little evidence that impoverished families
underestimate the benefits of schooling; and, though present-bias and behavioural
payoffs seem relevant, their magnitude cannot feasibly account for the degree of ob-
served under-investment, which Cunha & Heckman (2008) estimate as equivalent
to an unobserved cost in the order of $500,000 for U.S. College attendance. This
chapter proposes a new theory of educational investment, in which divergent edu-
cational pathways arise as an optimal response to small variations in early-years
opportunities.
Our model of a grades-focussed educational system generates a stark bifurc-
ation between high- and low-investment pathways at equilibrium. This result
provides the final link in the following outline mechanism for the intergenerational
cycle of poverty in advanced economies: i) at an early age, a child’s educational
opportunities are determined by her parents; ii) disadvantaged parents are likely
to provide less frequent educational activities;1 and iii) the education trap: our
results show that children who develop less than a critical threshold level of ability
1The literature suggests many potential reasons for this. Disadvantaged parents may have:
reduced time per child due to a higher incidence of single-parenthood and higher fertility rates;
reduced capability due to the debilitating urgency of poverty; or credit constraints that restrict
the provision of educational materials. Our model additionally suggests that disadvantaged
parents may have reduced esteem for and knowledge of the educational process, because for them
it was rarely optimal to participate in educational tasks given their own early disadvantage.
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during their early years should optimally invest very little into their education
thereafter. We refer to this result as the education trap because it implies that
a grades-focussed educational system will trap disadvantaged children into an in-
tergenerational cycle of poverty.
The education trap arises as a result of two key innovations in our model. Our
first innovation is to disaggregate the canonical one-shot investment decision of
Becker (1962, 1964) into the series of minor participation decisions that parents
and children make on a daily basis. At the earliest ages, such decisions include
whether to: talk to the child, play with the child, read with the child, and so
forth. Then, as the child develops, she begins to take decisions such as whether
to: engage in group activities, attempt classwork tasks, and study for tests. We
demonstrate that the equilibrium outcome from this series of incremental invest-
ment decisions is meaningfully different to the equilibrium outcome when the same
decisions are considered in aggregate. Intuitively, this is because the traditional
aggregate approach does not discount the series of immediate costs and benefits
which accrue to educational participation.
Our second innovation is to consider the implications of an educational system
that places a strong emphasis on its pupils’ grades. Recent decades have seen an
increasing emphasis on school accountability and inter-school competition in the
UK, the US, and elsewhere (Figlio & Rouse 2006; West & Peterson 2006; Bradley
Forthcoming), however I know of no existing theoretical analysis of the implica-
tions that such grades-focussed education could have on childrens’ incentives to
study. We model grades-focussed education by assuming that children are taught
to care about their performance in each incremental educational opportunity. In
our model, children receive a positive payoff for success, and a negative payoff for
failure, where these states are determined by a draw from their current cognitive
ability level. This models a situation where children evaluate their success based
upon any of: informal comparison against peers, formal assessment against grade
criteria, or frequent enumeration of their working-at-grade.2 This contrasts with a
learning-focussed model in which success would be based upon whether new skills
have been learned in the present period. The essence of a grades-focussed edu-
cational system is therefore that it rewards cumulative ability levels rather than
valuing learning per se.
Our results suggest that both of these innovations are necessary for the exist-
ence of the education trap. That is, for a wide range of parameter values there is
a unique high-investment equilibrium whenever agents either: perceive success as
2One consequence of the grades-focussed educational system in is that it has become common
practice to gradate tasks in schools, at least in the UK: for example as a ‘grade B question’, or
a ‘level 3c skill’.
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the development of their current ability level through educational participation,
or perceive education as a single period with T +1 possible participation levels
(rather than T periods of binary participation decisions). In contrast, we show
that the unique equilibrium of our model of a disaggregated and grades-focussed
educational system separates agents based upon their early-years ability develop-
ment. Specifically, an arbitrarily small change in early development could, at the
margin, precipitate a polar reversal in equilibrium investment thereafter. These
findings provide the first viable explanation for educational investment levels that
fall drastically below their canonically optimal level.
Our contribution builds upon several insights that are already established
within the literature. Cunha & Heckman (2007) synthesise the empirical literature
to identify six key stylised facts of educational development, and five of these em-
pirical facts are explicable as consequences of divergent developmental pathways.
Those authors go on to demonstrate that smoothly divergent pathways can emerge
from a model that partitions childhood into more than one developmental period,
provided that investments are assumed to be self-productive. We develop their
insights by: i) showing that divergent educational investment can arise as a child’s
rational response to early disadvantage, rather than solely through parental invest-
ment decisions; ii) showing that this divergence can be discontinuous, rather than
smoothly deviating around the optimal outcome; iii) deriving self-productivity,
rather than requiring it as a primitive assumption; and iv) proposing a mechanism
for the process of educational investment, rather than treating it as a black box.
The main policy recommendation of existing work is that intervention will be
most effective in a child’s early years. However, studies that treat educational
production as a black box can offer no insight as to the form that such interven-
tion should take. Because we model a mechanism of educational production, we
provide a tangible interpretation for the otherwise abstract concept of educational
investment. Our model implies that an effective intervention must support disad-
vantaged children and families to take-up educational opportunities, and that this
will require them to both recognise those opportunities and to believe that they
can be successful in those opportunities. However, these conditions would be suffi-
cient only to ensure a contemporaneous increase in cognitive ability. For a lasting
effect on future educational investment, the intervention would need to be main-
tained until its recipient reaches the threshold ability level for the high-investment
pathway, otherwise low educational investment would remain their equilibrium re-
sponse. Our results therefore additionally provide a detailed explanation of why
interventions are most effective during a child’s early years: the low-investment
equilibrium diverges further from the threshold ability level as time progresses,
such that eventually even sustained participation could no longer propel a disad-
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vantaged child onto the high-investment pathway.
In addition to providing tangible recommendations for individual-level inter-
vention, our model of the mechanism of educational production allows us to identify
the systemic factors which generate divergent investment pathways as equilibria.
We are therefore able to recommend specific and tangible interventions with the
educational system, through which full participation could become the dominant
strategy for all children of all ages. The educational system determines the set
of parameters that describe each incremental educational opportunity that our
agents encounter. In our framework, those parameters comprise: a future payoff
to human-capital accumulation, a present cost of participation, a positive payoff
from perceived success, and a negative payoff from perceived failure. Although
those parameters are exogenous to the child, they represent concrete aspects of
an educational opportunity, and so they can be manipulated by policy-makers,
by educators, and by parents. For example, if effort and individual learning were
valued over attainment then the psychic payoff to success could accrue instead
to participation, and if the positive aspects of failure were emphasised3 then its
negative payoff could accrue instead to non-participation. Together, these changes
would move our grades-focussed model towards a learning-focussed model, under
which high-investment would be the equilibrium response for at least the vast ma-
jority of children. Although the concept of intervening with the system rather
than the child represents a paradigm shift for some policy-makers, our results sug-
gest that such intervention could meaningfully reduce the persistence of poverty
in advanced societies.
Whilst the aforementioned policy implications are novel in both their scope
and their specificity, one of the most important implications of our model is moral
in nature. At any cross-section, a child’s observable ability is endogenously co-
determined by her innate ability endowment and by her sequence of educational
participation to date. Because current ability influences future participation, those
inputs not only interact inseparably within our educational production technology,
but ex-post it would be impossible to disentangle their relative contributions due to
an initial-conditions problem. However, children can influence neither their genetic
endowment nor their early-years educational participation. Thus, since we have
shown that apparent under-investment in adolescence could be an equilibrium
response to early disadvantage, we must conclude that the victims of poverty
may not be wholly responsible for their ostensibly poor educational investment
decisions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing educational
3Failure is positive in that it generates an opportunity for personal development, and also in
that it demonstrates that the individual is pushing herself to take on challenging tasks.
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investment literature, and finds that the observed extent of under-investment is
not yet adequately explained. Section 3 then presents our model, whereafter Sub-
section 4.1 characterises its analytic solutions, and Subsection 4.2 illustrates those
solutions numerically for a robust set of functional form assumptions. Section 5
analyses the origins of educational divergence within our model and then discusses
the implications of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Existing Literature
Educational investment decisions determine many individual outcomes. A large
body of evidence suggests that the financial returns to education appreciably sur-
pass market rates of return (Cahuc, Zylberberg & Carcillo 2014), that those returns
may themselves be surpassed by the non-pecuniary benefits of education (Oreo-
poulos & Salvanes 2011), and that the social returns to education are probably of
comparable magnitude to those personal benefits (McMahon 2004). It is therefore
an important objective for economic theory to be able to explain the observation
that a substantial minority of individuals drop out of education considerably before
it would be optimal for them to do so (Oreopoulos 2007).
Most economic theories of educational investment are built upon the canonical
investment model of Becker (1962, 1964). That model yields the elegant and
intuitive result that individuals should optimally invest until the marginal cost of
further education exceeds its marginal product. This implies that the apparent
under-investment of many disadvantaged children could be an optimal response,
if they either: possess a particularly low educational productivity, or experience
a particularly high participation cost. We assess the evidence for each of these
hypotheses in turn.
The first hypothesis lacks empirical support. It was shown as early as Griliches
(1977) that the returns to education for observationally less able children are at
least as great as those for their more able peers, and that conclusion is now sup-
ported by a large body of IV literature in which the LATE for individuals affected
by exogenous increases in compulsory schooling often exceeds OLS estimates of
the average returns to schooling (Harmon, Oosterbeek & Walker 2000). Thus it
is not the case that those children who invest the least in their education do so
because of lower productivity.
The second hypothesis has now also been refuted empirically. For an economic-
ally rational agent, educational participation costs arise due to credit constraints,
however Carneiro & Heckman (2002) determine that such constraints are of minor
importance in the developed world, and Jensen (2010) found that they affect only
the poorest families in the developing world. These results suggest that the ap-
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parent educational under-investment of many disadvantaged individuals in the
developed world does indeed represent a normatively suboptimal choice.4 The
challenge is therefore to understand the mechanism behind that choice.
Several economic theories attempt to explain suboptimal educational particip-
ation. One possible explanation is that disadvantaged children might under-invest
because they underestimate their true returns to education. There is evidence
that this may be an important factor in the Dominican Republic (Jensen 2010),
but those authors believe that such ignorance is unlikely to be significant in the
developed world, and Rouse (2004) finds firm evidence in support of that be-
lief. Nevertheless Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos (2016) survey a large number of
nudge-based interventions to find that some succeed in increasing participation
by expounding the benefits of post-compulsory eduction, which suggests that in-
complete knowledge regarding the returns to education may contribute toward
explaining under-investment.
Perhaps the most promising avenue toward explaining educational under-
investment is the acknowledgement of behavioural aspects of decision-making.
Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos (2016) eloquently articulate the intuition that
present-bias could lead to educational under-investment, and studies such as
Shoda, Mischel & Peake (1990) have provided convincing experimental corrobora-
tion of that hypothesis. Nevertheless, Oreopoulos (2007) estimates the parameters
of a standard investment model which incorporates present-bias to find that an
implausibly large degree of bias would be necessary to completely explain observed
under-investment.
A complementary approach could be to incorporate additional behavioural mo-
tivations into the model. For example, Wang & Yang (2003) and Köszegi (2006)
include a payoff to self-worth within their agents’ objective function, which induces
a psychic cost of failure within educational participation decisions and therefore
reduces participation. Analogously, Akerlof & Kranton (2002) include a payoff
to social identity, and thereby suggest that poorly endowed agents might choose
to reduce their educational effort in order to fit in with the ‘burnouts’. These ap-
proaches each provide useful insights, but once again they seem unlikely to explain
the magnitude of observed under-investment, which Cunha & Heckman (2008) es-
timate to be equivalent to an unobserved cost in the order of $500,000 for U.S.
college attendance.
The model presented in Section 3 does predict severe under-investment in edu-
cation by a subset of individuals. The separating equilibrium of our model is sus-
4If this conclusion is correct then one implication is that many early-leavers of education
should be expected to later regret that decision. Bridgeland, Dilulio & Morison (2006) corrobor-
ate that implication, by establishing that 74% of U.S. high school drop-outs later regret dropping
out.
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tained by the existence of small psychic payoffs to percieved success and failure,
which become consequential when the canonical one-shot educational investment
decision is disaggregated into incremental participation decisions. This is because,
although the life-cycle returns to educational investment are overwhelming in ag-
gregate, the returns to participation in each incremental educational opportunity
are less overwhelming, and when those returns are discounted to the perspective
of a young child, that child’s psychic payoffs can become instrumental. In par-
ticular, those payoffs drive a self-productivity in cognitive ability that leads to
path-dependence and divergent outcomes at equilibrium.
Despite the fact that educational investment is inherently incremental, there is
surprisingly little economic theory that examines more than a handful of periods
of investment decisions. Sjögren & Sällström (2004) and Filippin & Paccagnella
(2012) both analyse the many-period case, but neither model incorporates dynamic
skill-development. Those papers focus instead on the implications of over- or
under-optimism regarding an agent’s fixed ability endowment, to reveal that over-
optimism leads to greater participation. Some of the most important insights in
this area are therefore applications of more general results. For example, Thaler &
Shefrin (1981) analyse the conflict between an agent’s ex-ante preferences and his
extemporary desires, and O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) analyse the implications of
present-bias, both for sophisticated agents who anticipate it, and for naïve agents
who only experience it. Those papers derive important stylised facts of inter-
temporal decision-making as the result of inconsistent choice criteria across time.
By contrast, we show that divergent educational investment decisions can arise for
economically consistent agents. Moreover, our qualitative implications are robust
to the alternative assumptions of myopia (ex Thaler & Shefrin 1981) and naïvety
(ex O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999).
3 The Model
Agents face a series of T educational participation decisions. Their (potentially
mixed) strategy space is therefore given by S := {s1, s2, ..., sT}, where st is their
chosen probability of participating in the period t opportunity.
Each individual decision is presented as an extensive form participation game
in Figure 2.1. The decision utility payoffs that affect educational participation
within a grades-focussed educational system are:
dt the present value of the human capital developed by participation in the task,
ct the direct and opportunity cost of effortful task participation,
pst the psychic payoff to perceived success, and
pft the psychic cost of perceived failure,
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where the subscript t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} denotes period-specific, or equivalently, task-
specific variation. We shall refer to the first two items as the material components
of the payoff function, and the final two items as its psychic components. Since
these payoffs are formally defined up to affine transformation, we may normalise
the payoff of task avoidance to be 0, without loss of generality. It is then uncon-
tentious to further assume that pst , p
f
t > 0 ∀t – that is: success is pleasant, and
failure is unpleasant, ceteris paribus (see, for example: Bénabou & Tirole 2002;
Wang & Yang 2003). Although we initially analyse the implications of the model
for one representative agent, it will already be evident that individual outcomes
must be substantially determined by individual heterogeneity in decision utilities.
The implications of such individual heterogeneity are discussed in Section 5.




dt + pst − ct dt − pft − ct 0
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the agent’s probability of achieving perceived
success at time t is denoted by pit. pit is considered to be a draw from Πt, the
distribution of the agent’s probability of success across all possible tasks at time
t. Πt therefore captures the agent’s relative cognitive ability in time t. As such,
Πt may be affected by a spectrum of individual and familial characteristics, but it
will also be developed through the agents’ educational participation in all periods
τ <t. In particular, if the agent engages with the present period opportunity then
she will develop her cognitive ability such that in the next period her probability
of achieving perceived success will increase in expectation, whereas if she avoids
that task then her ability level will decrease relative to that of her peers and
relative to expected standards. We capture these effects by assuming that Πt+1
will stochastically dominate Πt if the agent engaged with task t, and that Πt+1
will be stochastically dominated by Πt if the agent avoided task t. In this chapter
we make the additional simplifying assumption that Πt(n) is uniquely determined
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by the period, t, and the number of educational tasks completed to date, n.5 This
assumption yields the intuitive and useful lemma that E (Πt(n) |n) is a strictly
increasing function of past engagement n, and a strictly decreasing function of
t, because past avoidance is given by t−n−1. A formal proof of this and all
subsequent propositions is provided in the mathematical appendix.
An agent’s probability of success distribution Πt(n) therefore parametrises her
stock of relative cognitive ability at age t, and so its evolution through time maps
out the development of her human-capital. The developmental value dt of parti-
cipating in task t is therefore partly derived from its positive effect on the future
likelihood of success Πt+1, and partly from its contribution towards the final dis-
counted value in period T+1 of having achieved educational attainment level n.
This life-cycle payoff, which we denote by V (n), will represent the sum of: ex-
pected future remuneration, expected non-pecuniary benefits of education, and
the opportunity value of whichever further and higher educational opportunities
are accessible to an agent of educational level n. Without loss of generality, we
normalise V (0) := 0, recognising that in absolute terms V (0) will be affected by
factors such as social security policy. dt(n) is therefore necessarily a function of
both the period t, and the current educational level n. We will impose the stand-
ard concavity assumptions that life-cycle returns to human-capital are positive
but diminishing, that is V ′(n)> 0 and V ′′(n)< 0, where V ′(n):=V (n+1)−V (n)
denotes the first difference of V at n, and V ′′(n) := V ′(n+1)−V ′(n) denotes the
second difference of V at n. Symmetric concavity conditions are assumed for the
expected probability of success, that is: E (Πt(n) |n)′′< 0 and E (Πt(n) |n)••> 0,
where E (Πt(n) |n)• is the first difference of E (Πt(n) |n) with respect to t at n.
The remaining payoffs are the direct and opportunity cost of effortful task
participation ct, and the psychic payoffs to perceived success or failure pst and
pft . These payoffs will be determined by an individual’s circumstances and by her
psychological traits. In principle, each of these payoffs could therefore also evolve
over time, however we will simplify our analysis by treating them as time-invariant
characteristics. This approach allows us to isolate the novel implications of our
model of grades-focussed educational production, and also to identify cleanly the
effects of heterogeneity in those characteristics.
Our model of educational production consists of the supergame formed by
T iterations of the stage game described above. To analyse the implications of
that supergame we will derive its Bayesian Nash Equilibria, which O’Donoghue &
Rabin (1999) refer to as ‘perception-perfect’ equilibria. This solution concept is
5This amounts to an assumption that educational tasks are perfect substitutes, which greatly
improves tractability but costs little in generality, since its relaxation would only enhance the
path-dependence of our model. In reality this assumption will be true to the extent that teachers
and parents are able to differentiate educational tasks to match the current needs of each child.
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strong, since it allows agents to choose their entire strategy S without restriction.
It is therefore unsurprising that, with probability 1, there is a unique equilibrium
for any given set of parameters, information structures, and commitment con-
straints (see Proposition 1). A weaker solution concept which requires only that
each period’s strategy st should be a best response, holding all other participation
decisions s−t constant, would generally produce two distinct weak equilibria, rep-
resenting high- and low-participation pathways respectively. Proposition 3 exposes
the fact that an arbitrarily fine change in initial conditions could determine which
of these two divergent pathways will be the unique (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium
outcome.
In our benchmark analysis we maintain standard rationality assumptions. In
particular: our agents discount future payoffs exponentially; they possess both
perfect and complete information about the full supergame (including their cur-
rent ability distribution Πt); and they possess no additional information as to the
realised state of nature pit. Given our context of educational decision-making,
this assumption set could be considered restrictive. Several possible relaxations
are therefore considered by the supplementary materials, where we find that out-
comes are qualitatively unaffected by: present bias, under which agents use quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (ex Laibson 1997); naïevity, under which agents fail to
account for future psychic payoffs (ex O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999); or myopia, un-
der which agents fail to consider any future-period decisions (ex Thaler & Shefrin
1981).6 It is also reasonable to question whether agents may, in fact, have some
prior information regarding the realisation pit. One might contend, for example,
that a child will learn something of the content of each educational task prior to
choosing whether to attempt it. Accordingly, Section 2 analyses the case where
agents receive a private signal as to their realised probability of success pit, and
thereby confirms that the effect of this adjustment is to introduce a stochastic
tremor around the benchmark participation decision.
4 Analyses
In this section we analyse the consequences of a grades-focussed educational sys-
tem. Subsection 1 presents our analytic results, which begin by establishing that
participation in each period will be optimal if and almost only if the agent’s ex-
6These alternative assumption sets are studied in greater detail by Embrey (2019b), where it
is shown that their quantitative effects on the threshold level of cognitive ability that separates
low- and high- participation equilibria will be important at the margin. That work also uncovers
some interesting interaction effects, not least that increasing an agent’s forward-planning ability
will only increase her participation if she also possesses sophisticated knowledge of her future
psychic payoffs.
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pected probability of success exceeds some determinate critical value. This result
yields three important corollaries: first, that equilibria will be unique, second,
that equilibria will be in pure strategies, and third, that cognitive ability will
be self-productive. We then show that this self-productivity leads to a profound
path-dependence whereby equilibrium pathways separate dramatically and discon-
tinuously around a well-defined threshold ability level (Proposition 3). Finally, we
characterise the separating equilibrium of our model by showing: i) that there ex-
ists a sufficient criterion for full participation in all remaining periods, and ii) that
if participation is delayed at all then it will be delayed to the maximum possible
extent.
Subsection 2 illustrates our results numerically. This approach is useful for
visualising our agents’ best responses for each possible situation, and it is essential
for exploring the stochastic element of our agents’ educational development when
they have private information.
1 Analytic Results
Our aim is to characterise the full equilibrium solution to our participation su-
pergame. Accordingly, we are interested in the set of strategic best responses
S∗ := {{ s∗t (n) }t−1n=0 }Tt=1 for each feasible prior participation level n in each period
t. Agents can derive their equilibrium strategy S∗ through reverse induction, under
the assumption that they will continue to act as fully rational and fully informed
economic agents in future periods. We therefore proceed by establishing a re-
cursive formulation for the expected utility payoff of any participation strategy
st(n) ∈ [0, 1] for all feasible period×prior-participation pairs (t, n).
In period T +1 the agent’s utility is given by V (n), the discounted present
value of the human capital accumulated through participation in n educational
opportunities:
UT+1(n) = V (n). (2.1)
In periods t = 1, ..., T , we can therefore derive the expected utility of strategy
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where δ is the agent’s discount rate. From Equation (2.2) we can see that the
present value of the human capital developed by participating in the period t task
is given by dt(n) = δEUt+1(n+1) − δEUt+1(n). Given (2.2) we can define U∗t (n)
as the maximum value of the agent’s expected utility function for period t given
prior educational level n:







which is well defined by the extreme value theorem.7 In each period t the agent’s
best response s∗t (n) is therefore given by the value(s) of st(n) at which U∗t (n) is











δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)− c−pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
. (2.4)
The full equilibrium strategy S∗ of our participation supergame can be derived
by the iterative use of Equations (2.2)-(2.4), from period T back through to period
1. We begin to characterise the properties of this equilibrium in Proposition 1,
which first confirms that it is indeed unique:
Proposition 1 In the finitely repeated game with T periods, and with any non-
degenerate probability-of-success distribution:
1. For any period t and prior attainment level n the best response s∗t (n) is unique
with probability 1;
2. Any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy S∗ ∈ {0, 1}T (T−1)/2 with probability
1;
3. In any period t, s∗t (n) = 1 if the agent’s expected probability of success exceeds
the determinate critical value
pi∗t (n) :=




ps + pf ,
and s∗t (n) = 0 if E(pit |n) < pi∗t (n).
The first two parts of Proposition 1 state that, with probability 1, the equi-
librium response to any situation is a well-defined pure strategy. These results
7To see this consider EUt(n) as a function of St: it is continuous on the closed and bounded
domain of [0, 1](T−t+1)(T+t−2)/2, and therefore attains its maximum provided that EUt+1(n) is
well-defined. However, we know that EUT+1(n) ≡ V (n) is well-defined, and so by (2.2) and the
principle of induction we have that EUt(n) and hence U∗t (n) are well-defined for all t.
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follow as corollaries of the third part, provided that the agent’s probability-of-
success distribution is continuous, because EUt(n) is a monotonic function of st
(see Equation 2.2) The third part of Proposition 1 derives a well-defined threshold
level of ability, above which participation becomes optimal, and below which task
avoidance is optimal. The intuition behind this result is clear: our agent will only
exert costly effort if she is sufficiently confident that she will achieve a positive
benefit from doing so.
The insight developed in Proposition 1 is intuitive, but it is also important.
It suggests that, at the extensive margin, agents with higher current ability levels
are more likely to participate in future educational opportunities. Thus, since
the agent’s stock of cognitive ability is itself developed through educational par-
ticipation, we have established a mechanism by which cognitive ability will be
self-productive. Moreover, since the probability that any given participation res-
ults in perceived success is itself determined by the agent’s current ability level,
our production technology for cognitive ability will also exhibit increasing returns
to scale at the intensive margin. Proposition 2 formalises these results:
Proposition 2
1. Cognitive ability is self-productive:
n > m⇒ E(pit+1 |n) ≥ E(pit+1 |m) for all t,
with strict inequality for all but at most one period t provided the marginal
utility of present-period participation (as derived in Equation 2.4) satisfies
the double crossing property in (st; t).8
2. Human-capital development exhibits increasing returns to scale:
n > m⇒ U∗t (n) > U∗t (m) for all t.
The first result demonstrates that our model of the mechanism of educational
production endogenously generates self-productivity in cognitive ability: that is
higher levels of ability this period beget higher levels of ability next period. Al-
though this is arguably the most fundamental stylised fact of educational produc-
tion, it has hitherto lacked any theoretical basis. The second result of Proposition
2 is similar in spirit: it demonstrates that higher levels of ability generate higher
levels of expected utility. Thus our technology of education production exhibits
increasing returns (in the sense of Arthur 1989), which are known to produce: mul-
tiple weak equilibria, path-dependence, and inefficient outcomes. In the context
8The double crossing property is defined in Appendix A. It excludes pathological cases where
V ′(n+ T − t) and E(pit |n) ‘wiggle’ across each other multiple times within the domain of t.
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of educational production, these results provide a theoretical foundation for the
importance of early intervention.
We explore the consequences of self-productivity and increasing returns to abil-
ity further in Proposition 3. Here we demonstrate that an arbitrarily fine differ-
ence in initial conditions could lead to a polar reversal in equilibrium educational
investment. Although this property is chaotic in the mathematical sense, it is
nevertheless intuitively accessible: I should invest fully if my chances of achiev-
ing success are sufficiently high, else I should avoid all costly participation. This
result is always true when the life-cycle benefit from human-capital accumulation
appears negligible, that is when V ′(n) ≈ 0, and so it provides a useful insight to
the decision-making of younger children for whom the end of compulsory schooling
could seem imponderably distant.
Proposition 3 In the absence of life-cycle returns to education, i.e. with
V ′(n) ≡ 0 :
The equilibrium strategy in any period t will be full participation for all periods
≥ t if current ability exceeds some determinate threshold, and zero participation
for all periods ≥ t if current ability is below that threshold.
The insight of Proposition 3 remains relevant when V ′(n) > 0. This is because
any child who embarks upon the high-participation pathway in their early years
will remain on that pathway in equilibrium, whilst the period T+1 consequences
of (non-)participation will only affect the low-participation equilibrium towards
the end of compulsory schooling. To see this, consider the effect of exponentially
discounting of a payoff V (n) over many years of schooling: even a reasonable annual
discount factor of 0.5 would attenuate more than 99.9% from the original value
over 10 years.9 The stark bifurcation that exists between equilibrium pathways
for the limiting case of V ′(n) = 0 is therefore likely to provide a good description
of equilibrium behaviour for at least the initial stages of childhood development.
Proposition 4 formalises this intuition by establishing that participation will be
maximally postponed under any equilibrium of the full model.
Proposition 4
1. Full-participation equilibria could exist:
E(pit |n)(ps + pf )− (c+ pf ) > 0 ⇒ s∗τ = 1 for all periods τ ≥ t.
2. A characterisation of Low-participation equilibria:
If ever s∗t (n) = 0, then participation will be postponed so far as possible,
9For discussions of empirically determined discount rates see Frederick, Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue (2002) and Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter (2010).
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that is:
s∗k(n) = 1 for any k > t ⇒ s∗τ (n+ τ − k) = 1 for all periods τ ≥ k.
Proposition 4.1 provides a sufficient criterion for full-participation. There are,
however, two reasons why this criterion might not be necessary. The first of these
is the recently-discussed fact that participation will be made more attractive by
the existence of life-cycle payoffs V (n). Although the magnitude of this effect will
depend upon the specific functional-form and parameter value assumptions that
an agent uses to calculate her expected utility, Section 2 confirms the intuition
developed above that it is likely to be qualitatively insignificant except during
the final years of compulsory schooling. In those final years, the consequences
of (non-)participation become more immediate for our agent, and so she will be-
come increasingly likely to invest in her remaining educational opportunities. The
second part of Proposition 4 confirms that the low-participation equilibria that
arise from these effects are indeed characterised by a block of consistent task
avoidance followed by a block of consistent participation.
The second reason that condition 4.1 might not be necessary is that agents are
forward-looking. Thus, if criterion 4.1 does not yet hold, but if it could nevertheless
become true given a small amount of costly educational participation, then it
might be beneficial for an agent to pay that short-term cost in order to realise
a long-term gain. As above, the magnitude of this effect will be determined by
the agent’s discount rate, but our simulations suggest that it will be qualitatively
small. This observation illuminates the important distinction between our model
of sequential educational opportunities and the canonical one-shot educational
investment decision. When T binary participation decisions are aggregated into a
single period with T+1 possible investment levels, the immediate costs and payoffs
of each investment level occur at the same time point. Thus a much larger ‘short-
term cost’ could be sustained because its ‘long-term’ benefit will be realised at the
same time as that cost, rather than discounted over many future periods. Section
1 shows that this distinction has substantial qualitative importance for a robust
set of parameter values.
This subsection has analysed the implications of our model of grades-focussed
educational production. We have established that its equilibria separate into diver-
gent high- and low-participation pathways, where the former is attained by agents
who possess at least a critical threshold level of cognitive ability. Because that prior
ability level is itself developed through the early-years educational investment de-
cisions that are made by a child’s parents, those parental decisions determine the
child’s final educational attainment level at equilibrium. Thus our grades-focussed
educational system traps disadvantaged children into a low-investment pathway.
We can contrast these results for a grades-focussed educational system with
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those that would arise under an alternative learning-focussed model. Under that
alternative model, any learning that develops a child’s current ability level would
be recognised as a success, and any avoidance of an educational opportunity would
be considered a failure to learn. To see the benefits of such a model, consider the
recursive utility formulation that they generate:
EU˜t(n) = st
[
δEU˜t+1(n+1)−δEU˜t+1(n) + (ps + pf )− c
]
+ δEU˜t+1(n)− pf .
(2.5)
Equation (2.5) implies that a sufficient criterion for full participation in all periods
would be:
(pf + ps)− c > 0. (2.6)
Intuitively, this criterion states that participation would be guaranteed whenever
the psychic payoffs due to engaging with an educational opportunity and learning
from it exceed the cost of participation.
Criterion (2.6) is strictly weaker than that of Proposition 4.1, and it is also
independent of pit. Together, these results imply that: if full participation were
optimal for the most able child under a grades-focussed model of education, then
full-participation would be optimal for all children of all ability levels under our
idealised learning-focussed educational model. We can also see that a learning-
focussed educational system cannot sustain an eduction trap: low prior participa-
tion cannot induce low future investment, because equation (2.5) is also independ-
ent of current ability. Of course, even under this idealised model, poverty could
still be transmitted between generations through, for example, heterogeneity in
participation costs c.
2 A Quantitative Illustration of the Results
We now provide a numerical illustration of our results. Although we necessarily
sacrifice generality to do this, the supplementary materials demonstrate that the
findings presented here are remarkably robust to a comprehensive set of alternative
specifications. Table 2.1 details our preferred specification.
The specification detailed in Table 2.1 provides a tractable model of ‘reality’.
To achieve this, we assume that agents encounter T = 1, 000 educational oppor-
tunities between birth and the end of compulsory schooling, which is considerably
more computationally viable than the ‘true’ number that might be two orders
of magnitude greater. However, the supplementary materials demonstrate that
our results are qualitatively indistinguishable from those that arise with either
T =10, 000 or T =100. The supplement also demonstrates that our results are ro-
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Table 2.1: The Parametric Assumptions for the Model Solved in this Subsection
Parameter Assumption Notes
Number of periods T = 1, 000 Robust to parameter variation.
Initial ability
distribution Π1 ∼ Beta[2.5, 2.5]
As used by
Filippin & Paccagnella 2012;
Robust to truncated normal;
Robust to parameter variation.
Πt update magnitude ι = 0.05 Robust to parameter variation.
Value of
education V (n) = V (T )
[
1−( 99100)n] Robust to parameter variation;Robust to linear form.
Maximum participation
benefit V (T ) = 10, 000 Robust to parameter variation.
Psychic payoffs ps=pf = 5 Robust to parameter variation;Robust to asymmetric values.
Participation cost c = 1 Robust to parameter variation.
Discount rate δ = 0.99 Reasonable cf.
† and ‡;
Robust to parameter variation.
A detailed discussion and robustness checks are provided in Appendix 2.
† Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter (2010); ‡ Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002).
bust to comparable degrees of variation around our other parametric assumptions,
and it provides a full rationale for our preferred specification. In summary, our
preferred specification implements: exponential discounting with δ = 0.99, for an
empirically reasonable annualised discount factor of 0.53; Beta-distributed ability,
as is natural for a distribution of probabilities;10 and a maximum schooling benefit
V (T ) which is approximately ten times greater than the total material cost c×T
of full educational participation, to reflect the common empirical finding that the
net benefit of compulsory education far outweighs its cost.
We now calculate the equilibrium strategy S∗ of our model of grades-focussed
educational production. S∗ specifies the full set of best responses s∗t (n) to all
possible period×prior-participation events {(t, n) : n< t}. As stipulated by Pro-
position 1, we find that these best responses are all pure strategies, and so Figure
2.2 illustrates S∗ by shading every event (t, n) for which present-period participa-
tion is optimal.
Using Figure 2.2 we can trace out the equilibrium path of an agent who is
exogenously placed at any event (t, n). If that event is shaded, then the agent will
participate in that period, and so traverse North-East to begin the next period
with prior participation n+1. If that event is not shaded, then the agent will
10This is bell-shaped on the support of (0, 1) and updates intuitively with positive but dimin-
ishing benefits of participation, and symmetric costs of task avoidance.
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Figure 2.2: The Equilibrium Strategy
The equilibrium strategy S∗ for the specification detailed in Table 2.1. All possible
events are represented by the set of period×prior-participation pairs (t, n) such that
n<t. Events that induce equilibrium participation are shaded.
traverse due East to begin the next period with prior participation n. Thus the
unique equilibrium path from event (t, n) traverses through T−t+1 line-segments,
heading diagonally upward through any shaded regions and horizontally across any
unshaded regions. Figure 2.2 therefore illustrates the results from Propositon 4,
that participation will either be full or maximally postponed, and the result from
Proposition 3, that there is a stark bifurcation between high- and low-participation
pathways such that an arbitrarily small difference in initial conditions could lead
to a life-changing difference in educational participation.
Let us now consider these findings within the context of a child’s development.
During the child’s early years her educational participation decisions are taken
by her parents, so let us suppose for definiteness that the child makes her own
investment decisions starting from period 301. The initial event for each child
would therefore be (301, n), where the ability endowment n ∈ [0, 300] is exogen-
ous from her perspective. We can see that each child would optimally respond
with full educational participation if she were endowed with sufficient educational
opportunity during her early years, and conversely that the optimal response to
an insufficient educational endowment would be to avoid all educational oppor-
tunities until towards the end of her compulsory schooling. Thus our model of
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grades-focussed education separates otherwise identical children onto divergent
high- and low-participation equilibrium pathways, as a consequence of their early-
years educational (dis)advantage.
In reality, other forms of heterogeneity are possible. For example, agents may
differ in their psychological traits ps, pf , their participation costs c, or their innate
ability endowments Π1, but our model shows that none of these differences are
necessary to generate divergent equilibrium investment decisions. Thus we cannot
reliably infer any conclusions regarding the character or innate intelligence level of
any individual merely by observing her level of educational investment. Moreover,
if we were to measure Πt, the current ability of a child during period t, it would be
impossible to disentangle the relative contributions of her early-years opportunities
(nurture), from her innate ability (nature). Instead we conclude that, whatever the
cause of a child’s initial disadvantage, its effect is likely to be greatly exacerbated
by our model of a grades-focussed educational system.
Figure 2.2 has illustrated the consequences of our analytic results. However, we
noted in Section 3 that those analyses were predicated on the strong assumption
that agents possess no private information as to their realised probability of success
pit(n) for the present-period educational task. In reality, children are likely to gain
at least some information as to their likelihood of achieving perceived success from
the subject area of any academic task. Since the effect of this private information
is bounded below by our benchmark analysis, we now establish an upper bound
on its effect, by calculating the equilibrium strategy for agents who can perfectly
condition their period t participation upon their realised ability pit(n). To visualise
this conditional equilibrium strategy, Figure 2.3 shades each event according to the
probability that the realisation pit(n) will be sufficiently high to induce equilibrium
participation. We denote this probability by ρ.
From Figure 2.3 we can see that the effect of private information is to induce
stochastic variation around the deterministic equilibrium of the benchmark case.
Indeed, we can read-off the benchmark equilibrium from Figure 2.3 as its dichotom-
isation around the participation probability ρ = 0.5. However we can also see that
the qualitative effect of private information is quite small, in that the stochastic
variation around the benchmark equilibrium remains narrow for the majority of
the supergame. For example, in period 301 we can see that participation probabil-
ities jump from less than 0.25 to more than 0.75 as a result of a very small change
in early-years development. This suggests that, even when private information is
complete, its effect will be minimal except close to the margin between high- and
low-participation.
To confirm this conclusion numerically, consider the case of an agent who be-
gins making her own decisions from the event (301, 157). Under the benchmark
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Figure 2.3: The Equilibrium Strategy with Private Information
The equilibrium strategy S∗ for the specification detailed in Table 2.1, when participation
may be conditioned upon the realisation pit(n). Events are shaded according to the
probability ρt(n) that the agent’s realised ability pit(n) would be large enough to induce
equilibrium participation.
model, this agent would marginally surpass the threshold for full participation, but
with private information the probability that she will participate in period 301 is
ρ301(157) = 0.501. Nevertheless, the consequences of that participation decision
are profound. If the agent does participate in period 301, then she will participate
in the next period with probability ρ302(158) = 0.617, whereas, if she does not
participate in period 301, she will participate in the next period with probabil-
ity ρ302(157) = 0.381. Thus, at the margin between high- and low-participation
pathways, an agent who misses a small number of educational opportunities could
swiftly diverge from the high-participation equilibrium. By contrast, a short dis-
tance away from that boundary the agent’s position would be reasonably secure
in that the effect of missing any given educational opportunity would be minimal,
for example ρ302(168)− ρ302(167) = 0.005.
The implications of these numerical findings are illustrated by Figure 2.4, which
simulates counterfactual human-capital development processes for 9 identical
agents who each depart from the initial event (301, 157). For each period t≥301,
Figure 2.4 plots the realised cognitive ability draws pit of each agent as grey dots,
and it indicates the local participation density of each agent by a shaded bar
across the top of her graph. We can therefore see that the relative ability of agents
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2,4,5,8,&9 is progressively developed through their frequent educational particip-
ation, whilst the relative ability of agents 1,3,6,&7 is eroded by their increasingly
sporadic participation in educational opportunities. We conclude from these find-
ings that a grades-focussed educational system is likely to generate divergence in
educational outcomes regardless of the degree of private information that children
possess.
Figure 2.4: Simulated Ability Development for 9 Identical Agents
Simulated relative ability development for 9 representative agents, all of whom are en-
dowed with n = 157 in period t = 301. Variation occurs because each agent receives
a private signal as to her realised probability of success in each period. The bar above
each panel is shaded to indicate the local participation density.
Figure 2.4 also provides an insight into the source of the divergence between
our simulated agents. To see this, first note that each realised ability draw pit(n)
will induce participation if and (almost) only if it is above the critical ability
level pi∗t (n) that was identified in Proposition 1. Figure 2.4 plots that critical
ability threshold as a line, and thereby demonstrates that it generally evolves
smoothly over time. In particular, the combined effect of diminishing returns
to education and time-consistent discounting is to gradually increase the critical
threshold for agents who participate frequently, whilst for agents who participate
rarely we can see that these effects generate certain participation as the period
T+1 consequences of non-participation loom large towards the end of compulsory
schooling. But we can also see a marked jump in the critical ability level for all
agents in the periods immediately following t=301. This is because those periods
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are the only time that any agent remains in the neighbourhood of the high-low
participation boundary, and in this region the critical threshold is highly sensitive
to participation decisions. Thus it is the implications that these marginal agents’
first few participation decisions have for their future payoffs that cause them to
diverge towards either high- or low-participation pathways.
We have therefore established that private information induces stochastic vari-
ation around the benchmark equilibrium outcome, but that both high- and low-
participation pathways are strongly attractive. Thus the boundary region wherein
an agent’s educational development could be qualitatively affected by chance will
be relatively narrow, and so a child’s early-years development is likely to remain
the key determinant of her later developmental pathway. The results presented in
Figure 2.4 for agents on that boundary could nevertheless have important implica-
tions for pedagogy and for intervention design. They suggest that any educational
programme, whether provided by a parent, an educator, or an intervention, is
likely to successfully engage a child in learning if and only if she perceives that she
is successful during its initial stages.
5 Discussion
1 The Origins of Educational Divergence
Our main discussion in Subsection 2 will focus on the implications of our results
for policy and for educational practice. However, to ensure that those implications
are valid, it is important to first identify the origins of the divergent equilibrium
pathways that emerge from our model of educational production. This subsection
addresses that need. We confirm here that divergence is generated by the com-
bination of i) disaggregated educational investment decisions, with ii) payoffs that
depend on the level, rather than the increment, of human capital.
We begin by ruling out possible alternative drivers for our findings. First, the
supplementary materials confirm that our numerical results are not sensitive to
changes in the parametric assumptions of Table 2.1, which is unsurprising given
their close correspondence with our analytic results. Second, we consider the warn-
ing of O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) that theoretical predictions for intertemporal
behaviour may be driven by a sophistication effect that relies heavily on the de-
manding assumption of perfect information in these circumstances. To investigate
this possibility, panel A of Figure 2.5 computes the participation probabilities ρt(n)
for myopic agents who do not perceive the existence of any future decision periods:
by comparing the result to Figure 2.3 we can see that our conclusions are equally
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valid for myopic agents.11
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Strategies under Private Information
(A) Myopic agents (B) No learning if grade bad
These figures can be compared with the the pre-
ferred specification in Figure 2.3. They show the
equilibrium strategy S∗ when participation may be
conditioned upon the realisation pit(n), for two al-
ternative cases. In panel A, agents do not perceive
the existence of any future decision periods; in panel B agents’ relative ability increases if
and only if they both participate and obtain a good grade for that participation. Events
are shaded according to the probability ρt(n) that the agent’s realised ability pit(n) would
be large enough to induce equilibrium participation.
As an additional robustness check, panel B of Figure 2.5 considers a conceptu-
ally different model of educational investment, under which agents might not ne-
cessarily be able to learn from educational opportunities. Some economic authors
have developed models of learning under which agents may attempt an educational
task, but fail to learn from so doing (examples include: Sjögren & Sällström 2004;
Filippin & Paccagnella 2012). Such an assumption does not reflect the modern
educational setting, in which teachers provide differentiated tasks and ensure that
pupils progress, however as an exercise in robustness we also calculate results for
a model in which agents learn if and only if they perceive that they have been
successful. We can see that this model generates the unrealistic implication that
agents with sufficient early-years disadvantage should never exert the effort to par-
ticipate because they would be unlikely to learn anything even if they tried, but,
that apart, we can see that a remarkably similar education trap would also exist
under this alternative model.
The foregoing results suggest that properties i) and ii) may be sufficient to
induce divergence in educational investment. For the converse, we can be certain
that they are both necessary conditions. The necessity of payoffs that depend on
grades rather than on learning was established analytically in Section 1, where we
11Embrey (2019b) conducts a more detailed investigation into sophistication effects within this
model.
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noted that the participation criterion for a learning-focussed system is independ-
ent of current ability level. Numerically, every possible event (t, n) would induce
equilibrium participation if our benchmark model were adjusted to be learning-
focussed, that is if ps and pf were to accrue to ability development rather than to
grades that are drawn from the agent’s current stock of ability.
It therefore remains to investigate whether disaggregation is necessary for di-
vergence in our model. Under an aggregated investment model, an agent at the
event (t, n) would perceive her T−t+1 remaining participation decisions as a single
decision with T−t+2 possible investment levels. Hence aggregation has two effects:
first, the immediate payoffs of future investment decisions should no-longer be dis-
counted relative to the immediate payoffs of the present investment decision, and
second, the period T+1 payoffs V (n) should be less discounted relative to (most
of) those immediate payoffs. The importance of disaggregation is therefore a nu-
merical question since it depends upon the discount factor δ, although we are able
to put a sign on its impact analytically. For the first effect, we noted in Section 1
that time-consistent discounting acts to reduce the likelihood that a disadvantaged
agent would accept short-term expected losses to realise long-term expected gains,
and for the second effect we note that increasing V (n) unambiguously increases
aggregate participation benefit. Thus both effects of aggregation act to increase
equilibrium participation.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 establishes that, for our preferred specification, the total
numerical effect of disaggregation is substantial. The shading here indicates the
equilibrium investment rate r, that is the proportion of the available investment
that should optimally be taken-up. We can see that the best response to the
majority of initial events (t, n) would be full investment, and that, in particular,
all events (301, n) would induce full investment thereafter. Thus, and as expec-
ted, aggregation recovers the canonical result that educational investment is over-
whelmingly beneficial. It is also possible to evaluate the relative importance of
the two aggregation effects, which is achieved in Panel B of Figure 2.6. Panel B
maintains the untenable assumption that all immediate payoffs are realised at the
start of the aggregated period, to identify the pure effect of removing the relative
discount factor between those immediate payoffs. It shows that this first effect
of aggregation accounts for around half of the expansion in the high-participation
region.
This subsection has therefore established that divergence in educational invest-
ment is generated by the combination of disaggregated educational investment de-
cisions with payoffs that depend on the level, rather than the increment, of human
capital. Both of these properties are necessary for the education trap to exist,
and there is substantial corroborating evidence that their combination may also
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Figure 2.6: Participation Percentage under Aggregation
(A) Aggregated case
(B) Aggregated case with V (n) realised in
period 2T−t+1
The high-participation region of these figures can
be compared with that of the benchmark specifica-
tion in Figure 2.2. These figures show the propor-
tion r of available investment that will be chosen in
equilibrium, given that all future decision periods
are aggregated into one and that the agent makes their decision at the event (t, n).
be sufficient. We now discuss our model’s implications for the ways in which policy
and practice could increase the educational investment of disadvantaged children.
2 Implications for Intervention Design
The previous section has established that, under the proposed model, educational
outcomes are dichotomised into high- or low-participation pathways. Of these, the
high-participation pathway is always optimal from the point of view of society,
and from the point of view of the child who ex-post enjoys the benefits of high
education at the expense of only sunk costs. Since educational investment is
inherently incremental, there are two ways in which public policy could intervene
to increase educational participation. Intervention could either seek to improve
the cognitive ability of disadvantaged children, or it could support all children by
manipulating the exogenous parameters of the model.
The most direct design of intervention would aim to improve the cognitive
ability of disadvantaged children. This could be effective, because we have es-
tablished that there generally exists some threshold level of ability above which
high participation would become self-sustaining. However we have also established
that this threshold ability level swiftly diverges away from the current ability of
children on the low-participation pathway (see Figure 2.2 or 2.4), and so if such
an intervention is not undertaken very early in the life-course it is likely to prove
ineffective. Indeed, such an intervention could even prove counter-productive due
to the psychic cost of trying, but failing, to catch up with peers whose ability is
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also steadily improving.
Our results therefore suggest that an indirect intervention design could be
more effective. Although the model’s environmental parameters are exogenous
for the child, it will generally be possible for parents and teachers to manipulate
them. For example: −c could be made positive by the use of sufficiently fun and
engaging tasks, or at worst by the imposition of credible sanctions on the outside
option. ps could be increased by agreeing appropriately challenging goals, and
by the judicious use of praise and rewards. −pf could be made less negative, or
possibly even positive, by both explicitly teaching and implicitly modelling that
failure is positive: because it shows that you are taking on challenges and because
it generates learning. Finally, the distant positive payoff of dt could be made more
immediate by emphasising the intrinsic value of developing one’s abilities, and the
sophisticated extrinsic value that present learning will render future tasks more
accessible and therefore more enjoyable. Table 2.2 maps these specific implications
onto existing pedagogical practices, thereby demonstrating that these implications
articulate the insights of experienced teaching professionals.
Table 2.2: Mapping the Model’s Implications onto Existing Pedagogy
ps accrues to participation Praise effort rather than intelligence
(e.g. Mueller & Dweck 1998);
Appropriately challenging goals
(e.g. Bandura & Schunk 1981).
−pf more positive Foster grit and resilience
(e.g. Duckworth et al. 2007).
−c more positive Tasks should be engaging
(e.g. Christenson, Reschly & Wylie 2012);
Effective use of sanctions
(e.g. Emmer, Everston & Anderson 1980).
dt more immediate Emphasise the formative use of assessment
(e.g. Black & Wiliam 1998);
Foster growth mindsets
(e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski & Dweck 2007).
The implications discussed in this section support the conclusion of Heckman
(2006) that early intervention is vital if the educational pathway of disadvantaged
children is to be altered. However they also caveat that conclusion with the ob-
servation that it applies only to traditional, child-focussed interventions. Because
we show that low levels of educational investment could arise as an equilibrium re-
sponse to initial disadvantage, we must conclude that it may not be disadvantaged
children who require intervention from policy-makers, but rather the educational
system. Accordingly, we have identified specific and tangible ways in which a
grades-focussed educational system could be altered to support the educational
participation of all children. Our results suggest that these systemic interventions
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could be substantially more effective than a traditional, child-focussed interven-
tion, and our belief is that they are also likely to be substantially less expensive
to implement.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has responded to the increasing emphasis on educational account-
ability by modelling a grades-focussed educational system. Under this system,
children care about their performance in the series of incremental educational op-
portunities that they encounter on a daily basis. We find that a grades-focussed
system generates an education trap, whereby children with low levels of prior
educational participation optimally invest very little into their future educational
opportunities.
We have shown that the education trap has several important properties. First,
it is discontinuous: life-changing differences in equilibrium investment can arise
from arbitrarily small changes in initial conditions. Thus our model provides the
first viable explanation for the empirical observation that many disadvantaged
children make educational investment decisions which are drastically below their
normatively optimal level.
Second, children are separated into divergent high- and low-investment equilib-
ria even when they differ only in their early-years educational development. This
result closes the cycle of intergenerational poverty transmission, because it implies
that early disadvantage will substantially reduce later educational investment at
equilibrium. This result also suggests that low levels of investment may represent
a child’s optimal response to their social environment, and so the observation of
low educational investment does not necessarily imply any deficiency in a child’s
character or innate ability.
Third, the education trap cannot exist under a learning-focussed educational
system. This suggests that the policy response to educational divergence should be
to intervene with the system, rather than with the children who may be optimally
responding to that system. Because our model provides an explicit mechanism for
educational production, we have been able to recommend tangible interventions
that could move a grades-focussed educational system towards a learning-focussed
system. Our results suggest that these systemic interventions could contribute to-
ward a meaningful reduction in the persistence of economic inequality in advanced
economies.
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A Mathematical Appendix
1 Proof of Lemma 0: E(Πt(n)) is a strictly increasing function of
n, and a strictly decreasing function of t.
Since we have the simplifying assumption that Πt(n) is well-defined, we may,
without loss of generality, choose the order in which the implied n periods of
participation appear within t−1 prior periods. For the first result, let us therefore
compare Πt(n) with Πt(m), where m < n < t, by assigning the first t − n − 1
periods of both participation sequences to non-participation, and the following m
periods to participation. The final n−m periods were therefore either periods of
participation to reach Πt(n), or periods of non-participation to reach Πt(m). Thus
Πt(n) stochastically dominates Πt(m) by the transitivity of stochastic dominance,
hence E(Πt(n)) > E(Πt(m)).
For the second result compare Πt+1(n) with Πt(n) by assigning the first
n periods to participation in both sequences, and the remaining periods to
non-participation. Thus Πt+1(n) is stochastically dominated by Πt(n), hence
E(Πt(n)) > E(Πt+1(n)). 
2 Proof of Proposition 1
In any given period t ≤ T , the equilibrium strategy s∗t that maximises the agent’s
expected utility is given by (2.4). We proved in footnote 7 that this is well-defined.
Consider three cases. Firstly, it is possible that the expected benefit of particip-
ation,
[
δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)− c−pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
could be precisely 0,
in which case all values for the decision variable provide identical expected utility.
However, provided that E(pit |n) is continuously distributed (and since we assume
ps, pf > 0), this case occurs with probability 0, and so we do not analyse it further.
Otherwise, if
[
δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)− c−pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
> 0, then the
optimal strategy is to set st = 1, and conversely, if
[
δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n) − c−
pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
< 0, then the optimal strategy is to set st = 0. Thus, with
probability 1, the decision problem in period t has a unique equilibrium response
of st ∈ {0, 1}. (result 1)
For definiteness we may therefore declare, with almost no loss of generality,
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that agents will participate in a given educational task if and only if:
[
δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)− c−pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
>0




ps + pf <E(pit |n). (result 2)
Finally, note that st ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1 for each of finitely many periods
t. The conjunction of these events is that S∗ ∈ {0, 1}T , and this therefore occurs
with probability ∏Tt=1 1 = 1. (result 3) 
3 Proof of Proposition 2
The first result follows immediately from Lemma 0 if n > m+1. If n = m+1 we
need to consider four cases:
s∗t (m) = 1 s∗t (m) = 0
s∗t (n) = 1 case i case ii
s∗t (n) = 0 case iii case iv
In cases i,ii, and iv the result again follows immediately from Lemma 0, because
n+ s∗t (n) > m+ s∗t (m). In case iii n+ s∗t (n) = m+ s∗t (m), and so the basic result
holds at least with equality. However, case iii can occur for at most one t if the
marginal utility of present-period participation (2.4) satisfies the double crossing
property in (st;n). To see this, consider the (expected) marginal utility of present-
period participation as a function of (st, n):
MUt(st, n) :=E
(








δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)− c−pf + E(pit |n)(ps + pf )
]
, (2.7)
then define the double crossing property as the natural extension of the single cross-
ing property that is discussed in Edlin & Shannon (1998): For partially ordered
sets X and Y , a function f : X × Y → R exhibits the double crossing property in
(x; y), if, for all x1 > x0:
Definition 1 1. f(x1, y0) < f(x0, y0) and f(x1, y1) > f(x0, y1) for y1 >
y0 ⇒
f(x1, y2) > f(x0, y2) for all y2 > y1; and
2. f(x1, y0) ≤ f(x0, y0) and f(x1, y1) ≥ f(x0, y1) for y1 > y0 ⇒
f(x1, y2) ≥ f(x0, y2) for all y2 > y1.
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Now the participation condition for s∗t (m) = 1 is thus precisely thatMUt(1,m) >
0. Hence, if we have the double crossing property, then if there exists any t0 < t1
for which MUt0(1,m) < 0 and MUt1(1,m) > 0, then there cannot have been any
t2 > t1 for which MUt2(1, n0) < 0. But proposition 4.2 establishes that once
participation becomes optimal it will remain optimal, and so if MUt(1,m) > 0 for
all t ≥ t1, then MUt(1,m + 1) > 0 for all periods t > t1, and so period t1 is the
unique period in which case iii can occur.
It is sensible to briefly discuss the intuition and viability of the double crossing
properties in this context. Intuitively, this property would allow the possibility
that s∗t (n) could cross from 1 to 0 as t increased due to E(pit |n) no-longer ex-
ceeding the threshold level given in Proposition 1, and then to cross back from
0 to 1 as t increased further, due, in effect, to the discounted life-cycle payoff
δT−t+1V ′(n + T − t) becoming more consequential than the present participa-
tion cost E(pit |n)(ps+pf ) − (c+pf ). The double crossing property would, how-
ever, require that once δT−t+1V ′(n + T − t) becomes more consequential than
E(pit |n)(ps+pf )− (c+pf ) it should remain so for all τ > t. This is highly plaus-
ible, as its contravention would require MUt(1,m) to have higher-order roots (i.e.
to evolve in a non-smooth manner). Equivalently, the double crossing property
requires that MU•t (st, n) should satisfy the single crossing property in (st; t).
For the second result of Proposition 2 we proceed inductively. In period T +
1 the result is trivially true, since positive returns to education V ′(n) > 0 are
assumed. For the induction step we again consider the cases i-iv from the proof of
the first part of this Proposition.
case iv Here the induction step is trivial, because U∗t (n) = δU∗t+1(n) and
U∗t (m) = δU∗t+1(m).
case ii The result follows in this case because U∗t (n) ≥ δU∗t+1(n) > δU∗t+1(m) =
U∗t (m), where the first inequality follows from st(n)∗ = 1, and the second follows
from the induction assumption.
case i In this case,
U∗t (n) =δU∗t+1(n+ 1) + E(pit |n)(ps+pf )− (c+pf ), and
U∗t (m) =δU∗t+1(m+ 1) + E(pit |m)(ps+pf )− (c+pf ).
Here: the first term is larger in the upper line by the induction assumption, the
second term is larger by Lemma 0, and the third term is identical.
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case iii In this case,
U∗t (n) =δU∗t+1(n), and
U∗t (m) =δU∗t+1(m+ 1) + E(pit |m)(ps+pf )− (c+pf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
.
Here the first term is weakly larger in the upper line by the induction assumption
(since n ≥ m+ 1), and the term A is negative. To see the latter, note that





+ E(pit |n)(ps+pf )− (c+pf )
< 0,
where the final inequality is due to s∗t (n) = 0, the penultimate is a consequence of
the induction assumption, and the first is true by Lemma 0. 
4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider again the present-period marginal utility of participation as defined in
Equation (2.7):
MUt(st, n) = st
[
δU∗t+1(n+ 1)−δU∗t+1(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A




Expression A represents the forward-looking component of utility, and is positive
by Proposition 2.2. Expression B is the immediate component of utility, and
may either be positive or negative. If Bt ≥ 0 then Bτ > 0∀τ ≥ t, because
E(pit+k |n + k) > E(pit |n)∀k ∈ N by the transitivity of stochastic dominance.
This implies that, if Bt ≥ 0 then it will be optimal to participate in period t and
in all periods thereafter.
Suppose conversely that Bt < 0. Then Ut(n) = V can be realised by participat-
ing in no future periods (recall that for this Proposition we address the simplified
case where V (n) ≡ V because V ′(n) ≡ 0). Alternative values of Ut(n) could be
realised by some combination of participation and non-participation, and it is our
goal here to show that any such combination would be strictly dominated by a full-
participation strategy. Suppose for contradiction that the optimal strategy S∗t (n)
includes at least one period of non-participation on the equilibrium path (off-path
deviation from full-participation is dealt with because this proof does not restrict
the initial values of (t, n), and so any (t, n) is trivially on the equilibrium path for
the initial conditions that start at that location).
The total utility U∗t (n |S∗t (n)) is made up of a series of immediate utility com-
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ponents ∑Tτ=t δτ−1Bτ plus the constant term V , and in the present situation the
first of the Bt < 0. In order for the utility U∗t (n) to exceed that of complete non-
participation, we must therefore have that at least one of the Bτ > 0. Note also
that, by the first paragraph of this proof, if ever Bτ > 0 then Bτ+k > 0∀k ∈ N.
Thus we may split our total utility into a series of negative (or zero) immediate
payoffs followed by a series of positive immediate payoffs. The first paragraph also
implies that the non-participation period assumed for contradiction must occur
during the series of negative (or zero) payoffs. The presence of that period of non-
participation therefore reduces the present value of the series of positive payoffs
by more than a factor of δ. This is because it not only delays the first period of
positive payoffs by (at least) one period (since E(Πt(n)) > E(Πt+1(n)) by Lemma
0), but in doing so it also reduces those payoffs (for the reason just mentioned)
and removes the final (most positive) term from that series. The same period
of non-participation reduces the magnitude of the series of negative payoffs by a
factor of weakly less than δ, because it delays some subset of that series of payoffs,
but in doing so it also makes them more negative because E(Πt(n)) > E(Πt+1(n)).
Now, since the equilibrium pathway of S∗t (n) was preferable to non-participation,
its original series of positive payoffs must have exceeded in (discounted present)
value its series of negative payoffs, and so the insertion of the non-participation
period has reduced the value of the former series by an amount strictly larger in
absolute value than the amount by which it has increased the value of the latter
series. Thus the inclusion of any period of non-participation cannot be optimal
unless S∗t (n) includes no periods of participation at all. 
5 Proof of Proposition 4
The first part of this proposition was proved in the first paragraph of the proof
for Proposition 3 – it was only thereafter that the simplification V ′(n) ≡ 0 was
applied.
For the second part of this proposition, we first need to establish the Lemma
0 < E(pit |n)− δE(pit+1 |n) < E(pit−1 |n)− δE(pit |n). (2.8)
To see that this is true, first note that E(pit |n) > E(pit+1 |n) by Lemma 0, and so
E(pit |n) > δE(pit+1 |n) a fortiori, since E(pit+1 |n) > 0 and 0 < δ < 1. Then, for
the second inequality, note that
E(pit |n)− E(pit+1 |n) <E(pit−1 |n)− E(pit |n)
< E(pit−1 |n)− E(pit |n) + (1−δ)
[
E(pit |n)− E(pit+1 |n)
]
,
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where the first line is true by the concavity assumption E (Πt(n) |n)••>0, where
the second line is true by Lemma 0, and where the second line rearranges to give
(2.8).
With the Lemma (2.8) in hand, we now seek to derive a contradiction from an
equilibrium subpath of:
S∗t = 0, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, ...
To do this, consider two permutations of this subpath:
Sat : 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, 0, ... & Sbt : 0, 0, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, ....
Each subpath results in the situation (t + k + 2, n + k), and so each yields an
identical utility over any future participations from period t + k + 2 onward. We
may therefore compare the total immediate utility contribution U˜ of each subpath
accross periods t− t+ k+ 2, and, if S∗t (n) is indeed the equilibrium outcome, then
it should produce the greatest utility over those periods. Now





E(pit+i |n+i−1)(ps + pf )− (c+ pf )
]





E(pit+i−1 |n+i−1)(ps + pf )− (c+ pf )
]
















δE(pit+i |n+i−1)− E(pit+i−1 |n+i−1)
]






δE(pit+i |n+i−1)− E(pit+i−1 |n+i−1)
]






δE(pit+i+1 |n+i−1)− E(pit+i |n+i−1)
]
(ps + pf ) + δk+1(1−δ)(c+ pf )
= U˜t(n, sbT )− U˜t(n, s∗T ).
Here the second line is true because δ > 0, the third line is true by the Lemma
given in (2.8). Thus if S∗t is indeed preferred to Sat , then, in turn, Sbt must be
preferred to S∗t , and so S∗t can never be an optimal subpath. 
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Cognitive and noncognitive skills determine many life outcomes, and so there
has been significant research interest into the technology by which they are
produced. We advance the state-of-the-art in this field by building upon
the definitive contribution of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (Estimating
the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation; Economet-
rica, 2010). We develop that contribution by normalizing its production
function, by nesting that production function, by relaxing over-identifying
restrictions, and by amending several minor discrepancies within the code.
These developments greatly improve the fit of the model, and they reverse
some counter-intuitive findings that formerly emerged from it.
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1 Introduction
The productivity of economic agents is determined by their stock of human capital.
It is therefore a central goal of economic science to understand the technology by
which that human capital is produced. Such knowledge would help children and
adults to develop their productivity, earnings, and welfare; it would help policy
makers to provide effective intervention where necessary; and it would help edu-
cators and parents to support the next generation. Nevertheless, the economic
literature has only recently begun to model the technology of cognitive and non-
cognitive skill production through multiple stages of childhood development.
The current economic model of childhood skill formation is developed in a
series of papers by James Heckman and Flávio Cunha. Cunha & Heckman (2007)
demonstrate that a multi-stage model of cognitive and noncognitive skill forma-
tion can explain several important stylised facts of childhood development that
are not consistent with the traditional single-period theory of educational invest-
ment. Cunha & Heckman (2008) contribute the first econometric estimation of
that theoretical model, and Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010, hereafter CHS)
develop that contribution by incorporating a CES skill production function to re-
lax the assumption that educational inputs are perfectly substitutable across time
and across input type. CHS also incorporate: a factor-analytic model of measure-
ment error, a structural investment equation to correct for endogenous investment
decisions, and an anchoring equation for latent factor scores, to address their in-
herently arbitrary location and scale.
In this chapter we develop the analyses of CHS in several important respects.
First, we identify that the anchoring described above implicitly estimates the CES
production function along an uninformative ray through the production space. We
correct this by explicitly normalizing the CES function around sample mean input
levels. By implementing this correction we find that early cognitive development
is substantially more dependent upon parental investments than was previously
thought, whilst early noncognitive ability is not so much determined by the invest-
ments that parents make as by their noncognitive and cognitive skill levels. These
results suggest that future CES estimates of the human capital production function
should explicitly consider the ray along which share parameters are computed.
Second, we relax the over-identifying restriction imposed by re-normalizing
factor loadings in each period. This problem was identified by Agostinelli &
Wiswall (2016b), who provide a full discussion of its implications. We also make a
number of other minor improvements to the model and to the code used by CHS,
and these are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix B provides evidence that these
improvements are statistically important by comparing our model’s auxiliary equa-
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tion estimates to those of CHS. Overall, Table 3.3 shows that these developments
produce a highly significant improvement in model fit.
Third, we implement a more flexible specification for the technologies of cog-
nitive and noncognitive skill formation. By nesting CES production functions, we
allow the elasticity of technical substitution to vary between different input pairs.
Our results suggest that the more restrictive non-nested form meaningfully dis-
torts the estimated elasticities of substitution between specific input types. This
approach also allows us to contribute the first unbiased estimation of dynamic
complementarity in inter-temporal investment, for which our results provide mod-
erate support. These results therefore provide further evidence that intervention
policies should target the early stages of childhood cognitive development.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
skill formation, to establish that Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) still rep-
resents the state of the art in that literature. Section 3 reprises their model and
outlines the developments contributed by this chapter: Subsections 2, 3, and 4
discuss production function nesting, normalisation, and over-identification respect-
ively. Section 4 then discusses the results of our re-estimation of the technology of
skill formation, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Literature on Skill Formation
An expanding literature now builds on the work of Cunha and Heckman to estimate
the technology of skill formation. A central aim of that literature is to establish
which of three key properties might characterise skill formation. Those properties
are commonly referred to as self-productivity, cross-productivity, and dynamic
complementarity, however there are inconsistencies in the usage of each term. We
therefore proceed by first proposing a standardised definition for each property,
before discussing the evidence for each property in the next subsection.
Self-productivity is the property whereby the next-period level of a skill is an
increasing function of its present-period stocks. Analogously, cross-productivity is
the property whereby the next-period level of one skill type is an increasing func-
tion of the present-period stocks of another skill type: for example next-period
cognitive ability may be positively affected by present-period noncognitive ability.
We say that there is dynamic complementarity of investment when the efficacy of
present-period investment (in percentage terms) is an increasing function of past
investment levels. This is true if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution between investments is less than 1 (proof in Appendix C). In practice,
dynamic complementarity could equivalently be defined as the property whereby
present-period investment is a complement to present-period ability stocks, since
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the effect of investment is universally positive in the literature. Dynamic comple-
mentarity between investments will therefore be present if and only if the elasticity
of technical substitution between investments and skills is less than 1.
Several existing papers use alternative definitions of dynamic complementarity.
Some studies conflate the concept with cross-productivity, and some stipulate that
the cross-partial derivative of production with respect to ability and investment be
positive. The latter condition requires the marginal product of investment to be
an increasing function of present ability stocks in absolute, rather than percentage,
terms. The reasons why complementarity is best defined through elasticities are
well known, but it is useful to illustrate them with an example. Consider a Cobb-
Douglas production function. Cross-productivity is present, since the technology
is an increasing function of all relevant inputs, and similarly the cross-partial
derivative is positive, except for pathological parameter values. Nevertheless, we do
not consider Cobb-Douglas inputs to be complements: intuitively, the percentage
increase in output caused by an increase in any given input is independent of the
level of all other inputs, and mathematically the elasticity of technical substitution
between inputs is 1.
It may sometimes be useful to define complementarity between skill types with
an analogous elasticity condition to that for dynamic complementarity between in-
vestments. If doing so it is important not to conflate those two properties. Whilst
it is true that they necessarily coincide under a CES production function, that
coincidence is an artificial restriction imposed by the assumption of a single com-
plementarity parameter. Several alternative functional forms exist which relax that
restriction. Functional forms for the technology of skill formation are compared
in Section 2.2, whereafter Section 3.1 provides formal mathematical definitions for
the properties described here. We now examine the existing empirical support for
each of those properties.
1 Our Knowledge of the Technology of Skill Formation
Table 3.1 organises the literature on skill formation. It outlines the econometric
specifications used by each study, and summarises their results regarding the afore-
mentioned key properties of the technology of skill formation. Results are coded:
• where they support the relevant property, ~ where they provide limited support
for it, ◦ where they do not support it, and ‘N/A’ where their methodology cannot
accommodate that property.
It is immediately apparent from Table 3.1 that self-productivity is a robust
characteristic of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation. Moreover, each of
the studies listed here finds that skill formation is increasingly characterised by
58 Chapter 3: Re-estimating the Technology
Table 3.1: Studies that Estimate the Technology of Skill Formation
Production: Results:‡






















Reuß (2011) • Cog; Noncog×2;
Invest×many.
• • N/A










Fiorini & Keane (2014) • Time Use ×many;
Current Skill.
• N/A N/A




Attanasio, Meghir & Nix
(2015)
• Cog; Health; Invest;
P.Cog; P.Health.
• ~ ~
Attanasio et al. (2017) Nested CES Cog; Health; Invest;
P.Cog; P.Health.
• • ~
Pavan (2016) • Cog; Invest; P.Cog. • N/A N/A
Agostinelli & Wiswall
(2016a)






Heredia (2017) Cobb-Douglas Cog; Invest×2. • N/A N/A
†Possible inputs are: Cognitive Skills, Noncognitive Skills, Health, Parental Investment, Parental
Cognitive Skills, Parental Noncognitive Skills, Parental Health, and Schooling. ‘Noncog×2’ in-
dicates that two separate aspects of Noncognitive ability are included. Studies typically also
control for some covariates.
‡ Results are coded as: • where they support the relevant property, ~ where they provide
limited support for it, ◦ where they do not support it, and not applicable (N/A) where their
methodology cannot accommodate that property.
self-productivity as children become older.
The evidence for cross-productivity between skill types is less consistent. Most
studies find that cross-productivity is concentrated in the early stages of child-
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hood development, although Reuß (2011) and Coneus, Laucht & Reuß (2012)
find an opposite trend. This is probably because those studies split noncognitive
skill into mental and emotional skills, where the former is rather more aligned
with cognitive ability than the standard operationalisation of noncognitive skill.
Those studies are also unique in finding consistent evidence for bi-directional cross-
productivity between cognitive and noncognitive skills; in the remaining literature
cross-productivity is generally uni-directional, although there is no clear trend as
to which of cognitive and noncognitive skills begets the other.
The existing evidence regarding cross-productivity between health and cognit-
ive skill in the developing world is clearer: health seems to be an important determ-
inant of early cognitive development (Attanasio, Meghir & Nix 2015; Attanasio
et al. 2017). Attanasio et al. (2017) is also the only existing study to separately
identify complementarity between skill types: their point estimates suggest that
health and cognition are strongly complementary in Ethiopia and strongly substi-
tutable in Peru, although these estimates are very imprecise. The inter-country
differences are probably attributable to the way in which their latent health factor
is derived from height, weight, and self-reported health: the factor loadings of self-
reported health are small in both cases, and generally opposite in sign between the
two countries. It seems that being large could be a sign either of good health or
of poor health, with the former signal dominant in the Peruvian sample and the
latter dominant in the Ethiopian sample.
Table 3.1 reveals mixed findings regarding dynamic complementarity. It is most
strongly supported by the results of Nicoletti & Rabe (2014), which demonstrate
that school investment in teaching staff complements cognitive ability, but that
other school investments substitute for cognitive ability. These contrasting findings
hint at a possible cause for the inconsistent results elsewhere in the literature. A
CES production technology imposes a single elasticity of substitution across all of
its inputs. Since parental investment typically contributes a relatively small share
of aggregate production, the underlying inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
for investment may not be easily inferred from the global CES complementarity
parameter. In Section 3.2 we show how this challenge can be overcome by nesting
CES production functions, in an approach similar to that used by Attanasio et al.
(2017) to identify complementarity between health and cognition.
Several of the papers listed in Table 3.1 make contributions to our knowledge
of skill formation which go beyond the results tabulated there. For example Pavan
(2016) extends the standard framework to establish that the well-known birth-
order effect, whereby first-born children exhibit greater cognitive development than
their siblings, is substantially explained by differential parental investment levels
in early childhood. Agostinelli & Wiswall (2016a,b) make an important meth-
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odological contribution, first by demonstrating that commonly-imposed factor-
loading assumptions are over-identifying, and second by proposing a novel estima-
tion strategy that can identify returns to scale and total factor productivity in the
technology of skill formation. These contributions are discussed further in Section
3.3, where we suggest that the underlying conditions for that estimation strategy
may be untenable in practice.
Fiorini & Keane (2014) make a unique contribution by modelling skill forma-
tion as a function of childhood time use. Their results suggest that: educational
activities with parents have a highly positive effect on both cognitive and non-
cognitive development; educational activities with others are similarly beneficial
for cognitive development but provide little benefit for noncognitive development;
after-school activities are beneficial for reasoning skills but less beneficial for vocab-
ulary knowledge; and conversely that media use is beneficial for vocabulary but
not for reasoning. The policy implications of those findings are clear, however
further research in this vein is needed to ensure that they are not driven by re-
verse causality. For example, are children who make poor progress more likely to
be detained after school, and if a child’s behaviour deteriorates are their parents
more likely to send them to others for educational activities? Further research
might also seek to embed detailed investment data from Fiorini & Keane (2014)
into a more complete model of skill formation, in order to identify whether those
investments are mutually and/or dynamically substitutable.
2 Functional Forms for the Technology of Skill Formation
A variety of functional forms for the technology of skill formation are used in
the literature (see again Table 3.1). Linear forms are restrictive, because they
assume perfect substitutability between inputs and because they assume constant
marginal returns to inputs, both of which are robustly refuted by the literature.
Those limitations could be overcome by including higher-order terms and their
interactions, however even including second-order terms would require k.(k+3)/2−1
free parameters for a k-input technology,1 which could soon over-fit most available
data.
The Cobb-Douglas form ameliorates the restriction of constant marginal re-
turns, but it replaces the restriction of perfect substitutability with one of perfect
independence. As above, the latter restriction could be overcome by including in-
teraction terms. Doing so would generate a Translog specification with k.(k+1)/2−1
parameters, a total which could feasibly be reduced further if some interactions
were empirically unimportant. However, a major disadvantage of the Translog
1When unit total-factor productivity and returns-to-scale are assumed; see the discussion
later in this Section.
Iain P. Embrey Pathways to Poverty 61
form is that its parameters are not readily interpretable.
One practical advantage of the CES production function is that its parameters
give directly the elasticity of substitution between inputs, and the production share
of each input (provided that the function is appropriately normalised; see Section
3.3). The CES form also has the theoretical advantage that it nests Linear and
Cobb-Douglas forms as special cases, and that the Translog form is a restriction of
its second-order Taylor expansion around the normalisation point (Embrey 2019c).
The CES function represents a parsimonious specification with k free parameters,
however its main restriction is that it imposes the same elasticity of substitution
parameter across inputs. That restriction can nevertheless be relaxed by nesting
CES functions at a cost of one parameter per nest level. Our preferred specification
is therefore a CES function, normalised to sample mean input levels and nesting
investment to separately identify its level of dynamic complementarity with current
skill levels. This specification is now formally set out.
3 The Model
1 A Framework for Skill Formation, and its Key Charac-
teristics
This subsection begins with a brief reprise of the underlying framework of skill
formation, as developed by Cunha & Heckman (2007) and Cunha & Heckman
(2008). We denote the vector of child i’s cognitive and noncognitive skills at time
t as θi,t = (θCi,t, θNCi,t ). Similarly, we denote ϑi = (ϑCi , ϑNCi ) as a vector of parental
cognitive and noncognitive skills, which we model as time-invariant. Our final
input is Ii,t: the level of parental investment in child i at time t. The technology
of skill formation is therefore given by
θt+1 = ft(θt, It, ϑ) = ft(θCt , θNCt , It, ϑC , ϑNC)











Dynamic complementarity of investment in skill k is considered to be present
whenever the elasticity of technical substitution between current ability and cur-
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So long as the effect of investment is positive, the above condition is true if and only
if the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution for investment is positive. Moreover,
Appendix C shows that it is also equivalent to requiring the effect of investment
(in percentage terms) to be an increasing function of current ability stocks.
2 The Econometric Model and Estimation Procedure
In principle, the technology ft could vary between periods, between skills, and
between individuals. However, our object of interest is a generalised technology
across individuals, upon which we must impose some tractable functional form. We
will estimate two model specifications: Model (3.1) reproduces the CES production
function of CHS except that it makes the normalisation point Θt explicit (see
Section 3.3), whilst our preferred specification (3.2) is the simplest nesting of
CES functions that can identify dynamic complementarity of investment. For
parsimony, we follow CHS in fixing fs across each of two stages of development





































































































where: γks,1+γks,2 =1; γks,3+γks,6 =1; γks,4+γks,5+γks,7 =1; ∀s; k∈{C,NC};
and where: ψks , ϕks , φks ∈ [−∞, 1] ∀s; k∈{C,NC}. (3.2)
CES production functions are defined for non-negative inputs, that is for
(θCt , θNCt , It, ϑC , ϑNC) ∈ (R+)5. This is consistent with the theoretical domain of
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those inputs, however it has some practical consequences. The first of these is
that the individual error terms ηi,t,k used in the estimation of (3.1) and (3.2) are
included multiplicatively and as exponentials. The second is that our auxiliary
equations – for investment, for measurement, and for the evolution of income and
investment – are written in terms of log inputs, so that their ‘true’ values will
necessarily be ∈ R+.
The technologies (3.1) and (3.2) share several salient features. For example,
they both assume unit total factor productivity and constant returns to scale; this
is discussed in Section 3.4. In addition, they both normalise each latent input such
that the post-normalisation input vector (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) corresponds to a specified
point Θt = (ΘCt ,ΘNCt ,ΘIt ,ΘPCt ,ΘPNCt ) in the production space. The importance
of CES normalisation is set out in Section 3.3, and discussed in detail by Embrey
(2019c). In our estimation, we set Θt at the sample mean level of each input at
time t; this ensures that the γks,j represent input shares along a policy-relevant ray
through the production space.
The distinction between Models (3.1) and (3.2) is that, where the former as-
sumes a single elasticity of substitution between all inputs, the latter allows three
distinct elasticities of substitution between specific inputs. This flexibility is par-
ticularly useful in the present context, because it is of significant interest to identify
whether parental investments are dynamic complements or dynamic substitutes.
In order to do this, we require separate identification of the elasticity of substi-
tution between investment and current skill levels (see the discussion that opens
Section 2), which is given by ϕ in Model (3.2). Model (3.2) is the simplest CES
production function which can identify that elasticity of substitution.
At this stage, it is valuable to make two observations concerning specifications
(3.1) and (3.2). First, the technology described by (3.2) is a strict generalisation
of (3.1), and second, the technology described by (3.1) is a strict generalisation of
the functional form used in CHS. The first generalisation is given by relaxing the
assumption that ϕks = φks = ψks for all s and k ∈ {C,NC}, and the second is given
by relaxing the assumption that Θt = 1, for all t.
Two main challenges arise in the estimation of (3.1) and (3.2). The first is
that parental investment may be endogenous, either because parents systematic-
ally alter their investment Ii,t in response to their child’s current skill level θi,t, or
because parents systematically alter their investment in response to informative
signals of their child’s next-period skill level that they receive before our obser-
vation of θi,t+1. We correct for the former type of endogeneity by simultaneously
estimating a structural investment equation (3.3), and we correct for the latter
by allowing residual investment pii,t – the error term from (3.3) – to be correlated
with ηi,t,k. This approach was developed by CHS, and it is broadly equivalent to
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the control function method used by Attanasio et al. (2015), Attanasio, Meghir &
Nix (2015) and Attanasio et al. (2017), except that their multi-stage estimation
neglects the information regarding θi,t that measurements of Ii,t implicitly provide
through the investment equation.
ln Ii,t = δt,1 ln θCi,t + δt,2 ln θNCi,t + δt,3 lnϑCi + δt,4 lnϑNCi + δt,5 ln yi,t + δt,6 + pii,t
(3.3)
ηi,t,k = γks,8pii,t + νi,t,k, for k ∈ {C,NC} , (3.3.1)
where yi,t is the family income of individual i at time t, and where we assume that
the residual error term νi,t,k is normally distributed with mean 0 for each skill k
in each period t, and that it is independent across skills and periods.
The second main challenge is that child skills, parent skills, and parental invest-
ments are all inherently unobservable latent factors. Nevertheless, since we have
two or more measurements Zl,t,m for each latent factor l ∈ {C,NC, I, PC, PNC}
at each time t, we can use a factor-analytic model to allow for error in each indi-
vidual measurement. The basis of such a model is an assumption that the common
variance between those measurements is precisely the latent factor of interest. CHS
prove non-parametric identification of a factor-analytic measurement model (3.4)
embedded within the present framework,2 up to factor location and scale in each
period, and Agostinelli & Wiswall (2016b) prove that, with all functional forms
considered here, it is only necessary to fix the location and scale of the factors in
one period. We therefore assume the following measurement error model:
Zi,k,t,m = µk,t,m + αk,t,m ln θki,t + εi,k,t,m , k ∈ {C,NC},
Zi,I,t,m = µI,t,m + αI,t,m ln Ii,t + εi,I,t,m ,
Zi,Pk,m = µPk,m + αPk,m lnϑki + εi,Pk,m , k ∈ {C,NC},
with αl,1,1 = 1 ∀ l ∈ {C,NC, I, PC, PNC},
and with the initial mean of ln θki,1, ln Ii,1, & lnϑPki set to 0 for all i; k ∈ {C,NC}.
(3.4)
Here we assume that the errors εi,l,t,m are normally distributed with mean 0 for
each measurement m of each latent factor l in each period t, and that they are
uncorrelated across measurements for any given factor in any given time period. In
principle a single measure could proxy multiple latent factors, provided that each
factor has at least one unique measurement, however in practice that would reduce
2Given at least two measurements for each factor for each period, and, in the case of serially
correlated measurement errors, one additional measurement. Serial correlation in measurement
errors is likely in this context, since many of the measurement items recur over several periods,
however the available data easily surpass both sets of requirements.
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the clarity of interpretation, and so it is sensible to assign each measurement to
at most one latent factor. In this chapter we follow the measurement assignments
of CHS, because our objective is to identify the effect of our adaptations to their
model.
To close the model, we must provide a structure for the evolution of parental
skills, family income, and residual investments. We model parental cognitive and
noncognitive skills as time-invariant, and we model income and residual invest-
ments according to an AR(1) process:
ϑki,t+1 = ϑki,t = ϑki, ∀k∈{C,NC},
ln yi,t+1 = %y ln yi,t + ρI + νi,t,y,
ln pii,t+1 = %pi ln pii,t + ρpi + νi,t,pi. (3.5)
where, as usual, the errors νi,t,pi & νi,t,y are assumed to be normally distributed
with mean 0. Note that the νi,t,pi are uncorrelated with present and past inputs by
construction, but that we also require both νi,t,pi and νi,t,y to be uncorrelated with
future error terms νi,t,k & νi,t,y. This assumption is reasonable as one would expect
that, if any shocks were to affect multiple residuals then they would do so contem-
poraneously. It is less certain that we may assume νi,t,y to be uncorrelated with all
current skill levels θki,t & ϑki , since this would require: i. independence from current
shocks νi,t,k, ii. independence from all past skill levels, and iii. independence from
past error terms νi,t′,y, νi,t′,pi, and νi,t′,k for all t′ < t. Conditions ii. and iii. will
be true if the effect of period 1 parent skills on family income, and the associ-
ation between child skill formation and the complete history of family income over
t′ ≤ t, are both captured by the first lag of family income. In practice this may be
a simplifying assumption, however it appears to be valid as we find that specifying
an AR(2) process for family income does not affect our results.3 Condition i. may
be restrictive, because certain events might influence both family income and a
child’s cognitive performance or noncognitive behaviours through their emotional
connection with their parents; to the extent that any such association is positive
our model will therefore over-estimate the importance of parental investment and
parental income.
This chapter broadly follows the estimation procedure of CHS. The model
parameters are jointly estimated by maximising a single likelihood function, which
compares each observed measurement in each time period with its value as pre-
dicted by the technology of skill formation and the global factor loading for that
3If Model (3.2) is adapted to include an AR(2) term: the estimated factor shares all re-
main within 0.03 of their original values, the AR(2) coefficient is 29.7 times smaller than the
AR(1) coefficient, and the likelihood ratio statistic is 0.96 against a critical value of 3.84 for one
additional degree of freedom.
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measurement. Numerical likelihood contributions are calculated by modelling each
latent factor as normally distributed,4 and by approximating their next-period
distributions via the Unscented Kalman Filter. Five time-invariant individual co-
variates are included in each measurement equation: gender, age, and dummies
to control for: teenage mothers, age at assessment, and non-linear age effects.
The estimation procedure is described in detail by Cunha, Heckman & Schennach
(2010) and by Cunha (2011), and so we do not reproduce those descriptions here.
However, our supplementary materials do contribute a new guide to the code used
to produce our results.
Our code is adapted from that developed by CHS. The following three subsec-
tions discuss the most substantial adaptations which we make to their code, whilst
other, less complex, corrections and adaptations are described in Appendix A. To
our knowledge, CHS represents the only existing paper to implement a single-step
estimation procedure for a dynamic latent factor model of multi-dimensional skill
formation. Although it is computationally expensive, this approach has a signific-
ant advantage in efficiency since each parameter is estimated taking account of its
indirect implications across the complete system of equations and across all time
periods. We therefore believe that our contributions build upon the best available
estimation procedure for the technology of skill formation.
3 CES Normalisation





1 + γ2θ φ2
] 1
φ (3.6)
The share parameters γk are so called, because in the special (Cobb-Douglas)
case where φ→ 0 the share of total resource that should optimally be spent on θk
is γk. This result is derived in Appendix D, by maximising equation (3.6) subject
to the ‘budget constraint’ p1θ1 + p2θ2 ≤ R, then solving for γ1. In our context,
resource R could include time, energy, and human capital, and pi indicates the
quantity of resource required to generate one unit of skill θi. At any optimal





and so when φ → 0 the share interpretation of γ1 is immediate. The derivation
for γ2 is symmetric.
4CHS do likewise, since they find no evidence to suggest that a mixture of normals would
better fit empirical factor distributions.
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In general, we can see from Equation (3.7) that the share of total resource
that should optimally be spent on θk is a complex function that not only depends
upon the γk, but also upon a chosen point (θ1, θ2) in the production space, and the
complementarity parameter φ. Outside of the Cobb-Douglas case, the parameter
γk cannot be interpreted as a general share parameter – it is correctly interpreted
as share of θk only along the ray in the production space where θ1 =θ2. Thus in the
present context where the θk are arbitrarily located latent factors, the parameters
γk are particularly uninformative.
This problem can be overcome by normalizing the CES function. CES normal-
isation was first introduced by De La Grandville (1989), and a thorough discussion
of its importance can be found in Embrey (2019c). In essence, CES normalisation
rescales the units of the parameter space so that we may freely select the ray along
which the γk represent share parameters. For the normalised CES function (3.8),
the chosen ray is that which contains the specified point (Θ1,Θ2). For our main
specification we set Θk as the sample mean value of {θk}i, so that our estimates
of the γk represent input shares at a point relevant to the population in question.











) φ 1φ , (3.8)
from which we can determine that the share interpretation of the γk is valid





−φ + p2θ2( θ2Θ2 )
−φ (3.9)
It is important to note that the normalised CES form (3.8) requires no addi-
tional assumptions over the simplified form (3.6). Rather, it makes the implicit
simplifying assumption that Θ1 =1 and Θ2 =1 both explicit and manipulable. This
observation also makes plain the mechanism by which the procedure developed by
CHS to anchor skills on adult outcomes affects parameter estimates. That proced-
ure implicitly renormalises CES inputs so that parameters are estimated along the
ray where input quantities are in inverse proportion to their approximate import-
ance for adult outcomes. That normalisation is difficult to justify, and it produces
estimates that are significantly different to those at the mean input levels for the
population in question.
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4 Factor Over-Identification
Agostinelli & Wiswall (2016b) observe that the practice of artificially fixing the
location and scale of each latent factor in each period represents a restrictive
assumption. Since their discussion of the matter is comprehensive, we provide
only a brief summary here.
For a single-period model, the measurement system in (3.4) identifies latent
factors only up to location and scale. That is, the model fits equally well for any
linear transformation of each latent factor. It is therefore necessary to artificially fix
the location and scale of each latent factor, which we (and CHS) achieve by fixing
the initial mean value and one initial loading for each factor. However the situation
is not the same for the dynamic model set out in Section 3.2. Once the locations
and scales of the latent state variables are fixed for any one period, they will also
be known in all other periods. This is because (all of) the CES functional forms
used here satisfy the known location and scale property defined by Agostinelli &
Wiswall (2016b): their output level at two or more points in the production space
is independent of all estimated parameters.5 The two unknown values of factor
location and scale can therefore be identified using the two equations generated by
those known points in the production space. In this chapter we therefore remove
the over-identifying restrictions implied by fixing CES factor loadings in periods
t>1.
Analogously, it is important to allow factor loadings for residual investment to
be freely estimated in periods t> 1. To do this we require the AR(1) process for
residual investment to have known location and scale, and so we normalise ρpi to
zero and %pi to unity in equation (3.5). CHS operationalise a different specification
that fixes one factor loading for residual investment in each period, whilst allowing
%pi to be estimated freely. These two approaches are not equivalent. Because CHS
assume that %pi is constant for all periods t, their fixed factor loadings become
arbitrary and restrictive assumptions from period t = 3 onwards. Appendix B
shows that our specification substantially and significantly reduces the unexplained
variance in estimated residual investment levels.
In contrast to the latent state variables, we maintain the assumption of CHS
that family income is directly observable. Thus we normalise the factor loadings
for measurements of family income to unity in all periods. We nevertheless allow
the effect of the control variables to vary through time, which implies that the
intercept terms in (3.4) must also be allowed to vary between measurements. In
order to identify those intercept terms we therefore require the AR(1) process
5For example, in equations (3.1) and (3.2), the output level is known whenever input values
are directly proportional to the normalisation point (ΘCt ,ΘNCt ,ΘIt ,ΘPCt ,ΘPNCt ).
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for family income to have known location, but we also wish to allow income to
evolve through time. We achieve this by normalising ρI to zero in equation (3.5)
whilst allowing %y to take any positive value. This AR(1) evolution assumption
is reasonable because real-terms income is measured on a defined scale that is
stationary across periods, but we nevertheless test its validity by confirming that
an AR(2) specification does not affect our results (see footnote 3).
Agostinelli &Wiswall (2016a) go beyond a discussion of factor over-identification,
to propose a novel strategy that promises to identify more general production tech-
nologies with freely estimable locations and scales. One such technology would be
a generalisation of the simple CES form (3.6) to include a total-factor-productivity
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φ (3.10)
The identification of such technologies rests upon the existence of some age invari-
ant measure for each dynamic input. As suggested by the definition reproduced
below, that measure is then taken as the definitive scale of its associated latent
factor – up to linear transformation through its measurement equation (3.4). In
the case of latent skill variables this is problematic because their measurement
scale is inherently arbitrary. For example, there is no reason to suppose that any
individual’s abstract ‘cognitive ability level’ should be exponentially related to
their score on a Peabody Individual Achievement Test, as required by Agostinelli
& Wiswall (2016a). That relationship could equally well be linear, logarithmic,
S-shaped, or follow some highly non-linear monotonic functional form, because cog-
nitive ability is an abstract construct which has no inherent cardinal quantification.
It is therefore meaningless to estimate total-factor-productivity or returns-to-scale
in the technology of latent skill formation.
Agostinelli & Wiswall (2016a): “Definition 2: A pair of measures
Zt,m and Zt+1,m is age-invariant if E(Zt,m|θt = p) = E(Zt+1,m|θt+1 = p)
for all p ∈ R++.”
5 The Data
Since we aim to build upon the methodological contribution of CHS, we base our
empirical estimates upon the data that they use, and we also map the same set of
measurements onto the same set of latent factors. As such, a full description of the
data can be found in Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) and their associated
supplementary materials; we summarise only the most salient points here.
The data are taken from the U.S. National Longitudinal Study of Youth ‘79
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Children and Young Adults cohort, and they are available from the National Lon-
gitudinal Surveys Program website at www.nlsinfo.org. The data are derived from
biennial surveys of the firstborn children of the ‘79 cohort, from birth to age 14.
We follow CHS in splitting these measures into two developmental stages: from
0-6 years, and from 5-14 years of age. Over that time, measures of cognitive abil-
ity transition from school readiness items to the Peabody Individual Achievement
Test, whilst measures of noncognitive ability focus on prosocial and antisocial be-
haviours. Measures of parental investment include the provision of materials and
experiences, as well as familial interactions. Measures of parental cognitive skills
include the verbal, non-verbal, and mathematical abilities of the mother, whilst
measures of parental noncognitive abilities focus on the self-worth and locus-of-
control of the mother.
4 Results
Our estimates for the technologies of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation
are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Both tables reproduce the results
from Table V of CHS in their first column, and they identify those of our results
that differ from CHS at the 95% significance level.6 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show sub-
stantial and statistically significant differences between our results and those of
CHS. Where Model (3.1) differs from CHS this can be attributed to normalisa-
tion (together with the other minor coding corrections detailed in Appendix A),
and where Model (3.2) differs from (3.1) this can be attributed to nesting CES
production functions.
The bottom panel of Table 3.3 provides the log likelihood of each specifica-
tion.7 Although normalisation adds no parameters to the model, the full set of
minor corrections listed in Appendix A adds 44 parameters to the model, of which
6Under the assumption that error terms are uncorrelated between the models, an appropriate
test of statistical difference would be provided by Welch’s unequal variances t-test with both tails.
However, in our case the error terms will be highly correlated, because they are derived from
the same sample using similar methods and identical measurements. Welch’s test is therefore a
strong criterion that provides a lower bound on the set of statistically different estimates. If the
error terms were perfectly correlated and of equal variance, then any difference in estimates would
be statistically significant. In comparison, student’s t-test with two tails would provide accurate
inference if the error variances were equal and if one quarter of that variance were common, and
so it probably also represents a conservative test in this setting (note that Student’s t statistic
always exceeds Welch’s). We indicate the outcomes of both tests in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
7 We report the log likelihood of the core model, which omits the additional idiosyncratic
contributions of each specification: for example CHS have an additional likelihood contribution
from their anchoring (CES normalisation) procedure, and we have an additional likelihood con-
tribution from our investment equation shrinkage procedure. The ‘core’ log likelihood omits
those additional idiosyncratic contributions so that it may be compared between the alternative
specifications, which are then nested from left to right.
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Table 3.2:
The Technology of Cognitive Skill Formation; Input Shares and Elasticities
1st Stage (ages 0-6)
Input CHS Table V Model (3.1) Model (3.2)
Cognitive Skill γC1,1 .(γC1,6.γC1,7) .485 .342** .352**
(.031) (.041) (.042)
Noncognitive Skill γC1,2 .(γC1,6.γC1,7) .062 .001* .001*
(.026) (.030) (.030)
Parental Investments γC1,3 .(γC1,7) .261 .486** .482
(.026) (.111) (.113)
Parental Cognitive Skill γC1,4 .035 .086 .082
(.015) (.027) (.030)
Parental Noncognitive Skill γC1,5 .157 .084 .083
(.033) (.058) (.057)
e-sub: (Investment) 1/(1−ϕC1 ) 2.410 .893** .983**
(.136) (.304)
e-sub: Child Skills 1/(1−ψC1 ) —
–
e-sub: Parent Skills 1/(1−φC1 ) .676**
(.231)
2nd Stage (ages 5-14)
Cognitive Skill γC2,1 .(γC2,6.γC2,7) .884 .923** .923**
(.013) (.015) (.015)
Noncognitive Skill γC2,2 .(γC2,6.γC2,7) .011 .002 .002
(.005) (.002) (.002)
Parental Investments γC2,3 .(γC2,7) .044 .000 .000
(.011) (.028) (.028)
Parental Cognitive Skill γC2,4 .051 .074 .073
(.008) (.019) (.019)
Parental Noncognitive Skill γC2,5 .011 .002* .002*
(.012) (.026) (.026)
e-sub: (Investment) 1/(1−ϕC2 ) .450 .500 —
(.043) –
e-sub: Parent Skills 1/(1−φC2 ) .499
(.044)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *Significantly different from CHS point estimate at the
95% confidence level (Student’s t); **Significantly different from CHS at the 95% confidence level
(Welch’s unequal variances t).
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Table 3.3:
The Technology of Noncognitive Skill Formation; Input Shares and Elasticities
1st Stage (ages 0-6)
Input CHS Table V Model (3.1) Model (3.2)
Cognitive Skill γNC1,1 .(γNC1,6 .γNC1,7 ) .000 .001 .001
(.028) (.039) (.039)
Noncognitive Skill γNC1,2 .(γNC1,6 .γNC1,7 ) .602 .693 .691
(.034) (.056) (.056)
Parental Investments γNC1,3 .(γNC1,7 ) .209 .000 .000
(.031) (.129) (.129)
Parental Cognitive Skill γNC1,4 .014 .077** .077**
(.013) (.029) (.029)
Parental Noncognitive Skill γNC1,5 .175 .229 .231
(.033) (.068) (.069)
e-sub: (Investment) 1/(1−ϕNC1 ) .683 .642 —
(.083) –
e-sub: Parent Skills 1/(1−φNC1 ) .647
(.085)
2nd Stage (ages 5-14)
Cognitive Skill γNC2,1 .(γNC2,6 .γNC2,7 ) .002 .000 .000
(.011) (.007) (.007)
Noncognitive Skill γNC2,2 .(γNC2,6 .γNC2,7 ) .857 .845 .847
(.011) (.014) (.015)
Parental Investments γNC2,3 .(γNC2,7 ) .104 .055 .056
(.022) (.063) (.075)
Parental Cognitive Skill γNC2,4 .000 .000 .000
(.008) (.017) (.017)
Parental Noncognitive Skill γNC2,5 .037 .100 .097
(.021) (.056) (.071)
e-sub: (Investment) 1/(1−ϕNC2 ) .657 .664 .703
(.054) (.355)
e-sub: Parent Skills 1/(1−φNC2 ) .640
(.228)
Model Fit
Core Log-Likelihood† 205 421.73 205 108.87 205 108.27
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; **Significantly different from CHS at the 95% confidence
level (Welch’s unequal variances t);
† Omits anchoring contributions to maintain inter-model comparability (see footnote 7).
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19 are freely estimable;8 thus the χ2 critical value of 60.5 for 44 degrees of freedom
provides a conservative likelihood ratio test between CHS and Model 3.1. The test
statistic between those specifications is 625.7, which therefore indicates unambigu-
ously that CES normalisation and our minor corrections improve model fit. The
two levels of CES nesting introduced by Model 3.2 require 8 additional parameters,
although 6 elasticity parameters approach redundancy under this specification due
to near-zero estimates on specific factor shares. The χ2 critical value of 6.0 for 2
degrees of freedom therefore represents a generous likelihood ratio test of whether
nesting improves model fit, and the test statistic of 1.2 does not approach that
threshold. Thus we can conclude that our normalisation and minor corrections
deliver a substantially and significantly better-fitting model than the benchmark
of CHS Table V, but that nesting the CES production does not deliver a statist-
ically significant improvement to model fit. We can also see from Tables 3.2 and
3.3 that nesting has little effect on our estimated input shares, although there is
statistically insignificant evidence to suggest that elasticities of substitution may
differ by input type.
We will now assess the implications of our results for each of the main conclu-
sions that CHS derive from their estimates. CHS emphasise that their conclusions
support five important stylised facts of skill formation: i) self-productivity in-
creases with age for both skill types; ii) complementarity between investments
and current cognitive skill levels increases with age; iii) the converse is true for
noncognitive skills; iv) cognitive skills stabilise, that is later investment is inef-
fective; and v) noncognitive skills flourish, that is they respond particularly well
to later investment. We discuss the implications of our results for each of these
conclusions in turn.
The results of CHS demonstrate robustly that self-productivity increases with
age for both cognitive and noncognitive skills. This can be seen by the substan-
tial and statistically significant increases in the own-factor production shares for
each skill type between developmental stages. Our results support the same high-
level conclusion, although they suggest that the increase is larger than previously
thought for cognitive skills, and smaller than previously thought for noncognitive
skills. These findings are perhaps best considered as a consequence of the changes
in the estimated factor shares of the other inputs, and so they are discussed when
we consider stylised facts iv) and v) below.
CHS provide suggestive evidence that the complementarity between invest-
ments and current cognitive skill levels may increase with age. Whilst their pro-
8Five investment equation parameters × seven periods are shrunk to be approximately equal
in ‘real terms’ across each of two periods; where ‘real terms’ compensate for non-uniform changes
in the arbitrary variances of the latent state variables as they develop through time.
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duction technology cannot separately identify this parameter, their estimates for
a global complementarity parameter are sufficiently different and sufficiently pre-
cise to infer that this conclusion is likely. Model 1 replicates this finding with
regard to the global elasticity of substitution in cognitive skill production, but it
does so with two important caveats. First, we find no support for the surprising
CHS result that early inputs to cognitive development are highly substitutable –
instead we find them to be weakly complementary. Second, we note that the sub-
stantial and statistically significant increase in complementarity between current
cognitive skills and other inputs as children age should not be interpreted as an
increase in the dynamic complementarity of parental investment, because we find
no evidence that later parental investment has any measurable impact on cognitive
development.
CHS provide very little evidence that the complementarity between investments
and current noncognitive skill levels decreases with age. We can see from Tables
3.2 and 3.3 that their main results suggest that, if anything, the opposite may be
true. CHS therefore claim support for this stylised fact based upon the results of an
alternative specification that does not correct for the endogeneity of investments:
however, whilst those results have the opposite comparative sign, the difference
between them is smaller and it remains far from statistical significance. Although
we do find a small and statistically insignificant decrease in global complementarity
in noncognitive skill production between stages, as above our estimates suggest
that this should not be interpreted in terms of the dynamic complementarity of
investments because earlier investments do not affect noncognitive skill production.
Arguably the most important stylised fact of human capital development is
that early investment in cognitive abilities is vital, because those abilities are
insensitive to later investments. This result is undoubtedly supported by CHS,
not only because of the small input share of second stage investments, but also
because of the low elasticity of substitution in the second stage of cognitive skill
development. Our results support this stylised fact a fortiori. We find that the
input share of early parental investment for cognitive development is substantially
and significantly larger than indicated by CHS, whilst the input share of later
parental investment is vanishingly small in our results.
The dual of the above stylised fact is that noncognitive abilities become more
manipulable as children age. CHS declare support for this result on the basis
of their ambiguous findings regarding the change across time of the elasticity of
substitution in noncognitive skill formation that we discussed above. In reality,
those ambiguous findings will be more than outweighed by the fact that they
estimate a substantial reduction in the input share of investment between the
two stages of noncognitive development. We find the opposite: when the model
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is normalised to an appropriate point within the production space, the share of
parental investment in the technology of noncognitive skill production increases
between developmental stages, albeit to a modest final level.
Outside of the main results discussed above, our findings are generally in line
with those of CHS. For example, neither we nor CHS find much support for cross-
productivity between skill types; indeed the weak positive effect of noncognitive
skills on early cognitive development that was found by CHS vanishes in our res-
ults. However there are two further substantial differences between our estimates
and those of CHS. It seems that the results from CHS Table V tend to misat-
tribute the effect of parental skills on early noncognitive development to an effect
of investments, and that they do the opposite for early cognitive skill develop-
ment. The latter misattribution is particularly anomalous, since it leads to the
counter-intuitive result that parental noncognitive skills are both substantially and
significantly more important for their child’s early cognitive development than are
parental cognitive skills. These findings are not replicated in our results, and so we
conclude that they be an artifact of the anchoring (CES normalisation) procedure
in CHS, which estimates share parameters along a ray through the production
space that is far from the sample mean input values. It is difficult to predict the
effect of this inappropriate CES normalisation, because the econometric model fits
a highly non-linear production function recursively to map out eight periods of
skill development.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we build upon the contribution of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach
(2010) in three important respects: we normalise its CES production function
to estimate input shares at a policy-relevant point in the parameter space; we
nest that CES production function to identify dynamic complementarity between
investments; and we correct the over-identification within its factor-analytic meas-
urement model. We also make several more minor improvements and corrections.
We establish that these developments significantly improve the fit of the model,
and we therefore also contribute a guide to the code in order to make the estimation
procedure accessible for future research.
Our developments induce substantial and statistically significant changes in the
estimated technologies of skill formation. For example, we establish that the share
of parental investment in the production of noncognitive skills increases with the
age of the child, which implies that parental investment can have a greater effect
on the production of noncognitive skills as children age. CHS state that this is
an important stylised fact of skill development, but their estimated elasticities are
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ambiguous with regard to this conclusion, and their estimated input shares are
opposed to it. Our estimates for the technology of cognitive skill formation are
broadly in-line with those of CHS, although we reverse their two most surprising
findings. First, we find that early inputs to cognitive development are somewhat
complementary, rather than highly substitutable, and second we find that parental
cognitive skills are of comparable importance to parental noncognitive skills in
fostering early childhood cognitive development, rather than being substantially
less important. In addition to these results, we provide the first unbiased estimates
of the degree of dynamic complementarity in parental investment, which suggest
that it may be present to a moderate degree.
Our estimates for the technology of cognitive and noncognitive skill forma-
tion therefore enhance the empirical support for the main policy implications of
Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010). We conclude that early intervention is
vital for cognitive skill development, because later cognitive ability is almost en-
tirely characterised by self-productivity, and because the elasticity of substitution
between current skills and later parental inputs is very low. Conversely, noncog-
nitive abilities remain malleable at much later ages. This presents an opportunity
for successful later intervention, but it also presents the hazard that initially prom-
ising noncognitive skill development could be disrupted by negative experiences in
later childhood.
A Minor Corrections and Adaptations to the
Code of CHS
Each paragraph outlines a minor correction or adaptation to the code of CHS.
None of these issues are discussed by CHS, either in their main paper or in their
supplementary materials.
Non-zero coefficients in the parental investment equation (3.3) imply that our
measures of investment also have non-zero factor loadings on the other state vari-
ables. For example if measurement ZI,t,m has loading αI,t,m on ln It, and ln θCi,t has
coefficient δt,1 in the investment equation, then measurement ZI,t,m should have
factor loading αI,t,m × δt,1 on ln θCi,t. A simultaneous estimation procedure such as
that used here can exploit that implied relationship, and does so via the module
policy.f90 in the code of CHS. That module as written in CHS has no effect
since the variable t is uninitialised; we initialise it to loop over periods.
CHS assume that the policy equation coefficients δt,j are invariant in abso-
lute terms across time. However, since the relative locations and variances of
the state variables vary substantially through time as a consequence of arbitrary
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factor-normalisation decisions, this assumption amounts to a strong and arbitrary
restriction. We relax that restriction to imposing instead that the state-variable
coefficients remain constant in real, rather than absolute, terms given the vari-
ances of the state variables – that is we impose: δt,1 × Var(θCt ) × Var−1(It) =
δt′,j × Var(θCt′ ) × Var−1(I ′t) ∀ t, t′, and similarly for the other state variables. We
then allow greater flexibility by imposing this restriction separately for each stage
s ∈ {1, 2}. Since it is impossible to impose these restrictions contemporaneously
within the estimation (the normalised values of each state variable would need to
be defined before its nominal value could be known for any individual), the cross-
equation restrictions are imposed by shrinkage (penalising the log likelihood for
any inter-temporal deviations from the above equality). Appendix B shows that
these adaptations substantially increase the significance of the investment equation
coefficients.
CHS assume that the effect of residual investment pii,t on individual production
shocks ηi,t,k is fixed across stages s ∈ {0, 1} and skill types k ∈ {C,NC}. We allow
that effect (γks,8) to vary by stage and by skill type. Appendix B shows that there
are statistically significant differences between these coefficients.
The code of CHS has a couple of additional typographical errors. First, the
factor loading of ZNC,t,19 was overlooked in the mappings module, and second, at
one point in the anchoring section in likeAUX.f90 the code referred to KF rather
than KFanch. The latter would have significant repercussions, however since we
now normalise our CES transitions (Section 3) that code section is no longer used.
Similarly, the redundancy of CHS-style anchoring alleviates the problems that
may be caused within the CES production function, where the anchoring process
of CHS raised state variables were to a power rather scaling them linearly.
B Auxiliary Equation Estimates and Goodness-
of-fit Measures
In this appendix we present the estimated coefficients of the auxiliary equations
that sit behind our main results of tables 3.2 and 3.3, and we present our estimates
for the auxiliary parameters that sit alongside those results. These comprise:
the investment equation (3.3), the laws of motion for family income and residual
investments (3.5), and the effects of heterogeneity within the technologies of skill
formation νi,t,k and γks,8 for k ∈ {C,NC}. Estimates of the measurement equations
are far too numerous to reproduce here, but are included within the supplementary
material ‘data and code’.
Table 3.B1 shows the estimated parameters of the investment equation for the
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periods t =1-7. Period 8 parameters are uninformative, because there are no
period 9 measurements with which to identify the left hand side of (3.3) through
the technology function in period 8. The size of these parameters is difficult to
interpret, because both the left- and right-hand sides of equation (3.3) are latent
factors with arbitrary scales. However the sign and significance of estimates can be
interpreted. We can see that, with the exception of family income, the investment
function estimates of CHS are far from statistically significant. This suggests either
that investment is not endogenous with respect to the included state variables, or
that their investment function is poorly specified.
CHS assume that their investment equation coefficients are constant in absolute
terms through all time periods. This assumption is inappropriate, because the
variables on both sides of equation 3.3 are latent factors that evolve in a non-
uniform fashion over time: for example parent skills are assumed to be constant,
whereas child skills evolve according to a complex non-linear technology. Thus the
relative scale of these factors will vary through time, which means that the absolute
size of their coefficients should change inversely to that variation to map out a
time-consistent investment function. One way to proceed would be to standardise
variables before running the investment equation, but this is impossible because the
investment equation is required in order to derive the state variables in each period.
Accordingly, we proceed by scaling the investment coefficients post-estimation to
cancel out factor variance, then by shrinking those scaled parameters towards








Table 3.B1: Estimates of the Investment Equation Parameters
Model (3.1)
CHS Table V Birth Age 1-2 Age 3-4 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Cognitive Skill δt,1 .003 .068 .219* .193* -.015 -.016 -.015 -.015
(.154) (.037) (.030) (.024) (.021) (.013) (.013) (.012)
Noncognitive Skill δt,2 .047 .259* .210* .202* .042* .048* .051* .055*
(.181) (.049) (.023) (.020) (.011) (.009) (.010) (.010)
P. Cog. Skill δt,3 .034 .052 .118* .149* .094* .118* .130* .141*
(.110) (.041) (.030) (.035) (.027) (.023) (.027) (.029)
P. Noncog. Skill δt,4 -.156 .002 .001 .003 .200* .251* .277* .299*
(.225) (.091) (.076) (.090) (.070) (.063) (.069) (.069)
Family Income δt,5 .142* .077 .151* .176* .098* .122* .132* .145*
(.042) (.056) (.032) (.035) (.026) (.021) (.024) (.024)
Model (3.2)
Cognitive Skill δt,1 .068 .216* .191* -.015 -.016 -.014 -.014
(.037) (.030) (.024) (.021) (.013) (.013) (.012)
Noncognitive Skill δt,2 .259* .210* .202* .042* .048* .051* .055*
(.049) (.022) (.020) (.011) (.009) (.010) (.010)
P. Cog. Skill δt,3 .052 .118* .149* .095* .119* .131* .141*
(.041) (.030) (.035) (.027) (.023) (.027) (.029)
P. Noncog. Skill δt,4 .000 -.003 -.002 .198* .248* .274* .296*
(.091) (.075) (.090) (.070) (.063) (.070) (.069)
Family Income δt,5 .076 .149* .175* .098* .122* .132* .144*
(.056) (.032) (.035) (.026) (.021) (.024) (.024)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * Indicates significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 3.B1 shows highly significant estimated coefficients in the investment
equation, with signs that match our expectations. We can also see some important
differences between stages of development, with the effect of child cognitive skills
on investment reducing markedly from age five, and the importance of parent
noncognitive skills increasing markedly in that second stage of development. These
results are consistent across our specifications.
Our specification for the laws of motion (3.5) of family income and of residual
investment also varies from that of CHS. We allow the factor loadings for residual
investment in periods t>1 to be freely estimated, and so we normalise the AR(1)
coefficient on residual investment to unity. CHS estimate that coefficient, but fix
one factor loading to unity in each period. These changes are not equivalent -
by imposing the same AR(1) coefficient through for all periods t, the extra factor
normalisations in CHS represent arbitrary and restrictive assumptions from period
t=3 onwards. From Table 3.B2 we can see that our adaptation substantially and
significantly reduces the unexplained variance in residual investment estimation.
Table 3.B2: Estimates of Family Income and Residual Investment Equations
Log Family Income at time t+1
CHS Table V Model (3.1) Model (3.2)
Time t Log Income %y .908 .901 .901
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Variance of Shocks νi,t,y .115 .113 .113
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Log Residual Investment at time t+1
Time t Log Residual Inv. %pi .831 — —
(.007) – –
Variance of Shocks νi,t,pi .062 .019 .019
(.003) (.001) (.001)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.B3 shows the estimated degree of heterogeneity within the technology
of skill formation under each specification. Individual heterogeneity is manifest
through the error term of the technology of skill formation, which is further de-
composed by Equation (3.3.1) into individual- and time-specific shocks for each
skill type, and into the correlation between residual investment (that which can-
not be predicted by the investment equation) and the error term in the production
function. Again, the magnitude of these coefficients cannot be directly compared
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due to the arbitrary scale of latent skill levels, but their sign and significance can
be.
We can see that unexplained variation (shocks to production) is similarly sig-
nificant across specifications, but that our estimates differ markedly from those
of CHS regarding the effect of residual investment on skill production (they refer
to this effect as that of unobserved heterogeneity). The results of CHS imply
that unobserved heterogeneity which increases parental investment also systemat-
ically reduces both cognitive and noncognitive skill production, which is somewhat
counter-intuitive. Our estimates suggest that our investment equation generally
predicts almost the entire systematic effect of parental investment on skill pro-
duction, except in the case of later cognitive skill production where unobserved
heterogeneity that increases investment also increases cognitive skill production.
These more intuitive findings are probably a consequence of the fact that our in-
vestment equation appears to be somewhat better specified than that of CHS (see
Table 3.B1).
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Table 3.B3: Estimates of individual Heterogeneity
Technology of Cognitive Skill Formation
CHS Table V Model (3.1) Model (3.2)
Variance of Shocks
Stage 1 Var(νi,t,C : t∈{1− 3}) .165 .498 .502
(.007) (.016) (.016)
Stage 2 Var(νi,t,C : t∈{4− 7}) .098 .445 .449
(.003) (.013) (.013)
Effect of Residual Investment
(unobserved heterogeneity)
Stage 1 γC1,8 -.046 .000 .000
(.017) (.131) (.130)
Stage 2 γC2,8 -.046 .137 .138
(.017) (.044) (.045)
Technology of Noncognitive Skill Formation
Variance of Shocks
Stage 1 Var(νi,t,NC : t∈{1− 3}) .203 .991 .996
(.012) (.057) (.058)
Stage 2 Var(νi,t,NC : t∈{4− 7}) .102 .488 .491
(.003) (.016) (.017)
Effect of Residual Investment
(unobserved heterogeneity)
Stage 1 γNC1,8 -.066 .000 .000
(.029) (.160) (.161)
Stage 2 γNC2,8 -.066 .036 .036
(.029) (.063) (.075)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
C The Marginal Productivity of Input A (in per-
centage terms) is increasing in Input B if and
only if their Elasticity of Substitution < 1
Proof of the above statement. Consider a simple production technology Y =
f(A,B), where all inputs and outputs are non-negative. Then the marginal pro-
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1 > fA · fB
Y · fAB
since inputs and outputs are non-negative. The right-hand side of the last inequal-
ity is precisely the original form of the elasticity of technical (or intertemporal)
substitution between A and B, as derived by Hicks (1932).
D Derivation of the economic interpretation of
the γi in a nested and normalised CES func-
tion


















where: φks ∈ [−∞, 1] ;
n∑
i=1
γi=1; and: γi ≥ 0 ∀ i. (3.11)
We first prove Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 Under monotonic preferences and with positive prices, the parameters
γi in the normalised n-factor CES production function (3.11) represent the share
of resources optimally dedicated to input xi at any point along the ray in the pro-
duction space that contains the normalisation point.
Proof:
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Maximise (3.11) subject to the resource constraint
n∑
i=1
pixi ≤ R. (3.12)
This holds with equality when preferences are monotonic and prices pi are positive.
The first order condition of this system under Lagrangian maximisation is therefore








.f(·)(1−φ) = λpi. (3.13)
By forming the ratio of any two of these equations we obtain the well-known
relationship between the optimal marginal rate of substitution between two goods
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Equation (3.15) is specialises to give (3.9) in the two-factor case, and specialises
further to give (3.7) at the implicit normalisation of Θ = 1. Furthermore, note
that, at any point x along the ray containing Θ we will have that x = k.Θ for







Thus we have demonstrated that γi can be interpreted along that ray as the share
of total resources which should optimally be allocated to xi. 
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For our main theorem we show that Lemma 1 generalises to an arbitrary nested
CES production function.
Theorem 1 Under monotonic preferences, with positive prices, and at any point
along the ray in the production space that contains the normalisation point: the
share of total resources optimally allocated to input xi within an arbitrary nested
and normalised CES production function is obtained by multiplying its coefficient
γi with the γ coefficients on all nested levels that contain xi.
Proof:
We proceed by induction over the number of nesting levels in an arbitrary
nested and normalised CES production function g(y). Lemma 1 provides the
result for nesting level 0, and so to prove 1 it suffices to show the induction step
whereby an arbitrary normalised CES production function (3.11) is substituted
for some (normalised) input yi/Θi within an arbitrary nested and normalised CES
production function g(y).
We first fix some notation. Denote the composite, post-substitution, produc-
tion function as G := g ◦ f . Denote by m the number of factors in the initial
production function g, and let Θg ∈ Rm be its normalisation point. Fix any point
y = k.Θg along the ray in the production space containing Θg. Denote by Θf the
normalisation point of the nested CES function f that is to be substituted for yi,
and denote by ΘG the concatenation of the first i− 1 elements of Θg, followed by
the n elements of Θf , followed by the final m− i elements of Θg. Similarly denote
by Y the concatenation of the first i− 1 elements of y, followed by the n elements
of x, followed by the final m− i elements of y.
By the induction assumption, the share of total resource optimally dedicated to
each input yj within g is given by product of its coefficient γj with the γ coefficients
for all nesting levels which contain yj. Denote that product as
∏
j for each input
yi. We must show that the share of resources optimally allocated to each input
yj, j ≡/i is unchanged by the above substitution, and that the share of resources
optimally allocated to each additional input xk is given by γk.
∏
i.
For the former, the proof of Lemma 1 demonstrates that it would suffice to
show that the marginal product MPj(y) of any input yj, j ≡/i at the point y
of the production function g is equal to MPj˜(Y ), the marginal product of the
corresponding input j˜ at the point Y of the composite production function G,
where j˜ := j if j < i, and j˜ := j + n otherwise. To see this, note that the term
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in MPj˜(Y ) is equivalent because
∑n
k=1 γxk = 1.
Given that the share of resources optimally allocated to each input yj, j ≡/i is
unchanged by the substitution of f for yi/Θi, and since the γi sum to unity, we
have that the share of the total resources RG available for the composite function
that is optimally allocated to the newly nested function f remains ∏i .RG. We




i = xipiRG ,
namely that the product of the coefficient on each newly nested input xi with all
coefficients on its nesting levels ∏i gives the share of total resources that should
optimally be allocated to that input at any point along the ray from the origin
that contains ΘG. 
Note that Theorem 1 could equivalently be rewritten as Corollary 1:
Corollary 1 If the normalised CES function f represents the production of an
intermediate good yi/Θi which is an input to normalised CES production function
g, and each function is normalised so that its share parameters are interpretable
along a ray-of-interest within its respective production space, then the compound
production function G := g ◦ f , is normalised so that its share parameters are
interpretable along the corresponding ray within its production space.
Further analysis of arbitrarily normalised and nested production functions are
provided in Embrey (2019c). In particular, I show there that standard results re-
garding the derivation of Linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas production functions
as limiting cases of the CES family extend to the arbitrarily normalised and nested
case, and that the standard derivation of the Translog production function as a
second order approximation around the Cobb-Douglas special case is extended to
a new derivation of the Translog function as a second order approximation to a
normalised CES production function around its normalisation point.
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Noncognitive skills have provoked substantial research interest in recent
years. However, existing evidence for their importance relies heavily upon
reduced-form regressions that do not account for the simultaneous produc-
tion of cognitive and noncognitive skills. Moreover, existing constructs of
noncognitive skill are typically chosen for their convenience, or else for their
explanatory power over psychological survey items. In response, we ana-
lyse a decision-theoretic model of educational development to derive five
candidate noncognitive skills, and we test their importance by adapting an
established longitudinal and structural econometric model of multidimen-
sional skill formation. We find: first, that noncognitive skills matter for
cognitive development; second, that different aspects of noncognitive skills
matter to different degrees; and third, that once a child begins to take her
own decisions, her propensity to think analytically becomes the most im-
portant noncognitive determinant of her ongoing cognitive development.
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1 Introduction
Noncognitive skills are increasingly acknowledged as important determinants of
individual outcomes. It is now well established that childhood noncognitive skill
levels predict adult outcomes in employment, wages, health, and criminality (Mof-
fitt et al. 2011; Segal 2013; Heckman, Pinto & Savelyev 2013). However, research
into noncognitive skills rarely goes beyond reduced-form empirics. Furthermore,
there is little consensus as to what noncognitive skills are, and there is almost no
theoretical basis for the mechanism(s) by which they might act.
Our first contribution is to derive a theoretical foundation for five candidate
noncognitive skills. We build upon the model of childhood skill formation that
was developed in Chapter 2 (Embrey 2019f), to identify five specific and tangible
mechanisms through which an aspect of noncognitive skill could affect a child’s
cognitive development. We show precisely how and why a child’s day-to-day edu-
cational investment decisions will be affected by: her academic confidence, her
resilience to failure, her drive to succeed, her cost of effortful task participation,
and her propensity to think analytically. Each of these potential mechanisms gen-
erates a testable hypothesis that its associated noncognitive skill should be an
important determinant of childhood cognitive development.
Our second contribution is to test each of these hypotheses. Ordinary regres-
sions cannot do this reliably, because cognitive and noncognitive skills develop
simultaneously from the same set of inputs. To account for this simultaneity, we
adapt the econometric model of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation that
was pioneered by Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) and developed further in
Chapter 4 (Embrey 2019d). This recursive model of multidimensional skill form-
ation utilises longitudinal data to disentangle the effects of self-productivity and
cross-productivity in the technologies of cognitive and noncognitive skill produc-
tion. Thus our hypotheses may be tested by the statistical significance of the
cross-productivity parameter for the input share of present-period noncognitive
skills in the production of next-period cognitive skills. Additional benefits of this
estimation strategy are that it implements a factor-analytic measurement model
to correct for measurement error, and that it incorporates a structural investment
equation to correct for the potential endogeneity of parental investments.
We find that all five candidate noncognitive abilities are statistically significant
determinants of cognitive development. Moreover, the estimated effect sizes also
have economic significance. For the average child, we estimate that the input shares
of her drive to succeed and her cost of effortful participation separately account
for around 9% of her period-on-period cognitive development during her early
years, whilst her propensity to think analytically accounts for 14% of her period-
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on-period cognitive development during later childhood. Our point estimates of
the input share for each of these specific noncognitive skills are substantially and
significantly larger than those of our benchmark model, which follows Cunha,
Heckman & Schennach (2010) in assuming that prosocial and antisocial behaviours
adequately proxy for generic noncognitive skill levels.
Our results complement the seminal findings of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach
(2010) by providing micro-foundations for specific aspects of noncognitive skill,
and by uncovering evidence that several of these explain a larger part of childhood
cognitive development than generic noncognitive skill levels. Our results contrast
with those of Cunha et al. in that we find some specific aspects of noncognitive
skill to be increasingly important in later childhood, whereas they find noncognitive
skill to be almost irrelevant after the age of five. Cunha et al. take this result
to be a manifestation of the well-established fact that cognitive skills stabilise
from early childhood, and this conclusion is supported by their estimates which
show that cognitive skills are increasingly self-productive in later childhood. We
also find that cognitive skills are increasingly self-productive in later childhood –
except when the noncognitive skill in question is the child’s propensity to think
analytically. This countervailing result is commensurate with the observation that
a child’s own decision-making will become an increasingly important determinant
of her educational investment levels as she matures.
The increasing importance of a child’s propensity to think analytically has
important implications, both for public policy and for economic theory. For eco-
nomic theory, it implies that an individual’s propensity to think analytically is
an economically relevant determinant of her decision-making, at least within the
domain of educational investment. Thus economic theory should consider whether
there might be other decision domains in which the normative decision theory
represented by Figure 4.1 might not provide as much insight as its generalisation
in Figure 4.2. For public policy, it implies that the effect of a child’s increas-
ing self-determinacy in later childhood can outweigh the effect of early cognitive
stabilisation. Thus, contrary to most of the literature, we conclude that later in-
terventions could potentially be more effective than early interventions, provided
they successfully develop the noncognitive skill of an individual’s propensity to
think analytically.
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2 Existing Knowledge
1 The Empirical Literature
Although the empirical importance of noncognitive skills is well established, the
appropriate interpretation of the term ‘noncognitive skills’ is not (Thiel & Thom-
sen 2013; Rustichini et al. 2016). The term was coined by Heckman & Rubinstein
(2001) as a catch-all for the set of all individual traits and abilities that one would
not generally describe as ‘cognitive’, and so existing operationalisations of non-
cognitive skill range from the big-five traits of personality psychology, to proxies
such as antisocial behaviors and participation in sporting activities (for a selective
survey see Humphries & Kosse 2017).1 Such measures are atheoretical, but it is
nevertheless pragmatic to make use of them given their predictive validity and
intuitive relevance.
More recently, behavioural economic theory has added to the set of candidate
noncognitive skills by identifying preference parameters such as discount factors
and risk premia that ought to affect choice behavior. Such preference paramet-
ers are typically elicited experimentally, although there is evidence that simple
Likert-style survey items may provide equally useful measurements of economic
preferences (Dohmen et al. 2011). Recent research has found that these micro-
founded noncognitive skills may be comparable to personality traits in terms of
their predictive power for life outcomes, and also that these two subsets of noncog-
nitive skills may be somewhat complementary as determinants of those outcomes
(Becker et al. 2012; Burks et al. 2015; Rustichini et al. 2016; Almås et al. 2016;
Humphries & Kosse 2017). Sadly it is rare for studies that regress life outcomes on
preference parameters to explicitly present a model that relates those preference
parameters to the outcome in question; indeed the present study is the first that
I know of which deliberately analyzes a theoretical model to generate and test
hypotheses as to which specific noncognitive skills should affect a given outcome
of interest.
Most existing evidence on the importance of noncognitive skills is derived from
reduced-form estimations that treat skills as static across time. Of the 27 re-
cent studies into noncognitive skills that were identified by Humphries & Kosse
(2017), only one went beyond reduced-form estimations, and none derived micro-
foundations for their noncognitive measures. Reduced-form studies provide useful
indicative results of associations between observables, but ultimately the causal
interpretation of such studies is jeopardised by the potential for confounding vari-
1The big-five traits are typically described as: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to experience, following the NEO-PI taxonomy of McCrae & Costa
(1985).
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ables. This is particularly true in the context of individual differences in life
outcomes, and it can only be partially mitigated by controlling for observables.
Of the many studies listed by Humphries & Kosse (2017), two utilise truly lon-
gitudinal approaches to tackle this problem. Heineck & Anger (2010) estimate
individual random effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity, whilst Heck-
man, Humphries & Veramendi (2018) estimate an instrumented dynamic choice
model to establish the causal effects of education, but not necessarily the causal
effects of noncognitive skill levels.
The econometric challenge presented by the simultaneous and dynamic pro-
duction of both cognitive and noncognitive skills has inspired a small number
of researchers to develop explicit econometric models of that production process.
The seminal contributions in this field are those of Cunha & Heckman (2008) and
Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010). These studies estimate the production
share of noncognitive skills within the cognitive development process to be small,
at 2% or 6% in a child’s early years and vanishing thereafter. Comparable results
are found by Attanasio et al. (2015) and Hernández-Alava & Popli (2017), whilst
Helmers & Patnam (2011) find that noncognitive ability negatively affects cognit-
ive development – although this finding may be less reliable because it is based
upon a single period of observation. The results of Coneus, Laucht & Reuß (2012)
suggest that these inconsistencies may stem from the inconsistent operationalisa-
tion of noncognitive skills between these studies: they decompose noncognitive
skills into emotional and mental skills to find that only the latter positively affect
cognitive development. Although this conclusion is intuitively plausible, there is
also conflicting evidence from Reuß (2011), who tends to draw the opposite con-
clusion from the same operationalization within the same dataset. The mixed
findings of this specialist literature contrast with those of the broader field of the
behavioral economics of education, wherein the importance of noncognitive skills
for educational production is no-longer in question (Koch, Nafziger & Nielsen 2015;
Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos 2016).
The specialist educational production literature is reviewed in Chapter 3 (Em-
brey 2019d), where I conclude that the original work by Cunha, Heckman & Schen-
nach (2010) still represents the state of the art in that field. Cunha et al. use
measurements of antisocial behaviours as a proxy for noncognitive skills, and so in
this study we will use a similar set of measures as a benchmark specification. The
results from this benchmark can be compared meaningfully to those of Model 1
in Chapter 3, which develops the contribution of Cunha et al. by normalizing the
production function, by relaxing over-identifying assumptions within the factor
model, and by amending some other minor discrepancies within the code. The
difference between the results in Chapter 3 and those of the present benchmark
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specification is that the former are derived from the US Children of the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth, whilst the latter are derived from the UK Millenium
Cohort Study.
2 The Theoretical Literature
The objective of our theoretical analysis is to establish a mechanism by which
noncognitive skills could affect cognitive development through childhood. Most
existing models of educational investment treat cognitive development as a black
box, and so provide insufficient insight for our present purpose.2 However, the
canonical model due to Becker (1964) does provide a useful intuition that human
capital may be generated through the input of costly effort, and we can further
develop that intuition in light of the empirical results of Fiorini & Keane (2014)
and Del Boca, Monfardini & Nicoletti (2017), who find that children’s time invest-
ments are a substantial determinant of their cognitive development. These insights
suggest that cognitive production might usefully be modelled as the cumulative
outcome of participation in a series of minor educational investment opportunities,
an approach which has been formalised by Sjögren & Sällström (2004), Filippin
& Paccagnella (2012), MacLeod (2016), and in Chapter 2 (Embrey 2019f). This
approach is intuitively appealing and, to my knowledge, it is the only candidate
mechanism for cognitive production that has been formalised within the theoretical
literature on educational development.
There nevertheless remain considerable variations in the detailed assumptions
that underpin economic theories of educational development. For example, the
prevailing assumption in that literature is that ability is a fixed endowment (see,
for example Bénabou & Tirole 2002; Filippin & Paccagnella 2012; Belzil 2007;
Köszegi 2006; Akerlof & Kranton 2002; Wang & Yang 2003; Sjögren & Sällström
2004), whilst only a few authors allow ability to be developed through educational
participation (see, for example MacLeod 2016; Embrey 2019f). The empirical real-
ity is that the nascent abilities endowed upon us by nature develop throughout
childhood and beyond, and they do so as a function of our developmental environ-
ment and experiences (Cunha & Heckman 2010; Heckman & Mosso 2014). That
being so, it is possible that some models with static ability may use the term ‘abil-
ity’ as short-hand for a concept of an individual’s idiosyncratic capacity to develop
ability, in which case this modelling discrepancy would be semantic, rather than
fundamental in nature. Presumably this generally is the case, because it is widely
accepted throughout the literature that human capital can be developed through
the exertion of effort.
2Notable ‘black box’ models include those of Becker (1962, 1964) and Cunha & Heckman
(2007).
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A more fundamental discrepancy within the literature is therefore the question
of whether educational participation produces cognitive development ipso facto,
or whether it is necessary to achieve success in order to develop human capital.
Here again MacLeod (2016) and Embrey (2019f) diverge from the main body of
literature by assuming that, in the words of a somewhat sceptical anonymous
reviewer: “in the attempt to understand algebra or to acquire familiarity with a
computer, what matters is not to actually achieve this skill, but to have attempted
to do so.” Again the discrepancy here may be largely semantic. The fact is that in a
modern educational setting, the child who genuinely attempts to master a current
learning objective is highly likely to do so, whether independently or through
seeking support from peers and from the teacher. It is therefore the subjective
perception of success that is in question. Perceived success may be determined by
formal grading or by informal comparison with one’s peers, and it is this perception
that gives rise to either positive or negative psychic payoffs under the assumptions
of Embrey (2019f).3
In the following section we maintain the assumptions of Embrey (2019f), and
we further analyse that model to derive five candidate noncognitive abilities. We
adopt this model: i) because it is the approach that most closely formalises the
accepted classical view that cognitive development is produced through the exer-
tion of effort; ii) because the results of Propositions 1-3 below would be unaffected
under the alternative interpretation of success (as is also the case for the main
results of MacLeod (2016) and Embrey (2019f)); iii) because the conclusions of
most alternative models collapse under our preferred interpretation of success,
since they frequently depend upon a trade-off between the benefit of learning and
the probability of achieving that benefit; and iv) because Observation 1 critic-
ally depends upon our preferred interpretation of success, and that observation is
strongly supported by our empirical results.
3 The Theoretical Model
We model the mechanism of educational investment as a series of elemental parti-
cipation decisions. Thus, cognitive development during the early years of childhood
will be produced by participation in games, challenges, and other informal edu-
cational opportunities that may be provided by a child’s parents. As the child
matures, incremental educational investment opportunities will increasingly be
comprised of classwork, homework, and extra-curricular activities within formal
3Embrey (2019f) presents a formal theoretical exposition of the modern educational system: in
principle opportunity is available to all; in practice the social context and early-years development
of disadvantaged children may lead to their not taking up that opportunity until it is too late.
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education. In each period t, the agent must therefore decide whether or not to
engage with the present educational opportunity, and she will do so according to
the extensive form decision problem presented in Figure 4.1. The payoffs relevant
to that decision are:
dt the present value of the human capital developed through task participation,
ct the direct and opportunity cost of effortful task participation,
pst the psychic payoff to perceived success, and
pft the psychic cost of perceived failure.
Figure 4.1: A Representative Agent’s Participation Decision
pit 1−pit
dt + pst − ct dt − pft − ct 0
Note: Adapted from Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 (Embrey 2019f).
Cognitive skill development is therefore modelled as a cumulative process,
wherein the stage game presented in Figure 4.1 is played repeatedly. Accordingly,
the developmental payoff dt must take into account the full stream of expected
future-period consequences from present-period participation, and so it may be
defined recursively by
dt = Vt + δE
[
(Ut+1 | engagementt)− (Ut+1 | avoidancet)
]
, for t < T,
and dT := VT ; (4.1)
where δ is the agent’s discount factor, where Ut+1 is her next-period utility pay-
off, and where Vt is the present value of the incremental life-cycle benefit of the
educational opportunity in period t. Intuitively, Vt enumerates the direct value
of the skills developed by the present task, whilst the expectation term enumer-
ates the indirect value of the future developmental opportunities opened up by
the present task. This temporal interdependence greatly complicates any analysis
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of the model, and so we develop here only such analytic machinery as is neces-
sary to derive our candidate noncognitive skills. A full analysis of the equilibrium
pathways of the repeated game is presented in Chapter 2 (Embrey 2019f).4
We begin with some basic assumptions regarding the agent’s payoffs for all
periods t. First, all payoffs are well defined maps from the set of all possible events
into the set of real numbers. Second, the payoff due to inaction is normalised
to zero – this is without loss of generality since utility is defined up to affine
transformation. Third, pst ≥ 0 and −pft ≤ 0: we assume that success is pleasant
and that failure is unpleasant. Fourth, ct ≥ 0: we assume the agent has some
outside option which is at least as attractive as doing nothing. Fifth, Vt ≥ 0: we
assume that the life-cycle benefit of each educational task is non-negative. Note
that this does not necessarily imply that dt ≥ 0; counter-examples could occur
if present participation were expected to have negative consequences on future
parameter values – for example it may be that participation is likely to lead to
perceived failure, and that this is expected to affect future decisions by increasing
pf , the agent’s aversion to failure, thereafter.
We continue by establishing the stage-game participation condition as implied
by these assumptions. In each period t, the agent will engage with the present
educational opportunity if and only if her expected utility from doing so exceeds
her expected utility from avoiding that opportunity. That is, if and only if:
dt + pit.(pst + p
f
t ) ≥ ct + pft , (4.2)
where pit is the agent’s anticipated probability of feeling successful conditional
upon engagement with the present educational opportunity.5
Given specific values for each parameter, Equation (4.2) determines whether
the agent will engage with the present educational opportunity. However, ex ante
there are multiple potential sources of variation around this clear prediction. First,
each of the parameters in Equation (4.2) is likely to depend upon the specific
4This formulation is subtly distinct from that developed in Chapter 2, in that here Vt is built
into the utility payoffs in each period as it is accumulated, rather than carried back recursively
from a realisation in period T +1. These formulations are equivalent if educational opportunities
are perfect substitutes (as was maintained in Chapter 2), but for the present analysis we do not
require that assumption, and so we take this more general approach.
5In this formulation, the realisation of perceived success determines which of the psychic
payoffs ps and pf will become manifest, but it does not affect dt. Thus we assume that human
capital is developed by engagement with each educational opportunity, whilst the perception
of success is determined independently, for example by comparisons with one’s peers or by the
allocation of grades. This assumption was discussed in Section 2, where it was noted that it
is not critical for Propositions 1-3. Indeed it is straightforward to adapt the model such that
the agent only learns from her perceived successes, and that adaptation would be orthogonal to
those propositions. On the other hand, Observation 1 would be weakened or reversed under the
adapted model.
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nature of the period t task. Thus the realisation ct, for example, represents a
draw from the distribution of the agent’s potential participation costs across all
possible educational opportunities in period t. Second, it is unlikely that the agent
will know her true parameter values for any given task a priori: instead she will
estimate these from a signal that is likely to contain an element of stochastic
noise. For example the apparent effort requirement of an educational task is likely
to depend upon a teacher’s presentation of that task. Thus the agent’s anticipated
participation cost ct should more properly be considered as ct(x, y), a draw from
the distribution of posterior ct across all possible task × signal pairs in period t.
Since only the distributions of each parameter in Equation (4.2) are fixed ex









dt + pit.(pst + p
f
t ) ≥ ct + pft
]
df(y |x) df(x), (4.3)
whereXt is the set of possible tasks in period t, where Yt is the set of possible signals
in that period, and where f(y |x) = fYt(y |Xt = x) denotes the conditional prob-
ability distribution function of possible signals y for each task x. Here we suppress
the function notation pit(x, y), pst(x, y), p
f
t (x, y), ct(x, y), and λt(dt, pit, pst , p
f
t , ct) for
clarity. The integral λt exists whenever the set Xt × Yt of task × signal pairs is
probability measurable – indeed its result is precisely the probability measure of
the subset of pairs for which the participation condition (4.2) is satisfied.
Equation (4.3) provides a clear notion of how each parameter could affect an
agent’s ex ante probability of participating in the period t educational opportunity.
Nevertheless, not all parameters will be effectual in all circumstances. For example,
there may be some tasks x for which
[1− pit(x, y)] .pft (x, y) > dt(x, y) + pit(x, y).pst(x, y), for all signals y : f(x, y) > 0.
(4.4)
In this case the participation condition (4.2) cannot be satisfied for any positive
value of ct. Intuitively, this is because the probability of success is sufficiently small
that the fear of failure exceeds both the developmental payoff and the potential
satisfaction from succeeding in the present task, and so participation would not be
optimal even if its cost were zero. In such cases we will say that the participation
condition (4.2) is not binding at x:




dt + pit.(pst + p
f
t ) ≥ ct + pft
]
df(y |x) ∈ (0, 1) for all x ∈ χ.
Iain P. Embrey Pathways to Poverty 99
Thus we say that the participation condition is binding for tasks χ if it is possible,
but not certain, that the signal y will induce participation.
Where the participation condition is binding, the participation probability λt
can be affected by the distributions of ct, pst , p
f
t , and pit over the set of possible task
× signal pairs. Let us refer to these distributions as Ct, P st , P ft , and Πt respectively.
In order to assess the effects of heterogeneity in parameter distributions, we will
use the following partial ordering:
Definition 2 A family of partial orders on parameter distributions:
For any  ∈ R, write C˜t > Ct on χ ⊆ Xt : if χ occurs with positive probability,
if c˜t(x, y) > ct(x, y) +  for all (x, y) ∈ χ×Yt that satisfy f(x, y) > 0,
and if c˜t(x, y) ≥ ct(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ Xt×Yt that satisfy f(x, y) > 0.
We define partial orders over P s, P f , and Π analogously.
This partial ordering is intuitive: C˜t > Ct requires that all possible realizations
of C˜t exceed the corresponding realizations of Ct by at least , and we will say that
C˜t > Ct on a non-empty subset of tasks χ if the same criterion holds for all tasks
in that subset. In the latter case we also require C˜t > Ct to be unambiguous –
that is we disallow cases in which the inequality could be reversed for an alternative
choice of non-empty subset.
We are now ready to derive our candidate noncognitive abilities. The first of
these are straightforward interpretations of the parameter distributions Ct, P st , and
P ft . Each of these distributions describes an aspect of individual heterogeneity at
time t, namely: the agent’s cost of effortful participation, her drive to succeed, and
her resilience to failure. Our fourth candidate noncognitive ability is confidence,
which emerges as a bias in the agent’s subjective probability of success distribution
Πt. Our final noncognitive ability is the agent’s propensity to think analytically,
which arises when the normative decision model of Figure 4.1 is relaxed into the
generalised decision framework presented in Embrey (2019e).
1 The Cost of Effortful Participation
A traditional view of the direct and opportunity cost of effortful task participation
would be that this is a purely environmental factor. However, further consideration
reveals that individual heterogeneity could important here too: there is no reason
to suppose that all children will require an equivalent amount of effort to focus on
school work or to forgo unrelated chatter and classroom antics. As such, it seems
intuitively plausible that an exogenous reduction in an individual’s cost of effortful
task participation could increase their educational participation in expectation.
Given the machinery above, we can identify sufficient conditions under which this
intuition will hold:
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Proposition 1 A reduction in participation costs C can increase cognitive de-
velopment:
1. For discrete tasks X : If there exists any period t, task x ∈ Xt, and positive
 ∈ R such that the participation condition is binding on {x} and such that
C˜t < Ct on {x}; if signals for task x are continuously distributed over a
connected support, and if the parameters ct, dt, pst , p
f
t , and pit are continuous
functions of those signals, then λt(c˜t, ·) > λt(ct, ·).
2. For a continuum of tasks X : If there exists any period t, tasks χ ⊆ Xt, and
positive  ∈ R such that the participation condition is binding on χ and such
that C˜t < Ct on χ; if tasks and signals are jointly continuously distributed
over a connected support, and if the parameters ct, dt, pst , p
f
t , and pit are
continuous functions of those tasks and signals, then λt(c˜t, ·) > λt(ct, ·).
3. Corollary: a strict increase in participation probability λt will lead to a strict
increase in total expected human capital development E∑Tτ=t Vτ .λτ .δτ−T ,
either if:
A. Tasks are perfect substitutes and the participation constraint remains
binding for some χτ ⊆ Xτ for all τ > t, or if:
B. Present-period participation weakly increases the probability of future
participation. (proof in Appendix A)
Proposition 1 confirms our intuition that a monotonic decrease in an agent’s
period t cost distribution will, in quite general circumstances, have a positive
effect on their expected participation likelihood in that period. Moreover, the
corollary shows that, under reasonable additional assumptions, this increase in
participation likelihood will strictly increase the total expected value of the human
capital accumulated during the repeated supergame. Neither of these outcomes is
certain for any individual, however they generate an empirical hypothesis that is
testable at the population level. Children with lower costs of effortful participation
over a span of periods are likely to exhibit greater total cognitive development on
average during those periods, all else being equal. The empirical challenge, as ever,
is to identify a causal effect of C within the constraints of a world where all else
is rarely equal.
We discuss our empirical strategy toward that challenge in Section 4. Within
that strategy, we measure the latent noncognitive skill of low participation cost
using the observations summarised in table 4.1. We believe that the commonality
between these measurements at each time period provides a plausible operation-








Table 4.1: Measurements of the cost of effortful task participation (−C)
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
Shows interest in test stimuli Visitor {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,368
Responds well to requests Visitor {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,368
Combined: –restless; –fidgets (parent); –fidgets (visitor) Vis. & Par. ≈R −IRT ∗ 15,356
Moves to a new activity after finishing task Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,774 13,489
Generally obedient Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783
Combined: obedient; responds well to requests Parent {0, 1, 2, 3} 14,773 13,488
Combined: –restless; –fidgets Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,772 13,488 12,822 11,028
Combined: interest; involvement; motivation; concentration Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3} 3,201
Combined: obedient; –restless; –fidgets Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3}; {0, 1} 8,712 7,275
Combined: school interesting; –fed up at scl; –tired at school Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 12,817
Combined: school interesting; like scl; –tired at scl Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 12,850 11,351
Combined: scl interesting; like scl; –hard to focus at scl Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 11,351
Combined, –often: exhausted; restless; hard to concentrate Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 11,125
Note: Noncognitive skill measurements in sweep 1 (age 9 months) are pleasantness, wariness, and fussiness.
∗Combined using Item Response Theory, see Section 4.1.
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2 Drive and Resilience
It is intuitively plausible that an individual’s drive to succeed could increase her
educational participation. We are able to refine this intuition by identifying our
agent’s drive to succeed as the parameter ps, which quantifies the psychic payoff
that our agent believes that she will enjoy if she is pleased with her performance.
ps may be derived from extrinsic feedback, such as the receipt of a grade that
our agent perceives to be ‘good’, or it may be derived from an intrinsic sense of
satisfaction. We can also separate our agent’s drive to succeed from the related
concepts of aspiration and thirst for learning, each of which would be manifest
through dt. The distinction between dt and ps is not merely semantic. According
to our model, high aspiration would motivate educational participation even if
that participation were certain to lead to an embarrassingly poor performance,
because such participation would nevertheless generate learning. In contrast, a
high drive to succeed would only motivate participation if there were some chance
that participation would lead to the perception of success.
Conversely, if participation leads to failure then our agent anticipates paying
the psychic cost −pf . This payoff is the dual to ps within our model, and it
operationalises a concept of resilience. Intuitively, a more resilient agent has a
larger (less negative) value of −pf , and so she anticipates less severe disutility
from perceived failure. Thus the resilient agent is more willing to attempt tasks
where the probability of failure is non-negligible. Table 4.2 lists the measurements
by which we operationalise P s and P f , and Proposition 2 formalizes their intuitive
importance by supplying precise conditions under which an increase in either P s
or −P f would increase the likelihood of educational participation.
Proposition 2 An increase in either drive P s or resilience −P f can increase
cognitive development:
1. For discrete tasks X : If there exists any period t, task x ∈ Xt, and positive
 ∈ R such that the participation condition is binding on {x} and such that
P˜ st > P
s
t on {x}; if signals for task x are continuously distributed over
a connected support, if the parameters ct, dt, pst , p
f
t , and pit are continuous
functions of those signals, and if there exists some δ > 0 such that pit(x, y) >
δ for all y ∈ Yt, then λt(p˜st(x, y), ·) > λt(pst(x, y), ·).
2. For a continuum of tasks X : If there exists any period t, tasks χ ⊆ Xt,
and positive  ∈ R such that the participation condition is binding on χ and
such that −P˜ ft > −P ft on χ; if tasks and signals are jointly continuously
distributed over a connected support, if the parameters ct, dt, pst , p
f
t , and pit








Table 4.2: Measurements of drive (P s) and resilience (−P f)
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
drive
Positive reactions during cognitive testing Visitor {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,368
Beams with pride when praised Parent {0, 1, 2, 3} 13,750
Likes to work things out for self Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,774 13,490
Sees tasks through to the end Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,769 13,485 12,677 11,210
Sees tasks through to the end Teacher {0, 1, 2} 8,718 7,291
Likes to do well Self {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,627
Values hard work Self {0, 1, 2} 11,347
resilience
–Negative reactions during cognitive testing Visitor {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,368
Quickly gets over being upset Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,774 13,489
–Easily Frustrated Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,773 13,490
Cambridge Gambling Task risk score Elicited ≈R 12,521 10,707
–Feels bad when does wrong Self {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,512
Willing to take risks Self {0, 1, ..., 10} 11,222
Note: Noncognitive skill measurements in sweep 1 (age 9 months) are pleasantness, wariness, and fussiness.
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δ > 0 such that pit(x, y) < 1 − δ for all x ∈ χ, y ∈ Yt, then λt(p˜ft (x, y), ·) >
λt(pft (x, y), ·).
3. Moreover, analogous results hold for P s for a continuum of tasks, and for
P f for discrete tasks, and the corollary to Proposition 1 applies in all of the
above cases.
Proposition 2 is identical to Proposition 1, save that it demonstrates the im-
portance of Πt as a mediator of P s and P f . Drive to succeed will only affect
participation if there is a non-negligible chance of success, whilst resilience is only
important if there is a non-negligible chance of failure. Reflexively, Πt will only be
an important determinant of participation if at least one of P s or P f is sufficiently
large.
3 Confidence
We have seen that an agent’s probability of success distribution Πt characterises
her cognitive ability at time t. However, since the agent’s payoffs are decision
utilities, in precise terms it is her subjective cognitive ability that is represented
by Πt – and there is no guarantee that her subjective beliefs will be unbiased.
In our model, bias could arise in the agent’s subjective probability of success
either through systematic inaccuracy in her prior beliefs, or through systematic
inaccuracy in her signal interpretation. Both of these are plausible: for example
there is evidence that many individuals over-estimate their own ability (Bénabou
& Tiróle 2016), and that teachers and parents overweight praise in their feedback
(Mueller & Dweck 1998). It is therefore likely that Πt will contain an element of
true cognitive ability, but also an element of subjective bias.
Positive bias in subjective cognitive ability Πt is a manifestation of (over-) con-
fidence.6 As such, we might expect an individual who has greater confidence in her
own ability to participate more readily in educational opportunities, since she will
overweight the probability of obtaining the positive payoff of success ps and under-
weight the probability of obtaining the negative cost of failure pf . Proposition 3
confirms that confidence will have a positive effect on participation across a broad
class of situations; a result which echoes the main theoretical prediction of Filippin
& Paccagnella (2012), but which contradicts the predictions of Bénabou & Tirole
(2002) and Köszegi (2006). Table 4.3 provides our empirical operationalisation of
confidence as a noncognitive skill.
6(Over-)confidence has been defined in this way by Bénabou & Tirole (2002), by Köszegi








Table 4.3: Measurements of confidence (E pit)
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
–Seems nervous or clingy Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,773 13,488
–Often seems worried Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,773 13,488
Perseveres with difficult tasks Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,773 13,488
Volunteers to help others Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,772 13,487
Combined: -worried; –nervous; volunteers to help Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 12,600 11,069
Combined: confident to try new things; perseveres Teacher {0, 1, 2} 3,186
Combined: –worried; –nervous; –down-hearted; volunteers to help Teacher {0, 1, ..., 6} 8,682
Combined: –worried; –nervous; volunteers to help Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 7,253
How often teacher thinks you’re clever Self {0, 1, 2} 12,672
Combined, how good at: English; maths; science Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 12,801 11,355
How happy with school work Self {0, 1, ..., 5} 12,903 11,170
Combined, Rosenberg self-worth items† Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 12,757 11,140
Combined: –worthless, –hopeless, –useless Self ≈R −IRT ∗ 11,143
Note: Noncognitive skill measurements in sweep 1 (age 9 months) are pleasantness, wariness, and fussiness.
∗Combined using Item Response Theory, see Section 4.1. †Satisfied with self; have good qualities; am capable; have value; feel good about self.
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Proposition 3 An increase in Πt, due either to an increase in current cognitive
ability or an increase in confidence, can increase future cognitive development:
1. For discrete tasks X : If there exists any period t, task x ∈ Xt, and positive
 ∈ R such that the participation condition is binding on {x} and such that
Π˜t > Πt on {x}; if signals for task x are continuously distributed over
a connected support, if the parameters ct, dt, pst , p
f
t , and pit are continuous
functions of those signals, and if there exists some δ > 0 such that either
ps(x, y) > δ or pf (x, y) > δ for all y ∈ Yt, then λt(p˜it(x, y), ·) > λt(pit(x, y), ·).
2. Moreover, analogous results hold for a continuum of tasks, and the corollary
to Proposition 1 is applicable.
4 State of Mind
Our final theoretically driven noncognitive skill arises when the normative decision
problem shown in Figure 4.1 is relaxed into the generalised decision framework of
Embrey (2019e). The model presented in Figure 4.1 is predicated upon a strong
set of assumptions which imply that all agents are required to act as if they trade
off present payoffs against future payoffs in all decision periods. This set of as-
sumptions is particularly restrictive for children, who frequently act without any
consideration for the long-term consequences of their actions. On a more funda-
mental level, this assumption set requires that both childhood desires and adult
returns to education can be meaningfully evaluated as quantities along the same
unidimensional utility scale, which is difficult to justify.
The simplest generalisation of Figure 4.1 that relaxes the normative assumption
set is shown in Figure 4.2. Here the agent will analyse future payoffs with prob-
ability ρt, or else they will follow their present impulses with probability (1−ρt).
The corresponding assumption set for this generalization is that all agents are
required to act as if they prioritise either impulsive or analytic payoffs in each
decision period. This assumption allows decisions to be made without any consid-
eration of their long-term consequences, and, whilst it still requires that all payoffs
must admit numerical valuations, it allows those valuations to lie along independ-
ent dimensions of the agent’s utility space. An extended comparison between the
foundational assumptions of the normative decision theory and of the generalised
decision theory is provided in Embrey (2019a).
Under the generalised model of Figure 4.2, each of two possible states of mind is
represented by a standard Neoclassical decision problem. Thus the psychic payoffs
to perceived success and failure only affect the agent under her impulsive state
of mind, whilst the long-term developmental payoff to educational participation is
only salient under an analytic state of mind. Similarly, we may decompose the cost
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Figure 4.2: A Representative Agent’s Participation Decision
1−ρt ρt
pit 1−pit pit 1−pit
pst − kt −pft − kt 0 dt − ζt dt − ζt 0
Note: Adapted from Embrey (2019e) with the author’s permission.
of effortful task participation ct into two components kt and ζt, which evaluate the
impulsive and analytic aspects of that participation cost respectively. The total
cost ct includes factors such as ‘not being bothered’, which lies entirely within the
impulsive component kt, and missing out on gossip, which lies within kt to the
extent that it that seems tantalizing in the moment, but which lies within ζt to
the extent that it has any lasting analytic value. Since the lasting analytic value of
classroom gossip is likely to be small, and since children of compulsory schooling
age are required to be present in the classroom whether or not they engage with
the present educational opportunity, we note that the analytic participation cost
ζt will typically be very low, whilst kt will typically be much greater.
These considerations imply that an individual’s state of mind ρt may be an
important noncognitive determinant of her educational development. If the agent
adopts an impulsive mindset in period t, then she will participate in the present
educational opportunity if and only if her expected enjoyment from feeling suc-
cessful exceeds both her fear of failure and her relatively high impulsive appraisal
of her participation cost. However, if the agent adopts an analytic mindset in
period t, then she will participate if and only if the educational benefit of doing so
exceeds her relatively low analytic appraisal of her participation cost. We should
therefore expect that an increase in the probability ρt with which an agent ad-
opts analytic preferences will increase her cognitive development except in rather
contrived circumstances.
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Observation 1 An increase in the state-of-mind parameter ρt will increase an
agent’s total cognitive development unless the quantity of cognitive development
that would be realised under her best analytic effort to optimize that development is
lower than than the accidental cognitive development that would be realised through
her pursuit of immediate gratification.
We will refer to ρt as the agent’s idiosyncratic propensity to think analytically.
It has been argued that this propensity can be measured by the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test of Frederick (2005); indeed it is in that context that the term propensity
to think analytically was first proposed (Pennycook et al. 2016; Pennycook & Ross
2016). If this is true, then there is substantial evidence to suggest that an indi-
vidual’s propensity to think analytically may have a pervasive influence across a
wide range of life outcomes (for reviews see Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler 2015;
Brañas-Garza, Kujal & Lenkei 2019). That possibility is investigated by Embrey
(2019e), where the decision-theoretic model presented in Figure 4.2 is applied to
a wide range of decision contexts to find theoretical evidence that an individual’s
propensity to think analytically could indeed have a pervasive influence over life
outcomes.
In the present chapter, we focus on the outcome of cognitive development
during childhood. Our data don’t include any Cognitive Reflection Test items,
however Table 4.4 demonstrates that they do include multiple empirical measures
of each individual’s propensity to consider the wider consequences of her actions.
The nature of these measurements underscores the distinction between an agent’s
propensity to think analytically and her discount factor. A discount factor determ-
ines how inter-temporal utility comparisons are made, and it is typically measured
by forcing a test subject to compare two or more alternatives. Such measurements
avoid the fundamental question of whether a comparison is truly possible, because
they ensure that the alternative payoffs are naturally located upon a single, usu-
ally monetary, scale. In doing so, experimental elicitations of a subject’s discount
factor induce the same pecuniary state of mind for the evaluation of both alternat-
ives. In our situation, we propose that an impulsive state of mind would focus on
the present-period payoffs of educational participation, whilst an analytic state of
mind would focus on its developmental payoffs. It is not clear that either state of
mind would naturally trade-off the two disparate sets of motivations against each








Table 4.4: Measurements for state of mind (ρ)
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
–Impulsive / acts without thinking Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,772 13,488
Chooses her own activities Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,774 13,490
–Easily distracted Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,773 13,488
Stops to think before acting Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,767 13,485
Considerate of others’ feelings Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,783 14,772 13,488
Combined: considers; shares; –easily distracted; thinks before acting Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 12,766 11,230
How often patient Parent {0, 1, ..., 10} 11,269
How good at controlling emotions Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 11,286
Focus during cognitive testing Visitor {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 14,368
Combined: considers consequences; awareness of: others; right & wrong Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3} 3,156
Combined: considers; shares; –easily distracted; thinks before acting Teacher {0, 1, ..., 7} 8,658
Combined: as above + works independently Teacher ≈R −IRT ∗ 7,305
–How often lose temper Self {0, 1, 2} 12,813
–How often get angry Self {0, 1, 2} 12,662
–How often school a waste of time Self {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,811 11,345
Combined: –use of cigarettes; drugs Self {0, 1, 2, 2.5, 3} 11,121
Note: Noncognitive skill measurements in sweep 1 (age 9 months) are pleasantness, wariness, and fussiness.
∗Combined using Item Response Theory, see Section 4.1.
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4 The Empirical Model
The foregoing section has produced five clear theoretical predictions; namely that
cognitive ability development should be increasing in each of: drive, resilience,
confidence, the cost of effortful participation, and the propensity to think ana-
lytically. We therefore adapt the empirical model pioneered by Cunha, Heckman
& Schennach (2010) to test each of these hypotheses. Since detailed discussions
of this empirical model are provided by those authors and in Chapter 3 (Embrey
2019d), we will present only a brief résumé here.
Our goal is to analyse the simultaneous production of cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills through childhood. For tractability, we will assume that the relevant
inputs at time t are captured by the state vector
(θCt , θNCt , It, ϑCt , ϑNCt ),
where θCt and θNCt denote the child’s cognitive and noncognitive skill levels, where
ϑCt and ϑNCt denote parent cognitive and noncognitive skill levels, and where It
denotes parental investment. Our operationalisation of each component of this
vector through childhood is shown in the tables of Section 3 and Appendix C.
Our object of interest is the technology by which cognitive and noncognitive
skills are produced. We will parametrise this technology using the CES functional
form, normalised to the sample mean level of each input. Thus we assume that,






























































γks,j =1; ϕks ∈ [−∞, 1] ; ∀s; k∈{C,NC}. (4.5)
In Equation (4.5) the γks,j are share parameters, that is they represent the
share of total resource that one should optimally allocate to input j for the form-
ation of skill k during developmental stage s at the sample mean input level
(ΘCt ,ΘNCt ,ΘIt ,ΘPCt ,ΘPNCt ). Thus the share γCs,2 represents an intuitive concept
of the ‘value’ to the average child of period t noncognitive skills θNCt in the pro-
duction of period t+1 cognitive skills θCt+1 during stage s of childhood development.
Equivalently, γCs,2 represents the output elasticity of θNCt in the production of θCt+1
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at the sample mean input level Θt.7
The γCs,2 are therefore our main parameters of interest, because they quantify
the importance of the present candidate noncognitive ability at each stage of child-
hood cognitive development. However the ϕCs are also of interest to us, because
they indicate the extent to which noncognitive skills can substitute for current cog-
nitive skills in the production of future cognitive skills. The elasticity of substitu-
tion between inputs for cognitive development during stage s is given by 1/(1−ϕCs ),
and an elasticity above unity would indicate that the inputs are reasonably sub-
stitutable, whereas an elasticity of below unity would indicate that the inputs are
mutually complementary.8
The remaining aspects of the econometric model are important for its validity,
but they are not central to our present purpose. First, each state variable is
considered to be latent, since none is directly observable. We therefore require
two or more measurement equations that proxy for each state variable in each
period in order to identify each as the factor-analytic commonality between its
measurements.9 However, our factor models depart from those of Cunha, Heckman
& Schennach (2010) to ensure that we do not impose multiple conflicting sets of
identifying restrictions. In particular we normalise the location and scale of each
latent factor during period one, but we do not impose any additional conflicting
normalisations thereafter. The consequences of imposing additional normalisations
were highlighted by Agostinelli & Wiswall (2016b), and they are summarised in
Chapter 3.
Second, we require parametric assumptions regarding the error terms ηi,t,k.
In the case that investment is endogenous because parents respond to private
signals of next-period skills, this term may be correlated with observed investment.
We therefore instrument parental investment with (OECD equivalised) household
income (controlling for the other input variables), and allow the error term pii,t
which represents unobserved heterogeneity within that investment equation to
appear within ηi,t,k := γks,6pii,t + νi,t,k, where the νi,t,k are assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero, and independent across skills and periods.
Third, we require production technologies for parental skills and for family
income in analogue to Equation (4.5). Parental cognitive skill is assumed to be
7See Embrey (2019c) for a detailed interpretation of share parameters within the normalised
CES production function.
8In precise terms, as the elasticity diverges to infinity the (normalised) CES form approaches
a (normalised) linear production technology with coefficients given by the γks,j ; as the elasticity
converges to zero the CES form approaches a Leontief production technology with input require-
ments given by the Θt,j ; and as the elasticity converges to unity the CES form approaches a
Cobb-Douglas production technology with shares given by the γks,j .
9We also require one additional measurement in each period to achieve non-parametric identi-
fication; for this and other details of the identification analysis see Cunha, Heckman & Schennach
(2010).
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constant due to data constraints, whilst parental noncognitive skill and family
income are assumed to follow AR(1) processes which ensure that their respective
factor-models are just-identified: as such parental noncognitive skills are mapped
directly forward into the next period to provide both location and scale for that
latent factor, whereas the AR(1) coefficient of family income is freely estimable
since we assume that our single measure of family income is accurate in each
period, which implies that the scale of that factor is already known.
Our estimation procedure adapts the code used in Chapter 3 (Embrey 2019d),
which in turn builds upon the procedure developed by Cunha, Heckman & Schen-
nach (2010). Under this procedure, the technology and ancillary equations are
estimated simultaneously via maximum likelihood iteration, which allows for effi-
cient data utilisation. A guide to the use and adaptation of this code is appended
to this thesis in Section A3.
1 Data
Our empirical model requires a large-scale longitudinal dataset with multiple meas-
ures of child and parental skills and investments, including multiple measures of
each candidate noncognitive skill at each period in time. As can be seen from the
tables in Section 3 and Appendix C, the UK Millennium Cohort Study meets these
requirements.
MCS subjects were born around the year 2000, and the first MCS survey at
around age 9 months reached 18,818 children from across the UK, with an over-
sampling of deprived and ethnic minority areas. We drop 272 of these children
because they represent multiple observations from the same household, and so
the unobserved heterogeneity within their production functions may not be stat-
istically independent. With this exception, we base our estimates on the avail-
able sample at each observation point. The MCS has achieved a lower attrition
rate than many longitudinal surveys, with 11,714 families responding in the latest
sweep, which is sweep 6 at age 14. Data access is controlled via the UK Data Ser-
vice, and further information can be found at https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/
datacatalogue/series/series?id=2000031.
The MCS compares favourably with the CNLSY data used by Cunha, Heck-
man & Schennach (2010) and in Chapter 3: it provides suitable measures for all
candidate noncognitive abilities; its measures of cognitive ability in sweep 1 are
considerably more relevent; and it has a much larger sample size. In reality, the
MCS contains too many measures for some latent factors, and so we combine
groups of highly correlated measurements together in advance of the main estima-
Iain P. Embrey Pathways to Poverty 113
tion.10 In complex cases, the measurement groupings were guided by exploratory
factor analysis similar to that used by Heckman, Pinto & Savelyev (2013). Where
possible we combined related measures using Item Response Theory, which estim-
ates a latent factor score for each individual by allowing each response for each
measurement to have separate difficulty and discriminatory properties. Because
of this, Item Response Theory makes considerably better use of large-scale data
than factor analysis, which allows only one loading parameter for each measure-
ment item11. Where data were too restricted or too skewed for Item Response
Theory, they were combined by hand into appropriate bands. The Stata code that
compiles our working dataset from the many MCS data files is included within our
supplementary materials, and further discussion of the data compilation process
is provided in our supplementary materials (A3).
5 Results and Discussion
Our main results for the technologies of cognitive and noncognitive skill production
are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. These tables display our estimates
of the share parameters and elasticities of substitution from Equation (4.5), while
our estimates of the auxiliary parameters and equations are provided in Appendix
B.
The first column in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 reproduces known results from the
American CNLSY sample for comparison. These are were derived under Model 1
of Chapter 3 (Embrey 2019d), which builds upon the methodology pioneered by
Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010). The third column of each table replicates
that benchmark specification within the larger and more recent dataset provided
by the Millennium Cohort Study in the UK.12 Focusing first on our estimates for
the technology of cognitive skill production, we can see that there are substan-
tial differences between the results of columns one and three. Most strikingly,
the estimated first-stage input share of present-period cognitive skill is substan-
tially lower in the CNLSY sample than in the MCS sample, with the bulk of that
short-fall appearing in the coefficient on parental investments. The discrepancy
between these estimates manifests institutional differences, but it is also driven by
differences in data availability between the two cohorts.
Empirically, the estimated coefficients are derived from their underlying data.
10Each additional measurement within the main estimation would cost seven additional para-
meters, and the parameter space affects our computational requirements approximately quad-
ratically.
11See Embretson & Reise (2000) for an overview.
12The dataset is described in Section 4.1; Appendix C details the measures of prosocial and








Table 4.5: Estimates of the Technology of Cognitive Skill Production: Input shares and elasticities
First stage ( 0–5 years)
behaviors –cost confidence resilience drive analyticity∗
CNLSY† Kwave 1‡ MCS −C E(pi) −P f P s ρ
Cognitive Skill γC1,1 .342 .651 .835 .785 .817 .822 .755 .831
(.041) (.099) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.008)
Noncognitive Skill γC1,2 .001 .029 .031 .090 .037 .033 .098 .026
(.030) (.027) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.008)
Parental Investments γC1,3 .486 .115 .003 .002 .004 .003 .000 .002
(.111) (.135) (.006) (.005) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.009)
P. Cog. Skill γC1,4 .086 .105 .128 .121 .135 .137 .145 .135
(.027) (.030) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
P. Noncog. Skill γC1,5 .084 .100 .003 .002 .007 .004 .002 .007
(.058) (.035) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
e-subs 1/(1−ϕC1 ) .893 .594 .595 .530 .676 .656 .671 .673
(.136) (.083) (.014) (.012) (.015) (.014) (.012) (.016)
Second stage ( 5–14 years )
Cognitive Skill γC2,1 .923 .932 .886 .872 .890 .906 .848 .793
(.015) (.015) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.009)
Noncognitive Skill γC2,2 .002 .004 .035 .050 .024 .009 .066 .138
(.002) (.003) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.010)
Parental Investments γC2,3 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001 .001 .002 .002
(.028) (.024) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.017) (.014) (.015)
P. Cog. Skill γC2,4 .074 .061 .078 .076 .085 .084 .084 .067
(.019) (.015) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.011) (.010)
P. Noncog. Skill γC2,5 .002 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.026) (.021) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.007) (.007)
e-subs 1/(1−ϕC2 ) .500 .482 1.013 1.199 1.078 1.016 1.536 1.427
(.043) (.045) (.088) (.112) (.096) (.102) (.138) (.112)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. †Chapter 3 (Embrey 2019d) Model 1; ‡CNLSY omitting wave 1. ∗The propensity to think analytically.
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Whilst most measurements at most waves are reasonably commensurate between
the two data sources, the CNLSY is not well-endowed with cognitive measures
during its first wave. A motor-social development score is observed during wave
one, but only for 9% of the sample, and so Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010)
use gestation length and birth weight to proxy for early cognitive development.
We would therefore expect the estimated self-productivity of early cognitive skills
to be deflated in the CNLSY sample because those proxy measurements are likely
to be less informative than the more direct measurements provided by the MCS
(these are detailed in Table 4.C2). To evaluate the economic significance of this
data deficiency, column two of Table 4.5 replicates column one except that it
omits the first wave of observations. These results indicate that the majority of
the empirical discrepancy between the MCS and CNLSY cohorts could be driven
by deficiencies in the CNLSY data.13
The remaining discrepancy between columns two and three can be attributed
to institutional and cultural factors. For example, enrolment rates in pre-school
education are substantially lower in the US than in the UK (OECD 2017), and so
we might expect direct parental inputs to have a commensurately larger role in the
early cognitive development of the US cohort. Our results show that this is indeed
the case: point estimates for parental investments and parental noncognitive skills
are substantially larger in the American sample, although the former is estimated
rather imprecisely. Our estimates for the second stage of childhood suggest that the
two samples converge towards a common production technology for cognitive skills
once formal schooling begins, except that the elasticity of substitution between
alternative inputs becomes significantly greater for children from the UK Cohort
during that stage of development.
We now turn to a comparison between the benchmark MCS results in column
three of Table 4.5, and the alternative estimates derived for each candidate noncog-
nitive skill. From the cross-productivity coefficients γCs,2 it is immediately apparent
that generic proxy measurements for noncognitive skills tend to under-estimate
their importance. However, we can also see that the specific noncognitive skills
of confidence and resilience are, if anything, less important in the production of
childhood cognitive development than are antisocial and prosocial behaviours.14
This is perhaps surprising, because the most robust implication from existing eco-
nomic theory is that confidence should affect cognitive development (see, for ex-
ample Bénabou & Tirole 2002; Köszegi 2006; Filippin & Paccagnella 2012) and
because there is now a substantial body of literature which follows Duckworth et al.
13Note that distortions in estimated latent factors from the first wave are also likely to affect
future waves in an unpredictable manner, due to the dynamic development of each individual’s
latent skill levels through time.
14Of course, these noncognitive skills could be substantial determinants of other life outcomes.
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(2007) in suggesting that grit should be an important determinant of educational
outcomes.15 However, despite the close linguistic relationship between grit and
resilience, only two of the twelve grit survey items relate to resilience as defined
by P f . These observations illustrate the benefits of working with precisely defined
measures that have been derived through rigorous theoretical analysis.
The remaining columns of Table 4.5 show that the noncognitive skills defined
by −C, P s, and ρ are substantial determinants of cognitive development during
childhood. During a child’s early years, her cost of effortful task participation
and her drive to succeed each account for at least 9% of her optimal period-on-
period inputs to cognitive development. Since cognitive skills are also shown to
be strongly self-productive, the effects of these noncognitive inputs will also accu-
mulate over time, so that by the age of seven approximately 23% of cumulative
cognitive development could be attributed to the child’s drive to succeed as meas-
ured during waves 1-3 of the MCS.16 Given that inputs accumulate in this way,
our estimate that the average child’s propensity to think analytically accounts for
14% of her period-on-period cognitive development in later childhood is a striking
result.
When taken together, our results provide further evidence that the most im-
portant determinant of ongoing cognitive development is current cognitive ability.
This suggests that an individual’s developmental pathway may often be determ-
ined during the early years of her life. However, to the extent that this path-
way remains malleable, the factors that have greatest influence over it are her
parents’ cognitive skill level and her own noncognitive skills – in particular her
drive to succeed, her cost of effortful task participation, and her propensity to
think analytically. These results are commensurate with the model of educational
investment that is depicted in Figure 4.2. During a child’s early years, it is the
cognitive ability level of a her parents that determines, either directly or indirectly,
the educational opportunities that are available to her. Thereafter, as the child
approaches compulsory schooling age, the educational input from her parents di-
minishes in importance. Meanwhile, the child’s responses to her early educational
opportunities are determined by her impulsive payoffs – chiefly by the trade-off
between the pleasure of successful task participation and the cost of exerting the
effort to participate. Thereafter, as the child matures, she is increasingly able to
impose analytic preferences over her decision-making, and so her impulsive payoffs
are invoked less frequently. Thus, once the child reaches compulsory schooling
age, her own propensity to think analytically becomes the most important outside
15Although a recent meta-analysis questions both the construct validity and the predictive
power of grit (Credé, Tynan & Harms 2017).
16This value is given by 0.98(1 + 0.755 + 0.7552).
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determinant of her ongoing cognitive development.
The results presented in Table 4.5 therefore support the conventional view
that developmental pathways for cognitive skills stabilise early in life, but they also
challenge the finality of that conclusion. From the prior research reproduced in the
first two columns of Table 4.5, we would conclude that only parental cognitive skills
can affect a young person’s developmental pathway once they reach compulsory
schooling age. In contrast, our estimates offer hope that some specific aspects of
noncognitive skill can also have a substantial influence over that pathway in later
childhood, and that these noncognitive skills can act as economic substitutes for
current cognitive ability. Our findings therefore imply that, if a policy intervention
could successfully improve a child’s propensity to think analytically, then it could
have a lasting positive influence over the likelihood that she will engage with
each incremental educational opportunity thereafter. This possibility is further
substantiated by the results presented in the final column of Table 4.6, which
suggest that an individual’s propensity to think analytically becomes strongly
self-perpetuating from later childhood.
There is accumulating evidence that it may indeed be possible to improve an
individual’s propensity to think analytically through policy intervention. Several
recent papers have developed interventions that target metacognition17 (Tanner
2012; Zepeda et al. 2015; Casselman & Atwood 2017), and Dignath & Büttner
(2008) synthesise a large number of earlier studies that have a similar focus. In
addition, there is now a scientific journal dedicated to the study of Metacognition
and Learning. Furthermore, work is underway to develop an online intervention for
economics undergraduates that explicitly targets ρ, and a randomised controlled
pilot study of that intervention has produced an eight percentage-point increase
in exam performance.18
Although our main object of interest is the technology of cognitive skill form-
ation, we also present results on the technology by which each of our candidate
noncognitive skills is produced. The first three columns of Table 4.6 suggest that
these technologies are largely comparable between the CNLSY and MCS cohorts,
and that the most important determinant of early noncognitive skill formation
is parental noncognitive skill levels. Our measures of parental noncognitive skill
follow Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) in focussing on maternal emotional
stability (see Table 4.C3), and so it is unsurprising that early resilience, confid-
ence, and social behaviors are most strongly affected by this production input. In
contrast, parental cognitive skills are typically unimportant for child noncognitive
skill development, except for specific cases where they probably act as a proxy for a
17Metacognition is defined as an awareness and understanding of one’s own thought processes.
18Pilot study results and details are available from the author upon request.
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secure family background: early resilience, behaviors, and the cost of exerting edu-
cational effort could each be affected in this way. Interestingly, tangible parental
investments could also proxy for a stable family background, and yet these are not
significant determinants of any noncognitive skill in Table 4.6, although there is
some indication that they may serve to build confidence in later childhood, and
that they may affect the later (non-)development of antisocial behaviours within
the CNLSY cohort.
The most substantial variation between the production technologies of our
candidate noncognitive skills is found in the cross-productive influence of cognit-
ive skills. For example, there is strong evidence in Table 4.6 that one needs to
experience early success in order to develop one’s drive to succeed. This mechan-
ism will act to reinforce the early stabilisation of cognitive skill, because it implies
that children who have comparatively high cognitive skill levels are most likely to
continue to engage with educational opportunities in order to seek further grati-
fication. Similarly, column five of Table 4.6 appears to suggest that cognitive skill
is important for the development of confidence throughout childhood, however
that finding may be an artefact of our measures of confidence: many of these will
necessarily contain an element of true ability in addition to confidence (which we
defined in Section 3 as perceived ability net of true ability). This is not the case for
the cost of effortful task participation. We find little evidence that cognitive skills
reduce this psychic participation cost, and so there is limited scope for confounding
within our measures of −C. These results challenge the main assumption behind
the signalling hypothesis of Spence (1973), since they suggest that less cognitively
skilled individuals may not experience a substantially greater cost of educational
investment than their more-able peers. Our findings for the technology by which
−C is produced therefore support the alternative hypothesis that cognitive skills
can be developed through educational participation.
Our technology estimates for the production of resilience also have important
policy implications. Table 4.6 shows that, as a child matures, it will be increasingly
essential for her to experience success in order for her to become resilient to failure.
Moreover, we find that ongoing success remains necessary even for children who
had high levels of resilience two years previously: by compulsory schooling age, the
self-productivity share of previous-period resilience is only 15%, and the elasticity
of substitution in the production of resilience is substantially below unity. These
estimates provide an alternative explanation for the oft-observed social gradient in
risk aversion: that gradient need not imply that less cognitively skilled individu-
als are less able to calculate expected benefits, instead our results suggest that
successfulness itself may allow individuals to be more resilient to the possibility








Table 4.6: Estimates of the Technology of Noncognitive Skill Production: Input shares and elasticities
First stage ( 0–5 years)
behaviors –cost confidence resilience drive analyticity∗
CNLSY† Kwave 1‡ MCS −C E(pi) −P f P s ρ
Cognitive Skill γC1,1 .001 .037 .054 .032 .127 .063 .284 .072
(.039) (.096) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.009) (.011) (.004)
Noncognitive Skill γC1,2 .693 .884 .712 .856 .748 .697 .643 .845
(.056) (.064) (.003) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.011) (.004)
Parental Investments γC1,3 .000 .000 .003 .000 .003 .003 .018 .001
(.129) (.124) (.006) (.005) (.012) (.013) (.019) (.006)
P. Cog. Skill γC1,4 .077 .038 .065 .037 .002 .038 .000 .021
(.029) (.032) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.002)
P. Noncog. Skill γC1,5 .229 .039 .166 .074 .119 .199 .055 .061
(.068) (.050) (.005) (.003) (.006) (.008) (.009) (.003)
e-subs 1/(1−ϕC1 ) .642 .493 .641 .775 1.018 .905 .972 1.007
(.083) (.136) (.014) (.023) (.049) (.031) (.039) (.036)
Second stage ( 5–14 years )
Cognitive Skill γC2,1 .000 .000 .000 .011 .176 .845 .124 .000
(.007) (.008) (.005) (.005) (.014) (.060) (.013) (.004)
Noncognitive Skill γC2,2 .845 .862 .996 .980 .772 .150 .864 .960
(.014) (.013) (.013) (.008) (.015) (.055) (.010) (.006)
Parental Investments γC2,3 .055 .069 .001 .002 .046 .000 .012 .013
(.063) (.048) (.010) (.005) (.031) (.004) (.021) (.005)
P. Cog. Skill γC2,4 .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .005 .000 .001
(.017) (.012) (.006) (.004) (.022) (.017) (.017) (.003)
P. Noncog. Skill γC2,5 .100 .069 .002 .007 .001 .000 .000 .026
(.056) (.041) (.006) (.004) (.013) (.010) (.017) (.004)
e-subs 1/(1−ϕC2 ) .664 .599 3.703 .664 1.072 .446 .867 11.516
(.054) (.057) (17.554) (.156) (.069) (.096) (.068) (18.604)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. †Chapter 3 (Embrey 2019d) Model 1; ‡CNLSY omitting wave 1. ∗The propensity to think analytically.
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the economically inefficient risk-aversion of those who are less fortunate – instead
we could improve that efficiency by putting policies in place to make educational
investment appear less risky for disadvantaged individuals.
6 Conclusion
Noncognitive skills are the focus of an extensive body of literature. That literature
has proposed a wide range of potential noncognitive skills, but these are typically
derived from intuitive arguments or as the commonality between psychological
survey items. In response, this chapter analyses a decision-theoretic model of edu-
cational investment to identify five specific mechanisms through which an aspect
of noncognitive skill could affect childhood cognitive development. Each of these
mechanisms generates a rigorous theoretical definition for one specific noncognitive
skill, and it generates a testable hypothesis that childhood cognitive development
should be affected by each of those skills. Our candidate noncognitive skills are:
one’s academic confidence, one’s resilience to failure, one’s drive to succeed, one’s
cost of effortful task participation, and one’s propensity to think analytically. This
contribution develops economic understanding from vague notions of noncognitive
skill based upon superficially cogent constructs to specific individual characteristics
defined by parameters within a decision-theoretic model.
Our second contribution is to test the importance of each candidate noncognit-
ive skill. Existing empirical evidence for the effects of noncognitive skills is almost
exclusively derived from reduced-form estimations, but this approach does not ac-
count for the fact that cognitive and noncognitive skills develop simultaneously
throughout childhood and beyond. Because of this, the partial effect of noncog-
nitive skills in simple controlled regressions may not provide an accurate estimate
of their true developmental importance. We therefore build upon the structural
econometric model of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010) to estimate the simul-
taneous technologies by which both cognitive and noncognitive skills are produced.
Our results corroborate our theoretical hypotheses by finding that each candidate
noncognitive ability is a statistically significant determinant of childhood cognit-
ive development. In addition, our results allow a comparison between US and UK
childcare provision, and our simultaneous technology estimates allow us to suggest
not only when, but also how public policy interventions might target noncognitive
skills to improve the educational outcomes of disadvantaged children.
The central message from existing research into childhood cognitive develop-
ment is that early intervention is vital, because a child’s cognitive developmental
pathway stabilises during her early years. Our findings support this message, but
with one important qualification. We find that the average child’s idiosyncratic
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propensity to think analytically becomes an increasingly important determinant
of her cognitive development as she matures. Between the ages of 5-14 years, this
noncognitive skill accounts for 14% of her optimum period-on-period input to cog-
nitive skill production, and it acts as an economic substitute for her current-period
cognitive skill level. Since we also estimate a high degree of persistence in this spe-
cific noncognitive skill, our results suggest that later interventions may achieve a
lasting positive effect on educational development if they target an individual’s
propensity to think analytically.
This conclusion may also have wider implications, both for public policy and
for economic theory. An individual’s propensity to think analytically arises as
a decision parameter under the generalisation of Expected Utility Theory that
was presented in Figure 4.2. Although we apply the generalized decision theory to
educational decisions, such as whether to attempt classwork or study for a test, the
same model could equally describe health decisions, such as whether to exercise
rather than watch T.V.; financial decisions, such as whether to save up for an
affordable car rather than purchasing an expensive one on credit; and political
decisions, such as whether to take rhetoric at face-value rather than enquiring
more deeply. Since our present results provide strong empirical support for this
generalised decision theory within an educational context, it could be fruitful for
future research to test whether an individual’s propensity to think analytically is
similarly important in other decision-making contexts. If so, interventions which
target that specific noncognitive ability could provide an effective policy lever
through which to address a cluster of negative life outcomes.
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A Mathematical Appendix
1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the discrete case: Fix t ≤ T ∈ N, x ∈ Xt, and  ∈ R such that C˜t < Ct on
{x} and such that the participation condition (4.2) is binding on {x}. Then re-
arrange the participation condition to define %t(x, y) := dt(x, y)+pit(x, y).pst(x, y)+
[pit(x, y)− 1] .pft (x, y)−ct(x, y). This % is a well defined continuous map: Xt×Yt →
R since it is a sum and product of well defined and real-valued payoff functions
that are continuous by the conditions of this proposition.
We now construct Γ ⊆ Yt as the set of possible signals at x, that is Γ := {y :
f(x, y) > 0}. Further, we construct the subset Z ⊆ Γ as the set of signals y for
which − < %(x, y) < 0 and f(x, y) > 0. For any signal y ∈ Z, participation in task
x would not be optimal under the original participation cost Ct, but participation
would be optimal under the reduced participation cost C˜t. Our goal is therefore
to demonstrate that x× Z := {(x× z) : z ∈ Z} has positive probability measure
in Xt× Yt, because the agent’s ex ante participation probability λt would increase
by at least that measure if Ct were to be replaced by C˜t.
We know by the conditions of the proposition that Γ is connected, since it is the
support of the probability distribution of the signals Yt for task x. Thus its image
%(x×Γ) is connected, since % is continuous. but we also know that %(x×Γ) contains
both positive and negative elements since the participation condition is binding
at x (Definition 1). Thus %(x × Γ) is an interval on the real line that contains
both positive and negative elements. We may therefore fix −e as an arbitrary
negative element of %(x × Γ), and define ′ := min(, e). Then the open interval
(−′, 0) is contained in %(x × Γ), and so its pre-image {(x, y) : x = x, %(x, y) ∈
(−′, 0), f(x, y) > 0} is a non-empty subset of Z, and it is also open, since it is the
pre-image of an open set under a continuous map. But the probability measure
of a non-empty open set with positive probability density is positive, and so we
have that any finite decrease in participation cost induces a positive increase in
participation likelihood under the conditions of the proposition.
The continuous case is demonstrated by a similar argument. First fix t ≤ T ∈
N, χ ∈ Xt, and  ∈ R such that C˜t < Ct on χ and such that the participation
condition (4.2) is binding on χ. Then construct Γ ⊆ Yt as the set of possible
signals at χ, that is Γ := {y : x ∈ χ, f(x, y) > 0}, and its subset Z as {y : x ∈
χ, f(x, y) > 0, − < %(x, y) < 0}. Then χ × Γ is connected by the conditions
of the proposition, and its connected image under % contains both positive and
negative elements by Definition 1. As such, it contains an open subset between
− and zero, the pre-image of which is a non-empty open subset {(x, y) : x ∈
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χ, %(x, y) ∈ (−′, 0), f(x, y) > 0} which therefore has positive probability measure
and which satisfies the participation condition under C˜t but not under Ct.
For the corollaries: Note that three period t participation outcomes are pos-
sible, dependent upon the realised task × signal pair (x, y). Either (x, y) would
induce participation under both Ct and C˜t, or under neither, or under only C˜t.
Only in the third case would the change to C˜t have any effect. In this case, addi-
tional human capital will be developed, with a present value of Vt, but we must
consider whether this increase could be reversed by the future consequences of
present participation. This rather perverse outcome would be possible in general,
but not under either of the conditions stated in the proposition.
If tasks are perfect substitutes, then the agent’s order of participation may be
freely interchanged without altering the net effects of that participation. Thus
additional participation in period t can never have a net negative effect in expect-
ation. To see this consider the counterfactual agent 2 who does not participate
in period t. Denote by τ the period in which counterfactual agent’s total parti-
cipation ‘catches up’ with that of agent 1. Then in period τ total participation
is the same, only the order of participation differs in the counterfactual, and so
future expected outcomes are identical. Thus the set of circumstances under which
counterfactual expected participation ‘overtakes’ agent 1’s participation is empty.
However, the converse is not true. So long as the participation constraint remains
binding, there remains some positive probability that the counterfactual agent
would not participate in any future period.
If present-period participation weakly increases the probability of future-period
participation, then the fact that C˜t strictly increases λt necessarily also means that
C˜t strictly increases E
∑T
τ=t Vτ .λτ .δ
τ−T | C˜t
2 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
The proof of Proposition 2 is almost entirely as above, so we will not repeat it here.
The only difference is that we define ′ := δ.min(, e), such that the pre-image of
the interval (−′, 0) contains only task × signal pairs such that an epsilon increase
in drive or resilience would be sufficient, when multiplied the the probability of
success (rsp. failure) to induce participation, even though that increase would be
reduced by a factor of pit (rsp. (1 − pit)), since that factor is bounded away from
zero by δ under the conditions of the proposition.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows exactly that of Proposition 2, since the effect
of an increase in pit is multiplied by the sum of pst and p
f
t , and since that sum is
bounded away from zero by δ under the conditions of the proposition.
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B Ancillary Results
Our empirical model was set out in Section 4. That model requires the simultan-
eous estimation of several ancillary parameters and equations, and this appendix
presents those results for the benchmark specification. These benchmark results
are representative of those from each candidate operationalisation of noncognitive
skill, and the full results for each of these can be found in the output files which
we provide alongside our code in the supplementary materials. Our benchmark
ancillary parameter estimates are provided in Tables 4.B1 and 4.B2.
Table 4.B1: Ancillary parameter estimates for the benchmark specification
Cog skill prod. Noncog skill prod.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Components of the error term ηi,t,k:
residual investment γks,6 .001 .000 .012 .001
(unobserved heterogeneity) (.012) (.019) (.012) (.015)
variance of idiosyncratic shocks νi,t,k .242 .085 .193 .585
(.003) (.006) (.002) (.012)
AR(1) coefficient on family income .904
(.002)
Variance of shocks to family income .024
(.000)
Variance of shocks to residual investment .277
(.005)
Variance of shocks to parent noncog. skill .130
(.001)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.B2: Estimates of the benchmark investment equation coefficients
9 months 3 years 5 years 7 years 11 years 14 years
Cognitive Skill δt,1 .117 .146 .160 -.013 -.031 -.027
(.014) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.038) (.065)
Noncognitive Skill δt,2 .086 .110 .105 .233 .220 .189
(.019) (.024) (.023) (.025) (.033) (.041)
P. Cog. Skill δt,3 .083 .205 .356 .323 .324 .343
(.006) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.044) (.067)
P. Noncog. Skill δt,4 .081 .176 .216 .099 .120 .120
(.008) (.020) (.018) (.019) (.035) (.053)
Family Income δt,5 .198 .486 .871 .954 1.002 1.071
(.011) (.033) (.033) (.040) (.088) (.134)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
C Measurement
The measurements used to operationalise each candidate noncognitive skill were
detailed in Tables 4.1 – 4.4. This appendix sets out our measurements of: the
benchmark proxy for child noncognitive skill, child cognitive skill, parental cog-









Table 4.C1: Measurements of prosocial and antisocial behaviours
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
–Combined: fights/bullies; argues; spiteful; temper; moody Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 14,783 14,773 13,488
–Combined: fights/bullies; lies; steals Parent {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,821 11,083
Combined: helpful; has ≥1 friend Parent {0, 1, ..., 8} −IRT ∗ 14,783
Combined: helpful; has ≥1 friend Parent {0, 1, 2} 14,773 13,489 12,822 11,150
–Combined: destructive; harmful to others Visitor {0, 1, 2} 13,795
Social development score Teacher {0, 1, ..., 9} 11,855 (separate scale used in England)
Combined: –steals; –lies; –temper; helps; ≥1 friend Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 8,725
Combined: –steals; –lies; –misbehaves; helps; Teacher {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 7,211
How often behave well in class Self {0, 1, 2} 12,760
–How often misbehave in class Self {0, 1, 2} 12,813
–Combined: raucous; shoplift; graffiti; vandalism Self {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,682
–Combined: raucous; shoplift; graffiti; vandalism Self {0, 1, ..., 7} 10,931
–Combined: bullies: siblings; other children; online Self {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 11,192
–Combined: last 12 months: fought; used weapon; stolen Self {0, 1, 2} 11,192
Note: Noncognitive skill measurements in sweep 1 (age 9 months) are pleasantness, wariness, and fussiness.








Table 4.C2: Measurements of child cognitive skill level
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 9 months 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
Combined: waves bye; extends arms; nods yes;
hands together; gives toy Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,675
Combined: sits up; stands (holding on);
moves around; walks a few steps Parent ≈R −PFA† 16,675
Combined: smiles; grabs; holds; passes Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,675
Birthweight (cleaned with admin. data) Parent ≈R 17,210
Combined: speech concerns; –needs help for tasks;
speech understandable; –various motion problems Parent ≈R −PFA† 14,571
Bracken school readiness Visitor ≈R 13,790
Vocab test Visitor ≈R 14,514 14,961 13,412 12,994 10,781
Picture similarlity test Visitor ≈R 14,951
Patterns test Visitor ≈R 14,904 13,552
Maths test Visitor ≈R 13,574
School subject difficulties Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 13,733
Teacher assessment in core subject areas Teacher ≈R −IRT ∗ 11,854 8,611 7,280
Working memory task errors Visitor ≈R 12,589
Decision test Visitor ≈R 12,552 10,708








Table 4.C3: Measurements of parental skills
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 9 months 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
Parental Cognitive Skills (assumed constant)
Highest qualification level (NVQ scale) Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 16,995
Years of schooling Parent {0, ..., 8} 17,270
–Difficulties: form-filling; arithmetic; reading Parent {0, 1, 2, 3} 17,280
Vocab test Parent {0, 1, ..., 20} 11,057
Parental noncognitive skills
Combined: learning empowers; education improves
parenting; –computer use too much effort Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,144
–Combined: feel: useless; no good; a failure Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,138
Combined: have control; get what want; run own life Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,139
–Combined: miserable; worried; scared; annoyed;
upset; jittery; enraged; heart races Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 16,155
–Combined: Tobacco use; alchohol use;
also drug use in sweeps 3 and 6 Parent {0, 1, 2, 3}† 17,311 15,385 15,166 13,778 13,178 11,578
How satisfied with life Parent {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}‡ 16,131 13,462 14,160 13,024 12,252 10,859
–Kessler psych distress: depressed; hopeless; restless;
effortful; nervous; worthless Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 13,575 14,358 13,199 12,334 10,881








Table 4.C4: Measurements of parental investments
Observations by data sweep
Measurement Reporter Domain 9 months 3 yrs 5 yrs 7 yrs 11 yrs 14 yrs
Frequency plays with friends Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 16,670
Combined: value of: Stimulating child; talking to
child; cuddling child Parent {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 16,152
Combined: access to: heating; phone; web; car; garden Parent {0, 1, ..., 5} 17,311
Patience with child Parent {0, 1, 1.5, 2, 3} 16,127
Combined: Observes: toys; encouragement; caressing;
conversing; praise; parent introduces visitor Visitor ≈R −IRT ∗ 14,176
Pianta relationship: affectionate; comforting; valued;
in-tune; sharing; confiding; –moody Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 13,750
Together: read; count; alphabet; songs; sport; draw;
reads with others Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 15,346
Together: sports; stories; music; arts/crafts; games;
exercise; park; read; active Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 15,172 13,782
Together: reading; writing; maths Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 14,979 13,760
Visits: Library; sports classes; cultural; historical; animal;
funfair; cinema; sports events Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 15,176 13,788
How often have weekend fun with the family Self {0, 1, 2} 12,822
Combined: help with hwork; enforce hwork Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 13,145
Excercise: with family; at club or class Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 13,179
I wish family could afford to buy me more Self {0, 1, 2, 3} 12,734
Together: how often: games; exercise;
library; talk about things that matter Parent ≈R −IRT ∗ 13,180
Extra tuition Parent {0, 1} 13,161 11,526
How often talk about things that matter Parent {0, 1, 2, 3} 11,575
Note: ∗Combined using Item Response Theory, see Section 4.1.
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Chapter 5: An Holistic Conclusion
1 The Present Contribution
This thesis has presented theoretical and empirical analyses of the pathways that
lead to poverty. Although poverty is characterised by a complex cluster of negat-
ive socio-economic outcomes, it is now well-established that the pathways which
lead into poverty are mediated through the effects of educational development
in childhood. Education transforms pre-existing characteristics into the cognitive
and noncognitive skills that determine adult outcomes, and educational engage-
ment decisions have a causal effect upon that transformation (Sparkes & Glenner-
ster 2002; Hobcraft 2002; Cahuc, Zylberberg & Carcillo 2014).1 Accordingly, the
present analyses have aimed to advance our understanding of the divergent de-
velopmental pathways that solidify as children progress through their compulsory
education in advanced economies. This chapter reviews my progress toward that
aim, and it outlines the broader implications of my results.
1These are indirect and direct mediation effects respectively – see Heckman & Pinto (2015)
for a rigorous discussion.
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In Chapter 2 I presented a theoretical explanation for divergence in devel-
opmental pathways. That explanation arises because childhood development is
modelled as the cumulative consequence of (non-)participation in a series of incre-
mental educational opportunities. Initially, those opportunities will be provided
by parents, but formal educational provision will take an increasingly important
role as the child develops, and so this model is able to encapsulate both the direct
and the indirect mediating effects of education in the production of adult out-
comes. The direct effect of education is manifest in the quality and quantity of
the educational opportunities that it supplies, net of any endogenous response by
parents to that provision. The indirect effect of education is the variation in even-
tual skill levels that can be attributed to skill differences at enrolment: my results
show that these initial differences will be attenuated over time for two sufficiently
similar agents, but that they will be greatly exacerbated for two agents who be-
gin education above and below their respective threshold ability levels. This is the
Education Trap: children who have sufficient early disadvantage will endogenously
separate onto a divergent low-investment pathway at equilibrium.
This model has several important implications for policy and for society. First,
the endogenous separation of children with less than a critical threshold level of
ability provides the first viable theoretical explanation for very low educational
investment amongst disadvantaged children. Second, this mechanism also contrib-
utes a rigorous explanation for the well-known result that early interventions in
cognitive development are the most effective (see, for example Francesconi & Heck-
man 2016): because the low-investment equilibrium rapidly diverges away from the
critical threshold ability level, later interventions will require an increasingly large
impact to propel their recipient onto a high-investment pathway. Third, these con-
clusions mandate a paradigm shift in intervention policy such that its target should
become the educational system rather than the child. To this end I have derived
concrete recommendations that might move the current grades-focussed system to-
ward a learning-focussed system that could not sustain a separating equilibrium.
Finally, because our model shows that the apparent educational underinvestment
of disadvantaged children may be an equilibrium response to an exogenous endow-
ment of early disadvantage, we must conclude that the victims of poverty may not
be wholly responsible for their situation.
Chapter 3 is primarily econometric in nature. Its contribution is therefore to
build upon the seminal work of Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010), and to make
the improved estimation procedure available for future research. My most import-
ant improvements to the estimation strategy were to replace its misleading an-
choring procedure with explicit CES normalisation and to correct over-identifying
restrictions within the factor-analytic measurement model, although I also made
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several more minor amendments to the code.2 Together, these improvements un-
cover substantial and statistically significant anomalies within the main results of
Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010), and so this chapter also makes an inde-
pendent contribution to our understanding of the technologies of cognitive and
noncognitive skill production. In particular, the evidence for cross-productivity
between cognitive and noncognitive skills is substantially weaker than previously
believed, whilst the already-compelling evidence for early investment in cognitive
skills is now substantially stronger than previously believed.
Chapter 4 builds upon each of the preceding chapters. Its theoretical contri-
bution is to derive five candidate noncognitive skills from the model presented in
Chapter 2, and its empirical contribution is to test the impact of each of those
noncognitive skills upon cognitive development during childhood. I find strong
statistical evidence that each candidate noncognitive skill positively affects on-
going cognitive development, and I also present estimates of the technologies by
which each of those noncognitive skills is produced. These results therefore ad-
vance our current knowledge in the area by suggesting which specific noncognitive
skills are likely to provide the most effective intervention opportunities at each
stage of childhood development. In addition, these results are highly informative
for intervention design because each specific noncognitive skill is precisely defined
as a parameter within a decision-theoretic model. These precise definitions con-
trast with many existing constructs of noncognitive skill, which are typically only
defined by linguistic associations.
In sum, the results from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 shed new light upon the pathways
that lead young people into poverty. I have provided a novel and yet intuitively
appealing mechanistic model of educational investment, and I have found strong
empirical support for that model. Moreover, because that model is based upon tan-
gible investment decisions, its payoffs are directly interpretable – both as aspects
of those investment opportunities and as aspects of an individual’s noncognitive
skill set. These interpretations are dual: for example the payoff that a given in-
dividual expects to derive from perceived success in a given task depends both
upon the characteristics of the task and upon their own individual characteristics.
In principle, policy-makers and practitioners could intervene to manipulate either
set of characteristics, although to date interventions overwhelmingly target the
individual (see reviews in Almlund et al. (2011) and Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos
(2016)). Current practice notwithstanding, a priori it would seem likely that in-
terventions which target the educational system could be both more effective and
less costly than individual-level intervention, and this suggests that such systemic
interventions could represent a valuable and underexploited set of policy leavers
2A rigorous discussion of CES normalisation can be found in Embrey (2019c).
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with the potential to reduce the incidence of poverty in advanced economies.
2 The Wider Implications of this Contribution
The present contribution suggests a number of implications for future research and
for public policy. An immediate implication is that future work might follow the
specific recommendations of Chapter 2 to develop and pilot educational systems
in which engagement becomes attractive to disadvantaged children. In addition,
where traditional individual-level interventions remain in use, an important aspect
of those interventions should become the explicit teaching and implicit modelling
of analytic decision-making, because the results presented in Chapter 4 have shown
that an individual’s propensity to think analytically is an important determinant
of their ongoing educational development. However, these results also raise the
possibility that an individual’s propensity to think analytically might be an im-
portant causal determinant across the wider domain of multi-dimensional poverty.
I therefore conclude this thesis by discussing that possibility.
My model of education as a repeated participation game was explicitly presen-
ted as a specialisation of a generally applicable modelling approach. That approach
recognises that people in their everyday lives might not always act according to
the complex high-level planning decisions of normative microeconomic theory, and
that instead some outcomes for some people could arise as the cumulative con-
sequence of a series of elemental participation decisions. In these cases, elemental
participation decisions could be seen as the nano-foundations of traditional mi-
croeconomic investment decisions, in analogue to the manner in which individual
objective maximisation provides the micro-foundations for macroeconomic decision
outcomes. Moreover, because this thesis has demonstrated that the nano-founded
approach can provide both explanatory power and novel insight into educational
decision-making, it seems possible that it may also provide new insight within
other microeconomic decision contexts.
Under the hypothesis that a single, aggregated, investment decision is made to
determine important life outcomes, it may appear beyond doubt that the decision-
maker will take due account of the long-term consequences of that decision. How-
ever, if such a high-level decision is never taken, if instead its outcome is arrived
at as the cumulative consequence of a series of incremental participation decisions,
then that commonly maintained assumption is no-longer beyond question. In Fig-
ure 4.2 of Chapter 4 I presented a generalisation of expected utility theory that
admits the possibility that some elemental participation decisions may be taken
without any consideration of their long-term consequences. That decision theory
nests Expected Utility Theory at the point where all individuals display a uni-
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formly perfect propensity to think analytically. However, the results of Chapter
4 provide strong empirical support for meaningful heterogeneity in individuals’
propensity to think analytically, in addition to the support that they provide for
the nano-founded model more broadly.
It is nevertheless possible that the results presented in this thesis may not
be externally valid beyond the educational investment decisions of children. In
particular, the generalised decision theory may only be pertinent for those child-
hood decisions because children are particularly likely to act without consider-
ing the consequences of their actions – indeed action without consideration for
its consequences is almost synonymous with childish behaviour. Future research
should therefore test the nano-founded approach and the generalised decision the-
ory within other decision contexts, for example by applying the methodology of
chapter 3 to establish whether the an individual’s propensity to think analytic-
ally has a substantial and statistically significant effect upon their production of
additional socio-economic outcomes.
On an intuitive level it is plausible that adults may also, on occasion, act
without considering the consequences of their actions. This idea is not new: in 1759
Adam Smith wrote that many people act “variously and accidentally, depending on
whether mood, inclination, or self-interest happens to be uppermost” (p.276), and
in around 380 B.C.E. Plato wrote “You may observe that in children: from their
earliest years they are full of spirit, but some of them seem to me never to acquire
reason, and most of them do so only quite late” (p.130). Moreover, it seems
likely that people living with the debilitating urgency of poverty are less likely
than most to deliberate analytically upon each elemental participation decision,
and so impoverished outcomes in one decision domain could cause impoverished
decision-making in others. Even in the absence of such causation, it is likely
that an individual’s propensity to think analytically in one decision domain will
be correlated with their propensity to do so in other decision domains, and so
if some individuals do indeed follow the incremental approach to microeconomic
decision-making, and if those incremental decisions are made according to the
generalised decision theory, then we should expect to see a clustering of negative
socio-economic outcomes.
The results presented in this thesis provide both theoretical and empirical sup-
port for a nano-founded and generalised decision theory within the domain of child-
hood educational investment decisions. If future work were to corroborate these
findings in additional decision domains, then the implications of these innovations
could be far-reaching. At the time of writing, there is some indicative support
for the generalised decision theory within the wider literature. In Embrey (2019e)
I sketch theoretical applications of the generalised decision theory that provide
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new insights into chronic unemployment and into economic behaviours such as the
crowding-out effect. In Embrey (2019a) I pursue a complementary avenue of re-
search by providing a thorough discussion of the foundational assumptions of the
generalised decision theory, and by placing that theory within the existing dual-
self literature in economics. In addition, there is authoritative psychological work
which proposes that the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick (2005) provides a
meaningful measure of an individual’s propensity to think analytically (Pennycook
et al. 2016; Pennycook & Ross 2016), and there is a large correlational literature
that documents associations between performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test
and outcomes across multiple decision domains (for reviews see Pennycook, Fu-
gelsang & Koehler 2015; Brañas-Garza, Kujal & Lenkei 2019). Initial indications
therefore suggest that nano-founded and generalised decision theories might in-
deed provide important insights into the pathways that lead to poverty, although
considerably more work is required to formalise their implications for additional
dimensions of poverty, and to test for causal evidence of those implications.
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Appendix: Supplementary materials to the main chapters
1 Introduction to the Supplement
I have compiled supplementary materials in support of each of the main chapters,
and these will be published alongside those chapters in due course. Some of these
materials cannot feasibly be reproduced here, but should any interested party wish
to be supplied with these then please contact the author via i.embrey@lancs.ac.uk.
The supplementary materials that are available upon request comprise:
• For all chapters the code that generates my results (variously in Matlab,
Stata, and Fortran);
• For Chapter 3 the final dataset;
• For Chapter 4 a spreadsheet detailing the structure and derivation of the final
dataset (in addition to the code that compiles that dataset). Instructions on
how to obtain access to the Millenium Cohort Study data for Chapter 4 are
included in Section 1 of that chapter.
However there are also some supplementary materials that can be appended to
this thesis. These include robustness exercises pertaining to Chapter 2, a guide to
the code pertaining to Chapter 3, and a commentary on the data compilation for
Chapter 4. These are now set out according to the below table of contents.
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2 Supplement to Chapter 2
1 Further discussion of Figure 2.3
Figure 2.3 of the main text is reproduced below. This figure shows the equilibrium
strategy for our preferred specification when agents possess private information
as to their realised probability of achieving perceived success in each period. In
doing so, this figure captures much of the numerical outcome from our preferred
specification: note for example that we can read off the benchmark solution as a
dichotomisation around ρ = 0.5. For this reason we will carry out our robustness
checks by computing the analogue of Figure A.1 for each alternative specification.
Before undertaking the robustness exercises it is worth taking a moment to
analyse the implications of Figure A.1 in greater detail. For example, we can see
that the participation probability is always positive. This is because ps > c, and so
there is always some chance that a sufficiently positive realisation of pit would lead
to a positive expected payoff. Nevertheless, the probability of such a positive draw
being realised may be negligible – the lightest shading here indicates ρ < 0.001.
We can also observe that Figure A.1 extends our analytic results by demon-
strating that the optimal quantity of postponed participation will be decreasing in
an agent’s prior educational level. This is because we have assumed diminishing
life-cycle returns to education (V ′′<0), and so an agent with greater prior ability
will have less incentive to invest in her education, until and unless she crosses the
critical ability threshold for the high-participation equilibrium.
Finally, Figure A.1 shows an interesting upward curve at end of the high-
participation region. This is because, as the number of future periods decreases,
the case for participation as a means to increase future expected psychic payoffs
becomes less overwhelming.
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Figure A.1: The Equilibrium Strategy with Private Information
The equilibrium strategy S∗ for the specification detailed in Table A.1, when participation may
be conditioned upon the realisation pit(n). Events are shaded according to the probability ρt(n)
that the agent’s realised ability pit(n) would be large enough to induce equilibrium participation.
2 Additional simulations cf. Figure 2.4
As stated in the text these (and other) simulations suggest that the individual
developmental pathways presented in Figure 4 are representative.
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Figure A.2: Simulated Ability Development for 16 additional Agents
Simulated relative ability development for 9 representative agents, all of whom are endowed with
n = 157 in period t = 301. Variation occurs because each agent receives a private signal as to
her realised probability of success in each period. The bar above each panel is shaded to indicate
the local participation density.
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3 Introduction to the robustness exercises
The preferred specification detailed in Table 2.1 of the main chapter is reproduced
here. This section provides the rationale for that specification, which is intended to
reflect reality as closely as possible whilst remaining tractable. This supplement
demonstrates that the numerical results presented in the paper are remarkably
robust to alternative specifications.
Table A.1: The parametric assumptions of Table 2.1
Parameter Assumption Notes
Number of periods T = 1, 000 Robust to parameter variation.
Initial ability
distribution Π1 ∼ Beta[2.5, 2.5]
As used by
Filippin & Paccagnella 2012;
Robust to truncated normal;
Robust to parameter variation.
Πt update magnitude ι = 0.05 Robust to parameter variation.
Value of
education V (n) = V (T )
[
1−( 99100)n] Robust to parameter variation;Robust to linear form.
Maximum participation
benefit V (T ) = 10, 000 Robust to parameter variation.
Psychic payoffs ps=pf = 5 Robust to parameter variation;Robust to asymmetric values.
Participation cost c = 1 Robust to parameter variation.
Discount rate δ = 0.99 Reasonable cf.
† and ‡;
Robust to parameter variation.
† Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter (2010); ‡ Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002).
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4 Rationale for the preferred specification
The first main functional form assumption of Table A.1 is that of the anticipated
benefit V (n) of obtaining any given education level n. Commensurate with the
intuition that education should add value, but at a diminishing marginal rate, my
preferred specification is for V (n) to approach its limiting value V (T ) exponentially
- here at the rate of one hundredth of the remaining distance each period. Over
1,000 periods, those incremental developments would sum to 99.996% of V (T ).
The second main functional form assumption determines the effect of each par-
ticipation decision on agents’ skill development, as parameterised by their probab-
ility of success distribution Πt(n). Since Πt(n) is a distribution of probabilities, it
is natural to model it as Beta distributed. The Beta-distribution is a bell-shaped
curve on the support [0, 1], which also has several other desirable properties: it
is very convenient to update the Beta distribution in response to participation or
avoidance since its conjugate posterior is also Beta distributed, and, under that
updating process, the mean of the Beta distribution1 exhibits diminishing marginal
effects of both participation and avoidance in a particularly intuitive manner.
The salient aspects of the parameter-size assumptions are generally their relat-
ive magnitudes. For example, there would be no effect on optimal strategies if each
of ps, pf , c, and V (T ) were multiplied by any constant, and it is only the ratio of the
initial Beta parameters to their update magnitude that is important under com-
mitment. The specific parameter values therefore represent a somewhat arbitrary
choice motivated by common sense: for example T = 1, 000 provides a tract-
able many-period model, and δ = 0.99 represents an annualised discount factor of
around 0.53, which is reasonable given the widely-varying empirical data in that
area (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue 2002; Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter
2010). Intuition suggests that the absolute size of these parameters is qualitat-
ively unimportant, and this conclusion is thoroughly supported by the extensive
robustness checks presented hereinafter.
1The mean of Beta(α, β) = αα+β — strictly, the computation of optimal actions under com-
mitment requires only an assumed form for the mean, not the entire distribution.
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5 A guide to the replication code
We supply all of the code used in both the main chapter and these supplementary
materials. The files are summarised here, and introduced in their appropriate sec-
tions below. All code is commented to explain the purpose of each block, and each
block starts with a fully commented parameter specification area, wherewith the
user may freely adapt our specifications as they desire. The reader may replicate
our results by running the code ‘as-is’, and they may extend our investigations by
altering these parameters. Table A.2 details the purpose of each code file, and the
interrelations between code files. In summary, we carry out most computations in
Matlab, before importing to Stata for visualisation.
Table A.2:
A guide to the replication code files
Code File Contents
“education_trap.do” Stata code for all figures presented in the main chapter.
“education_trap.m” Matlab code for all figures presented in the main chapter; feeds
into “education_trap.do” for visualisation.
“education_trap_supp.do” Stata code for the figures presented in this supplement.
“education_trap_supp.m” Matlab code that feeds into “education_trap_supp.do”.
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6 Robustness with respect to T , ι, δ, β, Π1, V T , V (n) con-
vergence rate, ps = pf , and imbalance in ps 6= pf or in
initial ability endowment
The code for the main chapter allows for the straightforward manipulation of
any parameters for any figure. Here we present a comprehensive set of robustness
checks that show our qualitative findings remain even under substantial deviations
around the preferred specification. We present output corresponding to Figure 2.3
of the main paper, since this best encapsulates the full results of our model. Figure
2.3 of the main paper is reproduced for convenience as Figure A.1 above, which
also provides the legend that applies to all remaining figures.
We now carry out stringent robustness checks for each of the model parameters:
The output below illustrates the effects of: an order or magnitude variation around
T , a 5-fold increase and decrease in each of ι, ps = pf , V T and V (n) convergence
rate, a 5-fold imbalance in initial ability endowment and in ps cf. pf , substantial
variation in the discount parameter δ from 0.99 (≡ 0.53 annually) to 0.997 (≡
0.83 annually) and 0.97 (≡ 0.15 annually), and the introduction of hyperbolic
discounting with β= 0.9 and β= 0.5. A short commentary is provided after each
Figure.
Each of these many changes has the expected quantitative effects and almost
all leave the solution qualitatively unchanged. The only changes to affect our
qualitative results are those where the initial balance between ps and either pf or
c is changed dramatically, in which case the following outcomes can arise: First,
ps = pf could be made so small relative to c that the cost of participation precludes
any agent from attaining a high-investment equilibrium pathway – Figure A.12
shows that ps = pf = 2 closely resembles the benchmark ps = pf = 5, whereas
if ps = pf = 1 then the high-participation pathway largely vanishes. Second, the
ratio ps : pf could become so skewed that full participation would be optimal
in almost any event, or that non-participation would be optimal in the majority
of events. These findings show that our model is highly robust to reasonable
levels of parameter variation, and it also illustrates the comparative static results
discussed in the main chapter, in particular regarding the importance to parents
and educators of maximising ps and minimising pf .
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Figure A.3: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Variation from number of periods T = 1, 000
(A) T = 10, 000 (B) T = 100
We can see from Figure A.3 that a ten-fold increase in the number of periods
produces a result that is qualitatively indistinguishable from our benchmark spe-
cification. Similarly, a ten-fold reduction in periods is distinguishable only because
it reduces the ‘resolution’ of the output.
Figure A.4: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Variation from update magnitude ι = 0.05
(A) ι = 0.25 (B) ι = 0.01
We can see from Figure A.4 that a larger update parameter would make the
high-participation pathway easier to attain, and the low-participation pathway
more entrenched, but it would not alter our qualitative findings. Conversely, a
smaller update parameter would make the high-participation pathway harder to
attain, and the low-participation pathway less entrenched, but again it would not
alter our qualitative findings.
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Figure A.5: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Variation from discount rate δ = 0.99
(A) δ = 0.997 (B) δ = 0.97
It can be seen from Figure A.5 that a smaller discount rate would make the
high-participation pathway more attractive, and the low-participation pathway
less attractive, but that it would not alter our qualitative findings. It can also
be seen from Figure A.5 that the low-participation pathway entails greater par-
ticipation when developmental benefits are less discounted. Conversely, a larger
discount rate would make the high-participation pathway less attractive, and the
low-participation pathway more attractive, but again it would not alter our qual-
itative findings. It can also be seen in Figure A.5 that the duration of the high-t
low-n participation region is reduced when discounting is greater.
Figure A.6: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Introduction of present bias β
(A) β = 0.9 (B) β = 0.5
We can see from Figure A.6 that introducing present-bias into our model does
not affect our qualitative findings. Quantitatively, it has very little effect on the
high-participation pathway, but reduces the amount of participation that should
optimally be made by disadvantaged children as they approach the end of com-
pulsory schooling.
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Figure A.7: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Variation from attainment V T = 10, 000
(A) V T = 2, 000 (B) V T = 50, 000
We can see from Figure A.7 that changing the life-cycle payoff for human-
capital accumulation does not affect our qualitative findings. Quantitatively, it
has very little effect on the high-participation pathway, but again there is a lar-
ger quantitative effect for disadvantaged children: a lower benefit from schooling
would contract the high-t low-n participation region, whilst a greater benefit from
schooling would expand the high-t low-n participation region.
Figure A.8: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Variation from a rate of convergence towards the maximum value of attainment
of one hundredth of the remaining distance per period
(A) one five-hundredth (B) one twentieth
We can see from Figure A.8 that a slower convergence toward maximum school-
ing benefit would extend the high-t low-n participation region to include much lar-
ger values of n, because increased prior participation would diminish the marginal
product of education by less. We can also see that this change would not alter our
qualitative findings: Not only is the effect relatively minor, but it is also situated
away from the relevant equilibrium pathways. As we would expect, the converse
effect is evident for a faster convergence towards the maximum schooling benefit,
although this again does not affect our qualitative findings.
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Figure A.9: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Symmetric variation from initial ability stability Π1 ∼Beta(2.5, 2.5)
(A) Π1 ∼Beta(0.5, 0.5) (B) Π1 ∼Beta(12.5, 12.5)
We can see from Figure A.9 that the effect of variation in the stability and pre-
cision of our agents’ ability distribution has very little qualitative or quantitative
effect on our findings.
Figure A.10: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Asymmetric variation from initial ability stability Π1 ∼Beta(2.5, 2.5)
(A) Π1 ∼Beta(5, 2) (B) Π1 ∼Beta(2, 5)
We can see from Figure A.10 that an advantageous skew to initial ability would
make the high-participation pathway easier to attain, and the low-participation
pathway commensurately more difficult to attain, but that the effect on our qual-
itative findings is minimal. The converse effect is true for a disadvantageous skew
in initial ability. The important conclusion here is that an agent’s innate ability
(dis)advantage could quite easily be reversed by the opposite (dis)advantage in her
early years development opportunities.
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Figure A.11: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Asymmetric variation from psychic payoffs ps = pf = 5
(A) ps = 2; pf = 10 (B) ps = 10; pf = 2
It can be seen from Figure A.11 that if the psychic cost of failure were substan-
tially larger than the psychic payoff to success, then the high-participation pathway
would be almost impossibly hard to attain. This clearly does not reflect reality,
but nevertheless our qualitative conclusions would change little. Conversely, if the
psychic payoff to success were substantially larger than the psychic cost of failure,
then the high-participation pathway would be much easier to attain - in this case
it could become almost certain except for children who experience a protracted
lack of educational opportunities. This figure therefore illustrates the discussion
of the main chapter, which emphasised the importance of adopting pedagogical
practices to increase ps and decrease pf .
Figure A.12: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Symmetric variation from psychic payoffs ps = pf = 5
(A) ps = pf = 25 (B) ps = pf = 2
We can see from Figure A.12 that the effect of symmetric change in psychic
payoffs is less marked than an asymmetric change. In either case, our qualitative
findings are unchanged, although a substantial reduction in those payoffs makes
the high-participation pathway rather harder to attain. An even larger reduction
to ps = pf = 1 would change our qualitative findings, since in this case almost
all decisions would be dominated by c the cost of participation, and so the high-
participation equilibrium would no-longer exist.
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7 Robustness with respect to truncated normal ability
distribution, agent naïvety, linear returns to education
V ′′(n) = 0, and increasing returns to education V ′′(n) > 0
The final set of robustness exercises confirm that the qualitative results of the
chapter are not an artefact of the specific (albeit sensible) choices of beta-
distributed ability, or of exponentially diminishing participation benefit. The
first panel of Figure A.13 shows that our qualitative findings are robust to an al-
ternative truncated-normal ability distribution, and Panel C of Figure A.13 shows
that our assumption of diminishing returns to education mainly affects outcomes
towards the end of compulsory schooling, and that effect is concentrated away from
most equilibrium pathways. Neither alternative assumption affects the existence
of the education trap.
For completeness, we also confirm that our findings are robust to increasing
returns to education and to naïvety. In Panel D of Figure A.13 we can see that
increasing returns to education would only amplify the effect of linear returns, and
that again these effects are concentrated into the final periods of the model and
away from the important equilibrium pathways.
Naïve agents are affected by psychic payoffs this period, but are not aware
that they will also be so affected next period. The naif therefore provides an
archetype of the most extreme version of the human tendency to discount any
visceral influences over our future behaviour, as described by Loewenstein (1996).
One would expect naïve behaviour to be somewhere between sophisticated and
myopic behaviour (myopes do not consider the existence of any future decision
periods – we showed robustness to myopia in the main chapter), and this does
indeed seem to be the case. certainly our qualitative results are robust to naïvety.
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Figure A.13: cf. Fig. 2.3:
Alternative functional forms and sophistication constraints
(A) Π ∼Truncated normal (B) Naïve agents
(C) V ′′(n) = 0 (D) V ′′(n) > 0
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3 Supplement to Chapter 3: A guide to the code
1 The basics of Fortran
Fortran is a somewhat old-fashioned programming language with more pedantic
semantics than most. On the other hand it makes extremely fast programmes.
Programming in Fortran is a two-step process; one first compiles the code into
an executable programme, then one runs that programme. I used the free IDE
‘codeblocks’ to edit the source files, and if you wish to do likewise then you will
be able to directly open the .cbp project files. If you use an alternative editor
you can completely ignore those files. The code itself is written in Fortran .f90
files. I then used WinSCP to transfer the .f90 files to the high-end computing
cluster at Lancaster University, taking care to ensure that they were transferred in
text mode. Finally I used a Putty command-line interface to compile and run the
code, the latter via a bash .com script. The bash scripts and a text file listing the
relevant commands to running and debugging in Intel Fortran are included with
this guide.
A couple of ‘interesting’ details to watch out for in Fortran:
• The line length cannot exceed 72 characters including initial space characters
(the size of a computer card). This includes comments, although most com-
pilers will allow comments to overrun – but watch out if using !$OMP as this
looks like a comment to the compiler and so might not throw up a warning
if it’s over line-length (this cost me about a week of my life). lines can be
carried over using ‘...’ but it’s probably best to avoid this where possible.
• It’s good practice to start any module, subroutine, etc with the command:
‘implicit none’; you will then need to define in painstaking detail all variables
which you wish to use, and, in the case of functions or subroutines that are
passed inputs, their ‘intent’, ie. do they merely go in to the function (in), are
they generated by the function (out), or both (inout). Wherever a function
is passed to another function it will need to be present in the latter via a
dummy ‘interface’ block, where the variable definitions and intents need to
match those of the actual function.
2 An overview of the code
The (Model 2) code contains the following files (in order of increasing seniority):
minimization.f90 This file contains the minimisation algorithms which we will
apply to iteratively reduce the log-likelihood. You probably don’t need to change
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it. The current configuration requires the process to converge twice (once through
dfpmin, and again through dfpmin2). 1st convergence does not imply continual
convergence of re-runs because dfpmin progressively builds up a numerical approx-
imation to the Hessian matrix of the function ‘func’ that it is passed, however as
the Hessian will in general change at different points, this process is imperfect.
Hence restarting it every (initially) 250 iterations improves convergence rate, but
can change the local minimum that is converged towards when these exist – pos-
sibly for the ‘better’ and possibly for the ‘worse’. The parameter itchunk allows
you to change the frequency of restarting the Hessian approximation process, sep-
arately for dfpmin and dfpmin2. Similarly you can set the maximum number of
iterations for each process via their respective itmax parameters. dfpmin operates
by finding the current numerical gradient (calling ‘gradient’), then searching along
that direction for a suitably large decrease in LL (calling ‘lnsrch’).
integration.f90 This file is a library of numerical integration procedures, some
of which are called upon. You will not need to change it.
globvar.f90 This file defines all those variables that will be accessible from all
(of the below) other modules. They will be stored and hold their values globally.
You may well wish or need to change some of these entries if using different data
or trying to do different things. The first 6 parameters in-particular may well need
to be changed, and possibly the nsubgp parameter. This file is especially well
commented.
normalizations.f90 This file sets (many of) the parameters to be estimated
to initial values (it is not especially related to CES normalisation). The code
optimises a likelihood function over a many-dimensional parameter space (1223 in
the case of Model 2), and the initial values for each of these parameters is set by the
file ‘point_fix_...’, where ‘...’ is specified in line 29 of main.f90. However, there are
more parameters that could conceivably be optimised over, and so normalisation
takes care of setting these to sensible numbers (such as 0 where a parameter
is abstracted from). You will probably only need to change this file if adding
additional parameters to the model, since many of its most relevant parameters
are overridden by ‘point_fix’ anyway.
matrix.f90 This file is similar to ‘integration.f90’ in that it provides a library of
routines that are called in other files... things to do with matrices like inverting
them and finding eigenvalues and so forth.
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policy.f90 This file provides what CHS refer to internally as the policy-function:
it is the mapping which ensures that the indirect effects of the ‘policy equation’
(aka. investment equation) are incorporated into the factor-loadings for each of
the state variables at each time period. Since it loops over the measures (27-43)
which are used to derive the latent state variable of parental investment, the values
27 and 43 will need to be changed if the positions (ie columns within the data) of
the set of factors that measure parental investments changes for any reason (eg. if
others are added, or if a different dataset is used).
utilities.f90 This file provides a set of functions and subroutines that sit within
the likelihood function of ‘likeIPE.f90’ (amongst other places). These routines
include those which compute the unscented transform, and which map out the
transition and policy functions. The transition functions (CES and linear) map out
the evolution of the state variables through time, and the CEStransition function
is the main object of interest in the whole exercise: it encodes equation 2 of the
main chapter, and its parameters are (mapped onto) those that are published in
Tables 2 and 3 of the main paper. The linear transition function maps out the laws
of motion of the other state variables (equations 5 of the main paper.) the policy
function is CHS-code terminology for the investment function (equation 3). Thus,
if you are content with the present formulations of these functions then you will
not need to change this file, but if you wish to adapt them then this is the place to
do it! Note that, as discussed in the main paper, the state variables are measured
and encoded in log terms, and so the CEStransition function is transformed into
that which operates on log variables to produce log variables. The other functions
operate directly on log variables (as can be seen in the paper).
WriteResults.f90 This file does what it says on the tin. It’s fairly self explan-
atory, and will need to be adapted if and only if there are additional variables
which you create and which to know the estimates for. The routine ‘writeresults2’
writes the ‘transition_shares’ files, which transform the main coefficients of the
model into the parameters of interest.
mappings.f90 The parameters over which the likelihood function is maximised
are contained in the variable ‘theta’ defined in main.f90 and passed to various
subroutines. Mappings.f90 contains two subroutines: ‘dimtheta’ is used just once
at the start to write the file ‘check.out’ which organises the information required to
dissect which variables will be extracted from which locations within ‘theta’, and
how big theta should therefore be. It is very-much parallel to the ‘getpar’ routine
that actually extracts the current state variables from the vector ‘theta’. These are
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not all just taken as written – for example some parameters have restricted domains
(such as [-∞,1] for complementarity parameters), and so mappings transforms the
variables such that they lie within the permissive range. Theta is then just a
vector of numbers which is transformed by mappings to define the variables and
parameters (listed in global.f90) that the likelihood function in likeIPE.f90 uses to
calculate the log likelihood of the model given the data. Theta is therefore the
argument of the ‘loglikelihood_IPE’ function that is passed to it via ‘dfpmin’ in
line 39 of main.f90. All of the iterative fitting and convergence of the model is
done within that line. Parallel changes to both subroutines will be needed if you
wish to change/add to/remove any of the parameters to be estimated.
probability.f90 This is another ancillary file which provides subroutines, such
as a numerical approximation to the normal distribution. As with matrix.f90 and
integration.f90, these would all just be standard commands within most program-
ming languages. Changes are unlikely to be needed.
initialize.f90 This file transforms the data into an array within fortran, and
extracts individuals’ datapoints into their appropriate arrays within the model.
This will need to be changed if the data used changes in any way, but CHS have
made it quite easy to do so:
• ‘nvar’ is the number of columns in the dataset,
• ‘data_aug3.raw’ is the filename of the dataset, which needs to be saved in the
same directory as the compiled code programme file (which will be named
‘a.out’ by default).
• ‘nequation’ gives the number of measurement equations for each period, as
it says on the tin,
• ‘stage’ specifies the developmental stage of each period - here the first three
transitions are stage 1, and stage 2 thereafter: stage can be chosen to match
your theoretical prior on whether there are multiple stages of development,
and how the periods of data are mapped into them.
• ‘ly’ gives the location of the measurement variables for the latent factors
(state variables): for example here the first measurement is gestation length
and it is in column 21 of the dataset. The remaining measurements are then
contiguous through to column 88.
• ‘ldy’ gives the location of the missing indicators for the measurements. Here,
the missing indicator for gestlength is in column 98, and the other indicators
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are contiguous thereafter, so line 32 of ‘initialize.f90’ shortcuts typing these
locations out by simply adding 77 to the values of ‘ly’. One could replace this
code with a full list of values similar to that which defined ‘ly’ if one wished
to do so. In this code, each variable for each individual is twinned with a
missing indicator: so row 1 of column 98 would contain a ‘0’ if gestlength
were missing for individual 1, and it would contain a ‘1’ if gestlength were
available for individual 1. It is important to generate these missing indicators
and to tell the code where they are located via ‘ldy’.
• ‘lsubgp’ is analagous and tells the code the location (column number) of the
variables which indicate membership of a certain subgroup, incase you wish
to normalise your CES transition function to the mean value of a particular
subgroup rather than of the whole population. This choice is set via ‘CES-
normopt’, which will be left at ‘0’ to normalise at the sample mean values of
each state variable. If CESnormopt=0, then there is no need to specify any
data within ‘lsubgp’
• ‘equindex’ maps out for each period which of the (in this case 64) measure-
ment variables are (in principle) available during that period. For example,
‘1’ only appears in period t = 1 because gestlength is only measured at birth.
The numbers here relate to the entries within ‘ly’, so that 1 relates to the
location ly(1)=21 within the data. Note that the length of each period’s
‘equindex’ vector should match that specified in ‘nequation’.
• ‘lx’ sets out for each time period where the covariates X are located within
the dataset. CHS (and I) control for: a constant term, and dummies to
indicate: whether the assessments were collected age age +1yrs relative to
others (since the measurements are biennial), gender, whether the child’s
mother was under 20 at birth, whether the child was born in cohort years
1987-2001, as well as the child’s age in the year 2004. These are located
in the columns of the dataset indicated by ‘lx’. There are 6 of them, as
indicated by the parameter ‘nx’ in globvar.f90, and all 6 are used as controls
in all measurement equations in all periods as indicated by the fact that ‘mx’
is set =‘nx’ in all cases in line 59 of initialize.f90.
• Hereafter nothing should need changing, unless new state variables are in-
troduced or similar, because the file simply takes the information supplied
above and uses it to define the datapoints for each individual within their
relevant arrays.
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stdev.f90 This file contains a series of subroutines that map back and forth
between a vector ‘thetagrad’ of the (non-measurement) model parameters and
their named parameter arrays within fortran. The various subroutines feed into
lines 44-63 of main.f90, which calculates standard errors via the standard hessian
inverse approach for MLE. In summary:
• ‘dimthetagrad’ determines the length of the vector ‘thetagrad’, that is the
number of parameters that standard errors will be calculated for. Note
that inverting a matrix of, for example, 1233 rows and columns would be
computationally infeasible, so CHS exclude the measurement factor loadings
and X coefficients that make up the lion’s share of those variables.2
• ‘transform’ maps the fortran variables into ‘thetagrad’
• ‘getparstdev’ provides the opposite mapping; this is called within ‘logdensity’
on line 226 of ‘likeIPE.f90’, which therefore calculates the log likelihood based
upon the current values of ‘thetagrad’; this, in turn, allows the numerical
gradient to be calculated for each element of thetagrad.
• ‘sdpar’ then extracts the estimated variances from the inverted Hessian mat-
rix on line 63 of main.f90.
There is then a sister-set of subroutines with ‘2’ at the end. These run analogously
to the above, but transforming the model parameters into parameters of interest
ahead of calculating standard deviations. for example complementarity parameters
are transformed into elasticities of substitution, and γ coefficients from the main
technology equation (2) are transformed into shares, as indicated in the main
results tables 2 and 3 of the main chapter. The section of code in main.f90 that
calls the original set of subroutines is mirrored in the ‘stdev2’ subroutine that
constitutes ‘stdevIPE.f90’.
likeIPE.f90 This file contains the likelihood function. It is useful to read Cunha
(2011), where the estimation procedure is described in detail. I have added com-
ments to identify some lines of the code with the equations presented in that
paper.
The first block calculates the probability (likelihood contribution) that the
observed measurements for individual i in period t = 1 would have taken place,
and then updates the factor means (‘a’) and factor variance-covariance matrix
‘P’ for each individual i based upon those observations via the Kalman Filter.
2This procedure will be valid if the covariance of the measurement system with the remaining
(of interest) parameters is zero, the extent to which this is assumption is restrictive could probably
be debated, but we will not do so here.
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Lines 73-88 then save the estimated factor score for each individual, and calculate
group mean levels – this requires transforming to the true (not log) factor scores,
averaging, then taking logs, because the mean of the log factor scores would not
give the log of the mean factor scores.
The next block of code (‘do t=2,ntime’) starts in period 2. This is because
its job is to predict the present-period factor scores from the last-period scores
via the transition equations using the unscented transform. It is followed by the
measurement block which was described in the preceding paragraph, which now
essentially assesses how well the transition equations predicted the next-period
measurements on each factor score.
The final block of code, from line 166 to 184, carries out the shrinkage operation
to penalise the log likelihood for variations in real terms between the investment
equation coefficients within each stage.
‘probcont’ has kept track of all the contributions to log likelihood, whilst
‘probextra’ has included only the shrinkage contribution and the contribution from
measurements of parental income. The former contribution doesn’t exist under the
original CHS ‘anchoring’ normalisation procedure, and the latter doesn’t exist un-
der alternative models which don’t correct for endogenous investment (such as
CHS Table IV). Thus, when analogous ‘probextra’ contributions are included to
remove the contribution of the CHS anchoring procedure, we can compare the
remaining core log likelihood across all models. (In fact, it makes sense to exclude
contributions form parental income measurements anyway, since these are assumed
to be measured-without-error.)
‘logdensity’ runs analogously to ‘loglikelihood_IPE’, except that it calculates
the likelihood contribution of each individual separately to feed into the standard
error calculation process. There is no need to calculate facvar type data here,
as that already exists because ‘loglikelihood_IPE’ has already been called. Also,
because these routines don’t run nearly so often as ‘loglikelihood_IPE’, they are
coded using an additional ‘if’ statement, that costs a little in speed and adds
somewhat in the typeset elegance of the .f90 file. ‘logdensity2’ is identical to ‘log-
density’, save that it operates with the transformed ‘thetagrad’ via ‘getparstdev2’
in line 354.
stdevIPE.f90 This mirrors lines 44-63 of ‘main.f90’, but calling the alternat-
ive set of mapping routines ‘...2’ from ‘stdev.f90’ to calculate standard errors
for the transformed parameters of interest. These are then printed in ‘trans-
ition_shares.out’ files. See the final paragraph in ‘stdev.f90’ notes above.
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main.f90 This file runs the show by calling upon all the other files’ subroutines as
necessary. It starts by counting dimtheta, it then pulls values from ‘point_fix.out’
and maps them into the programme variables via ‘getpar’. The ‘estimates’ proced-
ure writes the results implied by ‘point_fix.out’, before the work of the programme
is done by iteratively maximising the log likelihood using ‘dfpmin’. ‘estimates’ then
writes the results implied once that process is complete, before lines 44-63 calcu-
late standard errors. the final ‘estimates’ call on line 65 overwrites the previous
calls with output that now includes those standard errors. ‘stdev2’ on line 66 calls
the stdev procedures for the transformed parameters of interest, which are printed
via the call to ‘writeresults2’ on line 839 of ‘stdev.f90’.
3 The data file
The supplementary materials to CHS Cunha, Heckman & Schennach (2010)
provide a detailed discussion of the necessary arrangement of the datafile.3 This is
therefore not repeated here, but rather summarised very briefly. Each row of the
data should represent one individual at one particular time-point. Stata refers to
this arrangement as ‘long form’; see ‘help reshape’ in Stata. missing indicators are
needed for each variable as a separate column - see the discussion of ‘ldy’ (amongst
others) within ‘initialize.f90’ above. The data are needed in .raw format, which
can be produced from Stata using a command such as: ‘outfile using data_aug3
, wide’ where the ‘wide’ option stops Stata from wrapping lines of data into new
lines of the .raw file, which would mess everything up.
Two additional cautionary notes: first, your life will be much simpler if you
ensure that all variables are positively coded in your datafile, such that larger val-
ues indicate an increase in the latent factor. The alternative would be to correctly
initialise negative factor loadings, but this would be more likely to lead to error,
and it would inhibit your ability to inspect final estimated factor loadings for any
anomalies.
Second, if your datafile is very large then there could be a (single-thread)
memory requirement spike early in the programme where ‘initialize.f90’ loads the
datafile into memmory before reading its contents into their assigned variables
and dropping the raw dataset; this could cause a ‘sigsev’ or related error. As an
indication of memory requirements during this initial spike, my experience suggests
that they could reach slightly over double the size of your .raw datafile. Memory
allocation can be increased in a bash job script by a command such as: ‘#$ -l
h_vmem=1G’.
3A very useful spreadsheet detailing their data and its constituent variables is also available
there.
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4 Parallel processing
The code is endowed with OMP (Open Multi-Processing) commands to parallelise
the ‘gradient’ subroutine within ‘minimization.f90’. All OMP code lines begin
with the tag ‘!$OMP’, which serial Fortran compilation will disregard because
the initial ‘!’ is read as a comment. Thus the OMP code has no effect when the
programme is compiled using the single-processor compilation command described
within the file ‘commands.txt’ that is included with this guide. That file also
includes a parallel-processor compilation command (which simply includes the
flags ‘-qopenmp -static-intel’), under which the OMP code becomes operative. I
parallelise the ‘gradient’ subroutine because the vast majority of the CPU work
for the programme is done through that subroutine (it calculates the effect of
a small change in each successive model parameter on the global log-likelihood
during each iteration), and so parallel processing with n cores decreases run-time
by very nearly a factor of n.
In addition to the OMP code in the ‘gradient’ subroutine, there is also one
line of OMP code at the end of ‘globvar.f90’, and two lines in the ‘dfpmin’
subroutine of ‘minimization.f90’. The former ensures that variables that up-
date before or during each likelihood calculation are stored separately for each
thread (else mayhem would ensue as parallel threads attempted to write and read
each other’s updates to shared variables), whilst the latter ensures that it is the
master thread that executes the initial benchmark likelihood calculation (this
is important because if that calculation were dispatched to an alternative cpu,
that cpu might not have the initialised variable values because there has not yet
been any implied synchronisation since no OMP parallel command has yet been
reached). For a good guide to OMP in Fortran, see https://www.openmp.org/wp-
content/uploads/F95_OpenMPv1_v2.pdf.
Once the code has been compiled into a parallelised executable (by default
‘a.out’), we require a slightly different bash script to run that executable – this is
provided in the file ‘run_parallel.com’ (cf. ‘run_single.com’) that is supplied with
this guide. If you experience difficulty in reading and editing ‘.com’ files, simply
change the extension to .txt and open with your favourite text editor.
5 Point_fix.out
This file presented a large part of the challenge in understanding the functioning
of the programme, and its development will form a major component of applying
this code to any new dataset. The code in ‘normalizations.f90’ will, in principle,
allow us to comment-out the reading of ‘point_fix’ from ‘main.f90’, and to include
it again once the programme has converged for the first time by using ‘point.out’
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from that first convergence as the start-point for future runs. This approach would
allow us to assess the output from that first run for any contra-indications, (such
as negative or negligible factor loadings; inexplicable parameter estimates; and so
forth), which could inform us as to how to move from a current local minimum or
corner solution in the parameter space to an improved model fit elsewhere in the
parameter space.
The first problem with this approach is that, at present, the only adaptations
that we could make to point.out would be the untargeted addition of random noise
to all estimates. This approach is a useful robustness check, and it helped me in the
initial replication of CHS, but it is not always the most effective way of reaching
a global minimum within the parameter space. To target specific irregularities
with the current point estimate we require an intimate knowledge of the ‘getpar’
routine within ‘mappings.f90’. By working through this file line by line, we can
map each of the 1200+ components of the point_fix vector onto its eventual model
parameter. This enables us to test the implications of specific perturbations to
the measurement equations or other parameters.4 From the perturbed point, the
model may return to around the current minimum, possibly with slightly improved
or worsened log-likelihood, or it may diverge toward an alternative local minimum,
which may have greater or lesser log-likelihood than the current point.
The second problem with this approach is that, in my experience, the crude
initial values contained within ‘normalizations.f90’ do not suffice to get close to
the global optimum point. For this we require a rather more informed initial
point, in particular with regard to the measurement equations. To derive a more
informed initial point for the measurement parameters ‘beta’ and ‘H’, I wrote
the stata do file ‘point-fix-derivation.do’: this produces, in the correct order, the
regression coefficients of each control variable in each measurement equation as
initial values for the ‘beta’, and the natural logarithm of the sample variance for
each measurement as initial estimates for the ‘H’. This approach, when augmented
with a few different sets of very small random noise, allowed me to replicate the
original CHS results before moving on to adapt and develop their econometric
model.
4Typically modifications to only the technology equations won’t achieve a better fit – the
measurement equations and auxiliary parameters such as the initial covariance matrix very much
drive these results.
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4 Supplement to Chapter 4: Data compilation
1 Overview
Access to the Millenium Cohort Study Data is controlled via the UK Data Ser-
vice, and the survey overview can be found at: https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/
datacatalogue/series/series?id=2000031. Neither secure access nor special liscence
access are needed for the data used in this study, and so it is relatively accessible
for replication and extension studies.
The Stata code which compiles our dataset from the various study files is
attached to this supplement. This code extracts, collates, cleans and synthesises
data from 41 separate raw data files, which (following UK Data Service approval)
can be downloaded from the website above under the study numbers (SN): 4683,
5350, 5614, 5795, 6411, 6847, 6848, 7464, and 8156.
The data cleaning and synthesis process is simple in principle, though some-
what more involved in practice. Many variables required only the removal or rela-
belling of missing responses and responses such as ‘not sure’. For other variables,
excessively skewed or sparse responses required some straightforward recoding. In
cases where there were large numbers of closely aligned measurements, these were
combined into lower-dimensional scores using exploratory factor analysis and Item
Response Theory. The approach taken here is exemplified in Section 3 below.
Finally, some key variables were required to be nonmissing - these comprise the
control variables which appear in each measurment equation, and parental income
which instruments for investment. A brief overview of the approach taken for
each of these variables is now supplied in Section 2. An overview of all final vari-
ables, their usage, and their source variables in the raw data is supplied in the
supplementary file varlist.xlsx.
2 Cleaning and imputing key variables
Full details and additional comments can be found in the Stata code file. An
overview for each key variable is provided here. The most major requirement
for imputation comes during the first wave, because around 600 first-wave non-
respondants did respond in the second wave. In most cases, key variables for the
first wave can be imputed directly from their values in the second wave.
teenmum Dummy to indicate teenage motherhood; control variable. For almost
all individuals this is reported directly (in at least one of the first two waves),
however a few (< 0.1%) are missing this data. These were imputed using parent
age, interview date, and child birth date information from the household grid
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datafiles.
gender Dummy to indicate gender; control variable. This is defined as per the
wave 1 observation when available, and the wave 2 observation otherwise. There
are no remaining missing observations.
english_at_home Dummy to indicate whether English is spoken at home; con-
trol variable. Waves 2 and 3 are used to plug gaps in wave 1 where needed.
age the child’s age; control variable. Available in all sweeps, but at various
accuracies: days, months, or year tenths dependent upon the sweep. Not available
in 22 child×sweep instances out of 104,142 in final dataset – in these cases child
age is set to its mean value for that sweep.
faminc log of the family’s OECD equivalized monthly income in real terms
(2015 money); instrument for the investment equation. OECD equivalized in-
come is a key derived variable in the data, and it is observed in almost all
useable child×sweep instances (it’s hard to be certain of exactly what propor-
tion, since useable cases are only defined after the cleaning and imputation pro-
cess, but I’m confident that it is in excess of 99%.) In these cases, all that is
needed is to adjust income into real terms, by using the CIPH price index data
from the UK Office of National Statistics – this is their prefered price index
and it includes housing costs. Details and data on this index can be found at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/methodologies/consu
merpriceinflationincludesall3indicescpihcpiandrpiqmi. The OECD equivalized in-
come takes account of family size and composition, and so it is designed to reflect
more accurately the financial wealth : requirement ratio of a household (see
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf) This makes it
more suitable than raw income for instrumenting the investment equation.
For the few relevant instances where this variable is unavailable, values were
imputed using a standard Mincerian wage equation for each period, augmented
with a dummy to indicate whether both natural parents were present. To do
this, the mother’s age and years of schooling were used, or, where necessary, also
imputed from data in other sweeps. For example, the increase in age between any
two sweeps can be estimated very accurately using OLS, and years of schooling
can be carried backward, unless it becomes greater than age in which case it is
corrected to current age.
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3 Combining closely related variables
A Simple confirmatory case
The MCS includes many apparently closely related measures of maternal psycho-
logical distress in sweep 1: amdepr00 – get depressed; amworr00 – get worried;
amrage00 – get enraged; amscar00 – get scared; amupse00 – get upset; amkeyd00
– get annoyed; amnerv00 – get nervous; amhera00 – heart races. To confirm that
it was appropriate to combine these, the following code was used (line 710 in the
attached Stata .do file):
factor amdepr00 amworr00 amrage00 amscar00 amupse00 amkeyd00...
amnerv00 amhera00 , ml factors(2)
factor amdepr00 amworr00 amrage00 amscar00 amupse00 amkeyd00...
amnerv00 amhera00 , ml factors(1)
local obs= e(N)
polychoric amdepr00 amworr00 amrage00 amscar00 amupse00 amkeyd00...
amnerv00 amhera00 , pw
mat polychoric = r(R)
paran , all graph iter(500) saving(scree_pnc1-s1) mat(polychoric)...
n(‘obs’) centile(95)
The output from the first two commands allows us to compare, amongst other
things, the proportion of the variance of each variable that remains unexplained
under the principal factor model. In this instance, Table A.3 below shows that
a second factor would meaningfully reduce the unexplained variance of just one
variable, which suggests that there would be little value in deriving two latent
factors from these measurements.











Note: a comparison of the unexplained variance of measures of maternal psychological distress
under 1-factor and 2-factor latent factor models.
The paran programme in Stata is explicitly designed to test the dimensional-
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ity of a set of measurements Dinno (2009). (Here we use paran with polychoric
correlations since our data are ordinal, but this has little effect on the results).
Part of the ‘paran’ output is reproduced in Table A.4, and these results can be
analysed on two levels. First, we can compare the total explained variance R2
for each of the first n components - here we see that R2 is 61% using just the
principal component, and that this only increases by 9% when a component is
included. Dual to this observation is the eigenvalue analysis of the measurement
covariance matrix. If all of the variables were statistically independent then all
eigenvalues would be identically 1. Thus unity provides a rule of thumb against
which to judge the incremental contribution of each additional component. In-
tuitively, values greater than 1 explain more than ‘one variable’s worth’ of the
total variance, and so under the classical assumption that measurement error is
uncorrelated between measures, any factor with an eigenvalue greater than unity
necessarily has incremental explanatory power beyond the greatest possible con-
tribution of measurement error. Of course, due to random chance we would not
expect variables that were ‘truly’ independent to be statistically independent, and
so the paran programme also runs the parallel analysis of Horn (1965) to obtain a
corrected retention criterion. (Although, as can be seen from Table A.4 the effect
of this is small when the number of measurements is reasonable). Thus a standard
guide to the dimensionality of a set of variables would be to retain a number of
factors equal to the number of adjusted eigenvalues that exceed unity. In this
example, Horn’s criterion unambiguously indicates that these variables measure a
single underlying factor.
Table A.4: Eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
Component Eigenvalue Horn-adj R2
1st 4.90 4.87 .61
2nd .72 .69 .08
3rd .55 .54 .07
4th .48 .48 .06
5th .43 .43 .05
Note: the largest five eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of maternal psychological distress
measurements during sweep 1: unadjusted; adjusted to take account of random chance (Horn
1965); and the proportion of the total variance explained by each additional component.
A visual approach to assess the dimensionality of a set of variables would
therefore be to plot the eigenvalues of their covariance matrix onto a graph. Figure
A.14 shows such a graph, and it also plots the counterfactual retention criteria
of (Horn 1965), which can be seen to vary slightly around unity. Cattel (1978)
famously likened this graph to a steep mountain, with a ‘scree’ that extends from
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below the main slope of the mountainside. From the start of this scree onwards,
one can infer that each additional component captures little more than the pure
measurement error of one particular measurement, which suggests that we should
retain a factor for each eigenvalue that lies strictly above the scree slope. Again,
in this instance it is unambiguous that only one component should be retained.
Figure A.14: A scree plot for sweep 1 maternal psychological distress
measurements
Now that we have established that these variables load upon a single latent
factor, we will estimate each individual’s score on that factor using Item Response
Theory (IRT). A simpler approach would be to use estimated factor loadings to
compute the underlying latent factor as a weighted linear combination of the meas-
urements, but IRT utilises the available information more efficiently. Under IRT,
each response to each measurement is described by specific difficulty and discrim-
ination parameters. The former is effectively the location of that measurement as
projected onto the latent factor scale: for example a survey response ‘I get de-
pressed every day’ would be a considerably stronger statement than the response
‘I get depressed a few times per year’, and so it would have a considerably greater
difficulty parameter. The discrimination of each response is a measure of the vari-
ance of the latent factor score amongst individuals who give that response. A
response such as ‘I am not sure whether I get depressed’ would probably have very
low discrimination and hence a very flat curve along the latent axis. A restriction
on the usefulness of IRT is that the latent factor distribution across each response
is assumed to be normal, and so IRT does not perform well with highly skewed
data. It is informative to examine the fitted IRT curves post-estimation, as a final
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confirmation of the validity of the latent construct. These plot the probability
density distribution of the latent factor scores (theta) of the individuals who selec-
ted each response. In this particular case the underlying variables are binary, so
there are only two response curves for each measurement (this is highly unusual
within the MCS data). Figure A.15 shows two representative examples of these –
both have fairly strong discrimination, but the first is considerably more ‘difficult’
than the second.
Figure A.15: Representative IRT plots for s1 maternal psychological distress items
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A more complex example
We now carry out the same analysis for the full set of possible child noncognitive
measurements from sweep 1. These are: amhapna0 – pleasant when nappy chan-
ging; amunfaa0 – pleasant when in unfamiliar places; ambrusa0 – pleasant when
washing; amfeeda0 – pleasant when feeding interrupted; aminjua0 – pleasant when
injured; ambatha0 – wary of strange person bathing; amwarya0 – wary of strange
adult after 15 minutes; ambshya0 – wary of strange child; amfreta0 – wary of
strange places; amsleea0 – fussy when sleeping; amfubsa0 – fussy when waking;
amfuasa0 – fussy when sleeping in new place; and amcrysa0 – fussy when she does
not get what she wants.
Table A.5 summarizes output from factor analyses that retain various numbers
of factors. We can see that a single factor is inadequate since it would leave un-
explained over 90% of the variance of 5 separate measurements. When compared
with the 2-factor model, a third factor substantially reduces the unexplained vari-
ance of amunfaa0, amfubsa0, and amfuasa0, and makes moderate improvements
to several other variables. The addition of a fourth factor makes more marginal
improvements, with only amhapna0 being substantially better explained. This
analysis is more equivocal than that of the previous example, but it suggests that
three, or perhaps more factors might be needed to adequately capture the inform-
ation in these data.
Table A.5: Unexplained variance of each measurement
Uniqueness
Variable 1-factor 2-factor 3-factor 4-factor
hapn .98 .85 .83 .71
unfa .84 .81 .69 .70
brus .97 .78 .73 .74
feed .97 .80 .77 .70
inju .94 .88 .87 .80
bath .88 .87 .87 .87
wary .70 .62 .62 .62
bshy .71 .63 .64 .64
fret .60 .54 .53 .53
slee .79 .79 .76 .76
fubs .91 .86 .68 .67
fuas .92 .87 .76 .76
crys .89 .79 .70 .70
Note: a comparison of the unexplained variance of measures of child noncognitive skill under
1-factor up to 4-factor latent factor models.
Table A.6 summarizes the output from the paran programme. We can see that
three variables clearly surpass Horn’s retention criterion, and that a fourth factor is
reasonably far below that threshold level. However, the first three factors together
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do not explain as much of the variance of these data as did a single principal
component in the previous example.
Table A.6: Eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
Component Eigenvalue Horn-adj R2
1st 3.07 3.02 .24
2nd 1.77 1.73 .14
3rd 1.33 1.30 .10
4th .94 .92 .07
5th .84 .82 .06
Note: the largest five eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of child noncognitive skill measure-
ments during sweep 1: unadjusted; adjusted to take account of random chance (Horn 1965); and
the proportion of the total variance explained by each additional component.
Figure A.16 shows the scree and counterfactual plots for these variables. From
this image it is clear that a three-factor structure is appropriate, although the
transition from mountainside to scree is much less distinct than in the previous
case.
Once we have identified that three factors should be retained, we need to de-
termine how the measurements should be allocated between these factors. To do
this we need to carry out a factor rotation, which amounts to selecting an inform-
ative basis for the three-dimensional vectorspace that is spanned by the first three
principal factors. Many possible criteria have been developed for factor rotation,
some of which impose orthogonality between the factors and some of which allow
those factors to become oblique (correlated). We do not require orthogonal factors
for our main analysis, but it is good practice to check that one’s allocation de-
cisions are robust to the type of rotation used. The following commands perform a
leading rotation of each type (orthogonal varimax and oblique oblimin), and their
output is summarized in Table A.7.
factor amhapna0 amunfaa0 ambrusa0 amfeeda0 aminjua0 ambatha0...





In analyzing Table A.7 our objective is to allocate each measurement to the
most appropriate factor grouping. To do this, we wish to select the largest factor
loading from each row of (either half of) the table, and ideally we would prefer for
this decision to be clear-cut. The rotation criteria used here both aim to make this
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Figure A.16: A scree plot for sweep 1 child noncognitive measurements
allocation process clear-cut: the underlying mathematical tool for each rotation
is to maximise the sum of the squares of the factor loadings. It is essential that
rotation(s) such as these be performed prior to allocating the variables between
factors, because the original factor analysis produced factors in a hierarchical man-
ner, and so the first factor to be derived is likely to have the largest loading for
the majority of the measurements regardless of the underlying factor structure.
We can see from Table A.7 that the first five variables predominantly load onto
factor 3, that the next four variables predominantly load onto factor 1, and that
the last three variables predominantly load onto factor 2. (Of course the factor
numbers are arbitrary). Only ‘amsleea0’ is difficult to assign. In this case I decided
to allocate it to factor 2 as indicated by the oblimin rotation, since the varimax
rotation is unnecessarily constrained.
Finally, once the measurements have been allocated to three separate factors,
we estimate those latent factors using item response theory, and check the item
characteristic curves as described in the previous subsection. Since the allocation
of amsleea0 was ambiguous, it will be particularly important to check its char-
acteristic curves. Figure A.17 shows the item characteristic curves for amsleea0
and amwarya0, and we can see that each response to each of these survey item
provides useable information as to the individual’s latent factor score. The curves
for amsleea0 are flatter than would be ideal, which shows that the measurement
is not perfectly aligned with the underlying factor, but each response is never-
theless well-defined and conveys a distinct signal of an individual’s latent factor
score. If the curves were substantially flatter than these we would conclude that
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Table A.7: Rotated factor loadings for a 3-factor model
Orthogonal – Varimax Oblique – Oblimin
Variable factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 1 factor 2 factor 3
hapn .03 -.12 .40 .09 -.07 .40
unfa -.33 -.00 .45 -.29 .09 .45
brus .01 -.13 .51 .08 -.06 .51
feed -.01 -.13 .47 .07 -.07 .47
inju -.13 -.12 .31 -.08 -.07 .30
bath .35 -.06 .03 .34 .03 -.01
wary .61 .05 -.02 .62 -.01 .01
bshy .60 .09 .01 .60 .03 .05
fret .68 .09 -.07 .67 .02 -.03
slee .35 .33 -.07 .30 .31 -.01
fubs .09 .55 -.05 .00 .57 .03
fuas .10 .47 -.07 .02 .48 -.00
crys .12 .51 -.18 .02 .50 -.11
Note: Factor loadings for a 3-factor model of sweep 1 child noncognitive skills, as rotated to
optimize the varimax and oblimin criteria respectively.
the measurement did not represent the underlying factor, and so we would omit
it from that factor and either test its suitability for an alternative factor, include
it independently, or drop it from the dataset. If two responses from a particular
measurement had a similar distribution across factor scores, then we would infer
that those two responses carried similar information about that latent factor, and
we would consider combining those response categories.
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